272. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State0
SUBJECT
- Comments on CIA Memorandum “Soviet Policy in the Aftermath of the Cuban Crisis” (29 November, 1962)1
We agree with many of CIAʼs observations and in particular with the description of considerations affecting the Soviet reaction to the Cuban crisis contained in the first third of the memorandum.
However, we differ with the presentation of probable Soviet policy decisions as being essentially a choice of two alternatives—a “hard” line devoted to an arms buildup or a “soft” line stressing negotiations, disarmament measures, and peaceful coexistence. We believe that Moscow will not choose between these two approaches, but will—as it has in the past—combine arms building with pursuit of its objectives through negotiation.
While the possibility of a major change in Soviet policy over a broad range of issues cannot be excluded, recent evidence suggests that Soviet [Page 595] policy on major issues will not be marked by radically new departures. The Cuban crisis appears to have added weight to the arguments on both sides of unsettled questions in Soviet policy, but without shifting the pre-existing equilibrium. It may well turn out that in the long run the principal effect of the Cuban crisis will have been to make difficult decisions even more difficult and thus add to the Soviet leadershipʼs propensity to temporize, adopt half-measures and avoid taking radical decisions.
Because we do not view Soviet policy alternatives as a single hard-soft dichotomy, we disagree with the estimate, in paragraph 17, that an assertive US policy would unquestionably impel Khrushchev toward a “hard” line. Obviously an aggressive US policy (demanding Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, for example) would have that effect, and in the extreme case might even drive the Soviet leaders to conclude that they had no alternative but to launch a pre-emptive strike. However, more moderate displays of assertiveness on the part of the West could well have the opposite effect, causing the Soviets to exert greater efforts in seeking negotiations and agreements with the West. We believe that the lesson of the passing of Soviet deadlines on Berlin and the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba is that, despite his sensitivity to appearing weak, Khrushchev will show prudence in response to a policy which is assertive without being provocative.
The reasoning in paragraph 18 likewise suffers from posing the Soviet policy alternatives as a hard-soft dichotomy. Soviet misinterpretation of our motives in offering considerable concessions is not apt to bring about a return of Soviet policy to a harder line, since the concessions might well appear to obviate a need for the harder line.
An intelligence study on Soviet post-Cuba policy is in preparation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/11-2962. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was attached to a December 12 memorandum from Executive Secretary Brubeck to Bundy, which stated that Thompson believed he would find it of interest.↩
- Document 269.↩