Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

233. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador-designate to the Soviet Union (Kohler)⁰

Washington, September 6, 1962.

There are four points on which the President wishes to give Ambassador Kohler personal guidance for his use in his first conversation with Chairman Khrushchev:

(1) With respect to the recent exchange of notes on the possible inadvertent violation of Soviet frontiers by a U.S. patrol plane,¹ the President has particularly asked Ambassador Kohler to reiterate that his instructions of January 1961 are firm and will be most strictly enforced. Continuing investigation indicates that safeguarding procedures in the case of this particular patrol flight were not adequate, and corrective measures are being taken.

(2) The President would like to make clear to Chairman Khrushchev that he has given personal examination to the question of possible interference by United States aircraft and ships with the freedom of movement and navigation of Soviet vessels in international waters. On hearing of Ambassador Thompsonʼs report of the Chairmanʼs expression,² the President instituted immediate inquiries, and as a result he can give definite assurance that there have not been any encounters since the Presidentʼs inauguration which have had as their motivation the hindrance of movement or navigation in international waters of Soviet vessels. In particular, we know of no instance in which any Soviet ship was ordered to stop or be fired on by a U.S. naval vessel. It is always possible that a particular military officer may act with imperfect judgment, but instructions to all such officers are clear and have been reiterated. If the Chairman knows of specific instances which raise specific questions, the President will be glad to have them investigated if pertinent data are presented.

(3) If Chairman Khrushchev should again raise the question of any possible relationship between events in Berlin and political divisions in the United States, Ambassador Kohler should inform the Chairman that the answer which Mr. Thompson made at the time represents the official opinion of this Government. Any crisis precipitated by Soviet action over Berlin, at any time, would unite public opinion in the United States. The result of such a crisis would inevitably be a worsening of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which would not be in the interest of either country. On the other hand, a settlement of this problem and the achievement of a modus vivendi which would reduce tension in Berlin would be to the interest of both governments.

(4) The President continues to regard an effective nuclear test ban as a matter of the greatest importance, and would like Ambassador Kohler to emphasize these two basic points: first, there is simply no way in which the President can bring the United States Senate to agreement on a comprehensive treaty without inspection; second, as the President sees it, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have three great common interests in a workable agreement:

(a) the fallout problem

(b) the hazard of high energy electrons contaminating outer space

(c) and, perhaps most important of all, the common interest in discouraging other powers from acquiring nuclear weapons.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Talks (Kohler). Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
1. See footnote 2, Document 236.
2. See footnote 2, Document 215.