Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

248. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, October 16, 1962, 2 p.m.

970. Policy. I met with Khrushchev for three hours in talk which ended only because at that point Khrushchev was giving luncheon for Kekkonen.¹ Agreed at end we would both say to press we discussed important international questions and questions relating to American-Soviet relations in meeting characterized by frankness and mutual understanding. Khrushchev was accompanied by Acting Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, Chief of US Section Smirnovsky and interpreter; I by Counselor Davies. Atmosphere was cordial and frank with no tirades.

Aside from amenities and generalities, talk covered harassment of Soviet vessels, Cuba, U-2 incidents, nuclear testing, Germany and Berlin and meeting between President and Khrushchev.

Khrushchev confirmed intention to come to New York latter part of November and expressed hope to meet President. I replied on lines pen-ultimate paragraph Deptel 864.² Khrushchev said we could be sure he would take no action before meeting which would make situation more difficult.

On harassment Soviet vessel, I used paragraph 2 my instructions on Sept. 6,³ adding material from second paragraph Deptel 864. Specific information re Soviet harassment USS Tanner was most timely and useful and gave Khrushchev pause. He provided me with specifics of one incident as reported in full account which follows⁴ and circumstantial description of another. This led to discussion of Cuba in which Khrushchev took general line ofTASS statement and Gromykoʼs speech.⁵ He raised particularly our efforts impede Soviet air communications with Cuba, which I confirmed, pointing out our refusal to support or help Castro regime did not constitute an attack or internal interference. He assured me on “word of honor” fishing base was purely for fishing and would remain so. Regretted that announcement had been published during electoral campaign in US which was due to his own absence from Moscow.

On U-2, I used paragraph 1 my instructions which he accepted. He also seemed to accept, although complaining of nearness of our approaches, that both sides engaged in electronic surveillance.

On nuclear testing, I used paragraph 4 of my instructions, saying they supplemented other communications between us on this subject in meantime. He professed to feel this question nearly resolved and could be finalized in meeting with President. However, despite long discussion improvement in methods of detection and strong plea on my part re essentiality of verification he refused to commit himself to any inspection.

On Berlin, Khrushchev, took the standard Soviet line. Since time was then running short, I did not comment at length, pointing out that both President and Secretary would be discussing this subject with Gromyko October 18 (Deptel 892).⁶ Neither Khrushchev nor Kuznetsov had heard this from Gromyko but Khrushchev expressed gratitude to President.

Should appreciate guidance on briefing Allies and especially Brit, French and German colleagues here, who will besiege me on subject tomorrow.⁷

Kohler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-1662. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Kohler had presented his credentials on September 27.
1. Urho K. Kekkonen, President of Finland.
2. Telegram 864, October 10, informed Kohler that his instructions did not need updating, but offered specific details on the Soviet harassment of the USS Tanner in August and September and mentioned that the President hoped to meet with Khrushchev if he came to New York for the United Nations General Assembly session. (Department of State, Central Files, 123 Kohler)
3. Document 233.
4. Not further identified.
5. For text of the TASS statement, September 11, see Pravda or Izvestia, September 16, 1962; for text of Gromykoʼs speech before the United Nations General Assembly, September 21, see U.N. doc. A/PV.1127, pp. 37-48.
6. Telegram 892, October 15, reported that Gromyko would meet with the President and Secretary of State on October 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-1562)
7. In telegram 912 to Moscow, October 16, the Department of State authorized Kohler to brief his colleagues in general terms on the subjects of U-2 flights and harassment of vessels and more fully on Cuba and Berlin. Kohler was advised to restrict his summary on nuclear testing to an expression of Khrushchevʼs optimism that some final agreement might be reached, but should not reveal that the Chairman intended to come to New York. (Ibid., 761.5411/10-1662)