Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

271. Current Intelligence Weekly Review⁰

Washington, December 7, 1962.

Soviet Foreign Policy Developments

Now that the Cuban crisis, in Moscowʼs view, has been liquidated for all practical purposes, Khrushchev is turning his attention to rebuilding his bargaining power for an eventual resumption of Berlin negotiations. He told the Canadian ambassador on 28 November that a new round of talks should begin soon, and gave the impression that he meant within the next few months.

Khrushchevʼs exposition of his Berlin position to the Canadian ambassador—and to Lord Home, through Soviet Ambassador Soldatov in London, on the same day—probably reflected the general line the Soviet premier had planned to take in a personal appearance before the UN General Assembly last month if the Cuban crisis had not intervened. In these conversations, and in a letter to Prime Minister Macmillan on 28 November,¹ Khrushchev characterized Berlin and Germany as the most important questions requiring “urgent solution.”

Ambassador Soldatov tried to present Soviet Berlin proposals in the most reasonable terms, stressing the “great concessions” the USSR and East Germany had already made. He repeated the line Khrushchev had taken with British Ambassador Roberts on 12 November that a certain degree of understanding on such questions as German frontiers and respect for East German sovereignty had been reached in talks between the USSR and the US and Britain, and that the only remaining issue is the question of Western forces in West Berlin.

Soldatov recalled that Khrushchev had told the British ambassador that Moscow was ready to agree that the “old occupation flag—which in fact serves as a screen for NATO—should be replaced by the UN flag.” He proposed that the Western forces should be replaced by a “UN police unit” for a fixed period of time. This “police unit” should be composed of the Western garrisons, plus contingents from other unspecified UN members. It should not exceed the combined strength of the Western garrisons as of 1 July 1962, and would be reduced at a fixed annual rate until the “unit” is withdrawn altogether at the end of four years, leaving West Berlin under the protection of UN “obligations.”

Soldatov also renewed earlier Soviet suggestions that the UN headquarters should be transferred to West Berlin. Khrushchev also made this proposal to the Canadian ambassador, claiming that the “whole world” would then be the guarantor of West Berlinʼs freedom.

In contrast to the generally conciliatory approach to the British, Khrushchev adopted a stronger tone in his talk with the Canadian ambassador. He warned that failure to reach a Berlin agreement would create a “very dangerous situation” which could get out of hand, and he revived the threat of a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He emphasized that “Berlin is not Cuba” and that it would be “dangerous madness” to expect a further Soviet retreat.

Khrushchev warned that the USSRʼs local tactical and strategic position is vastly stronger in Berlin than it was in Cuba, and that “if people think the Cuban affair will restrain us, they donʼt know us.” He reiterated that after a separate treaty is signed, the USSR could and would cut Allied military access to West Berlin. He added, however, that he would not repeat “Stalinʼs stupid mistake” in imposing a blockade on civilian traffic.

In his talk with the Canadian ambassador, Khrushchev advanced stronger terms for a Berlin settlement than Ambassador Soldatov outlined to Lord Home.

Khrushchev said he “knew” that British Ambassador Roberts in their 12 November talk had received the impression that the USSR would accept the continued presence of Western forces in West Berlin, without the addition of Soviet troops, provided they were under UN aegis rather than the existing occupation status. He denied categorically that he had said this and insisted he would agree only to one of four variants: (1) the addition of Soviet troops to the Western garrisons; (2) replacement of the Western forces by contingents of smaller NATO and Warsaw Pact countries; (3) contingents from neutral powers; (4) a combination of (2) and (3).

In reporting this interview to his government, the Canadian ambassador commented that he could not believe that Ambassador Roberts had misunderstood Khrushchev. Although Soldatovʼs definition of Soviet terms to Lord Home went beyond Khrushchevʼs 12 November views, Soldatov did not use this occasion to “correct” Ambassador Robertsʼ alleged misunderstanding.

Khrushchev had told Roberts that the actual composition of the forces under the UN flag need not be a subject for dispute. He implied that the USSR would not object to the continued presence of Western forces provided an agreement is reached to place them under UN authority. Khrushchev at that time did not insist on adding Soviet troops to the Western garrisons and did not mention the other “variants.”

The Canadian ambassador also pointed out that Soviet officials have long tried to create or widen a wedge between Canada and the US and to encourage a neutralist attitude in Canada. Khrushchevʼs more demanding line probably was aimed at prodding Canada into urging both the US and Britain to take a more forthcoming position in the next round of Berlin negotiations.

Stress on Soviet Missile Lead

Khrushchevʼs preoccupation with strengthening his post-Cuba bargaining position was also reflected in his remarks to the Canadian ambassador and in renewed claims in the Soviet press of the USSRʼs superiority in long-range strategic weapons. Khrushchevʼs sensitivity to the damaging effect of his backdown in Cuba was evident in his statement to the ambassador that it was not a matter of much importance where Soviet rockets are located. He contended that withdrawal of strategic missiles from Cuba did not seriously affect the USSRʼs over-all capabilities and that the USSR has plenty of ICBMs and submarines which could fire Polaris-type missiles against the US.

