Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

251. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, October 16, 1962, 7 p.m.

979. Policy. Khrushchev-Kohler—Part IV¹—U-2; Cuban fishing port; nuclear test-ban; US elections. Khrushchev said he had to give President his due. He was a good politician and picked good men to work for him. Khrushchev had had very good conversation with Secretary Udall, who understands his job, is very free and has a free mind.² Udall made very good impression and Khrushchev would give him job as minister if he did not already have job. Of course, Udall represents capitalism and Khrushchev is communist, but this didnʼt interfere with conversation. Khrushchev gave Udall film about Soviet electrification and asked him to show it to President. President is very clever at making speeches: he is a “demagogue of great note.” But he didnʼt mean that in a bad way.

I said he probably meant President was a good politician.

Khrushchev agreed. He said President Eisenhower was not a bad man, but politics was “not his dish.” He still owed President Eisenhower something, because Eisenhower had sent him a bull. He had wanted to send Eisenhower a sheep, but then Powers case occurred. Khrushchev had been on Eisenhower farm and wanted to repay him. He had also received bull from Admiral whose name he couldnʼt recall.

I said it was Admiral Strauss, who had just written interesting book about his years in public service.³ (Khrushchev asked Kuznetsov to get book for him.)

I said Khrushchev would not be surprised that his remarks reminded me of another point I wished to mention: incident with U-2 plane on which we had exchanged notes. I then read appropriate portion of my instructions.⁴

Khrushchev said he was very glad to hear what I had said and he believed Presidentʼs words. At the time, he had asked his military people and they said weather had been very bad, with result violation could have been unintentional. He then asked what it was that drew us to Soviet borders, saying Soviets do not violate US borders. No doubt it was just the way imperialists acted.

I said reason was the same as that which made their trawlers do the same thing.

Khrushchev said Soviets stayed in international waters and didnʼt violate US borders.

I agreed but said that this was electronic age and both sides apparently liked to listen to electronic emission.

Khrushchev asked whether we should dig ourselves deeper into ground and just sit there.

I said no, but we should use good judgment and that is what President wants to do.

Reverting to Cuba, Khrushchev said he wished to assure President that port regarding which Soviets had signed agreement was just fishing port. “I give you my word.” He said he would reveal a state secret. While he was away, they had signed agreement without consulting him. When he came back he cursed them and said they should have waited until after US elections. Japanese fish off Brazil and have a base there where fish are processed. Cubans couldnʼt build port themselves so Soviets decided to help them. But agreement had been signed at wrong time. If they had asked him, he would have said sign it November 10 or 15, because he knew it would provide fuel to Republicans who are frying President at the moment. Since Soviets value good relations with President, they could have waited to sign. (Kuznetsov changed “signed” to “published” when interpreter translated this.)

I thanked him for these remarks and said I thought President would be glad to hear them.

Khrushchev said perhaps President would think he had concluded this agreement on purpose just to “put a little salt on his wounds.”

I said I believed President was a little surprised.

Khrushchev said, “and rightfully so,” adding that when Soviets do a silly thing they recognize it as such, but Americans donʼt.

I said I thought President had been very frank about a couple of matters at Vienna.

Khrushchev said that was right. Soviets were formulating agreement right now to send ten to fifteen fishing boats to Cuba. Cubans were having trouble with sugar cane harvest. In past, US had sent Cuba dried cod fish but had now stopped shipments. So Soviets had to help Cubans get fish to feed their people. There were no electronics involved, just plain fishing boats.

I said I took good note of his statement.

Khrushchev said there were other basic problems still confronting our two countries. One was nuclear-test-ban. We are now very close on this issue. Only problem is that of underground tests. Soviets didnʼt want these to continue since they were source of arms race. USSR is on even basis with US on underground testing. We should agree on proposals of English scientists. But President wants inspection, which Soviets will never accept. This is invention of American imperialists and monopolists. Soviets had arranged underground tests which US had detected and announced next day. So national means are clearly enough to detect underground tests.

I said I was familiar with (recent exchanges) on this subject, but wished to read to Chairman what I had written down after talking to President. (I then read applicable section instructions.) I said I might just add that we on our side, President, Secretary, Foster, and all concerned, had done our best to recognize their sensibilities and to reduce possibility they might view inspection as espionage. While unmanned seismic stations had greatly improved chances of detecting explosions or what seemed like explosions, there was nothing of which we knew that would replace a certain measure of inspection to determine whether certain events in particular were tests or natural events.

Khrushchev said statement by American scientists published two days ago admitted there were means to verify this.

I said I thought this was an inaccurate statement. We had looked at all possibilities and were convinced no means existed to determine nature of event. Fact that event has occurred can be determined, but inspection is needed to establish what kind of event it was. Number of cases in which inspection would be necessary would probably be infinitesimally small, but in those cases it would be necessary. Such inspection would also be helpful to USSR, since our scientists say there must be inspection to establish nature of event. I personally had no doubt that, if USSR said it would not test, then it would not. But there must be provision for objective observers to determine whether events were natural or not, or doubts would remain in rest of world.

Khrushchev said there were various points of view on that question and that is why there is no agreement. But Soviets had found out that there are means to determine nature of event without inspection. It was situation in Congress which prevented President from moving on this subject; he canʼt convince Congress to agree and consequently holds on to argument about inspection.

I said Congress represents public opinion. Difference between us is now so small, President hopes we can come to agreement. But agreement must be ratified by Congress and Congressional opinion represents US public opinion. We had made every effort to reduce this so it would not be a problem for Soviets and President really hopes for agreement.

Khrushchev asked for my evaluation of elections.

I said nobody quite knew how they would go. Normally, administration in power tends to lose some votes in off-year elections and this is not regarded by anyone as a disaster. Latest polls I had seen showed chances about even, but should be remembered that Democrats already have big majority in Congress.

Khrushchev said that was so, but they didnʼt support President.

I said they didnʼt always, but much of his program had gone through.

Kohler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-1662. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only.
1. In Part III (telegram 978 from Moscow) Kohler reported the discussion on Cuba; see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, pp. 47–49. In Part V (telegram 981 from Moscow) Kohler summarized the discussion on Berlin; see ibid., vol. XV, pp. 359–362.
2. See Document 236.
3. Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions, New York, 1962.
4. See Document 233.