A Red Star article on 4 December by Marshal Biryuzov, commander in chief of the Soviet rocket forces, claimed that the USSR “still confidently leads the US in the creation and development of powerful rockets.” He boasted that the Soviet Union is “perfecting” nuclear warheads, with yields of “50 to 60 and more megatons,” which can be delivered to any point on the globe, and that the USSR has “successfully solved” the problem of destroying enemy rockets in flight. Izvestia also carried an article on 1 December by Chief Marshal of Artillery Varentsov which stressed the “absolute reliability and high precision” of Soviet missiles which make them “far superior” to American missiles.

Berlin

Although Moscow apparently does not plan to intensify pressure on Berlin in the near future, it continues to seize any opportunity to keep the issue alive.

The Soviets sent notes to the Western powers on 29 November² protesting a West German action in bringing suit against an alleged Communist-front organization before the Federal Administrative Court in West Berlin.

Moscow pointed out that the Western governments agree that West Berlin is not part of the Federal Republic and charged that West German authorities were illegally interfering in West Berlin affairs. Although the notes contended that this incident underscores the “urgent necessity” of a German peace settlement, they made no mention of a separate peace treaty.

In his first public statement on Berlin and Germany since the Cuban crisis, East German leader Ulbricht also omitted all references to a peace treaty and echoed Moscowʼs line that “dangerous disputes” must be settled through compromise. In a 2 December speech to an East German party district conference, Ulbricht adopted a moderate position and placed the peace treaty question in the framework of a general East German “long-term policy.” He expressed optimism that the formation of a new government in Bonn may lead to negotiations and an eventual normalization of relations between the two German states.

Disarmament

In his talk with the Canadian ambassador, Khrushchev reiterated his earlier position that no real progress could be expected on disarmament prior to a Berlin settlement. TheUSSR, however, continued to take a hopeful view of prospects for a nuclear test ban agreement.

In his 28 November letter to Prime Minister Macmillan, Khrushchev repeated the proposal which the USSR first outlined to the US on 7 November for using unmanned, automatic seismic stations to police a nuclear test ban. Although the Soviet premier again rejected on-site inspections regardless of the number, he suggested that these seismic stations, with “elements” of international control, would provide a basis for a “mutually acceptable compromise.” He repeated the offer to install two or three “black boxes” in the USSR and listed three areas “most prone to earthquakes” as possible sites.

Apparently judging that the British position on test-ban controls is actually closer to the Soviet than to the US stand, Khrushchev probably hoped by this line to encourage Macmillan to urge the US to relax or abandon its insistence on on-site inspections in the USSR.

At Geneva, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin continued to stress the “favorable conditions” for a test ban agreement. He claimed that the “black boxes” would enhance the efficiency of existing national detection systems. Tsarapkin privately acknowledged that this scheme was designed to compensate the US for the absence of on-site inspections. However, he took the usual position in a private discussion with Ambassador Dean that “agreement in principle” on the use of the seismic stations should be reached before the technical details are discussed.

The USSR maintained its insistence on a comprehensive ban on all testing. Tsarapkin rejected a Swedish proposal for an interim agreement to stop underground tests, contending this would only legalize such tests and give the US a military advantage.

Cuba

TASS reported without comment the US announcement that the IL-28 jet light bombers are being withdrawn from Cuba. Following Mikoyanʼs talks with President Kennedy and other US leaders, Soviet propaganda demands for a formal US noninvasion pledge declined sharply. Mikoyan characterized his talks as having been useful in clarifying respective positions on Cuba, Berlin, and other questions. He said the meetings left the impression that a “possibility is in the offing for bringing the viewpoints of the two sides closer on a number of important international questions.” He agreed to further talks in New York to work out a Cuban settlement and said “we expect progress in these talks.”

In his speech to the Italian Communist Party congress on 3 December, Kozlov developed Moscowʼs apologia for Khrushchevʼs handling of the Cuban crisis. He claimed that Moscowʼs “decisive and far-sighted actions” had prevented an attack on Cuba and preserved world peace. He promised that the USSR would continue to help “revolutionary Cuba to defend its independence.”

Khrushchevʼs letter to Macmillan stated that the Cuban issue still retains “top priority” and claimed that the USSR has fulfilled its understanding with President Kennedy. He noted that the US has lifted the naval quarantine but said final settlement must include a formal US noninvasion pledge.

[Here follow sections on the Sino-Indian border dispute, Sino-Soviet dispute, and Bloc-Yugoslav relations.]

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; No Foreign Dissemination; Background Use Only. Prepared by CIAʼs Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 4-7 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.
1. Not found.
2. For text of the note to the U.S., see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 828-829.