Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

226. Current Intelligence Weekly Review⁰

Washington, August 24, 1962.

Soviet Foreign Policy Developments

Moscowʼs abolition of the office of the Soviet commandant in Berlin on 22 August was intended to remove the most important remaining symbol of four-power responsibility for all of the city. The timing of this move probably was dictated by renewed Western insistence that the USSR acknowledge its responsibility for East Berlin by participating in a meeting of the four commandants to discuss means of easing tensions produced by the recent incidents at the Berlin Wall. Although the decision to dissolve the commandantʼs office probably does not foreshadow an early breakoff of bilateral talks with the US, it does suggest that Khrushchev sees little chance of obtaining further Western concessions at this time and that he is now mainly concerned with strengthening the USSRʼs position for signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

The Soviet communiqué¹ announcing the abolition of the commandantʼs office suggests that this will not have any immediate practical effect on Allied military access to West Berlin. Responsibility for “control over the movement of personnel and supplies” of the Western garrisons has been transferred “temporarily” to the commander in chief of the Soviet forces in Germany. The Soviets apparently do not intend to withdraw from the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) in the near future, and thus abandon their control over military air access. The failure of the communiqué to refer specifically toBASCʼs future suggests, however, that some move to subject civilian air access to East German control may be in the offing. Moscow may also be prepared to permit the Ulbricht regime to incorporate East Berlin into East Germany and to impose new requirements on Allied military personnel entering East Berlin in an effort to force the West either to recognize GDR sovereignty over East Berlin or to forego further patrol activity there.

The dissolution of the commandantʼs office marked the culmination of a series of maneuvers over the past months to bypass the Western commandants in Berlin and to transfer all remaining four-power relations and functions from the commandants to the level of the commanders of the Soviet and Western forces in Germany. The USSR had rejected a Western proposal of 25 June for a meeting of the four commandants to discuss means of easing tensions in Berlin. The acting Soviet commandant repeated this rejection when the three Western commandants renewed the proposal on 19 August. The Soviet communiqué of 22 August charged that the Western commandants were trying to take advantage of the existence of the Soviet commandantʼs office to interfere in the internal affairs of the “sovereign and independent” GDR and its capital.

In addition to the immediate purpose of blocking Western efforts to oblige the USSR to acknowledge its responsibility for East Berlin, the Soviets probably believe that the abolition of their commandantʼs office will further erode Western rights based on the four-power status of the city and make it more difficult for the West to justify its position that the continued presence of Western forces under existing agreements is not a negotiable question.

The decision to terminate the commandantʼs office has not been accompanied thus far by any efforts to create an atmosphere of imminent crisis. The East German reaction to recent disorders in West Berlin was harsh, featuring charges that “fascist hooligans” and “young political rowdies,” enjoying the protection of Mayor Brandt, had attacked Soviet personnel and terrorized the West Berlin populace. Moscow radio warned on 20 August that tension in Berlin “has now turned into a direct threat of a serious conflict” but concluded that these disorders simply show that a peace treaty must be signed without delay. Moscow added that the USSR “is not closing the door to negotiations on the German and Berlin problems.”

Khrushchev Speech

In his speech at the 18 August Moscow ceremony honoring the two Soviet cosmonauts, Khrushchev repeated the standard formula that a separate treaty will be signed only if “we fail to meet with understanding on the part of the Western powers.”² He cited both the Laos and West New Guinea settlements as evidence that it should be possible to settle the questions of a German peace treaty, admission of both German states to the UN, and creation of a free-city status for West Berlin. On the question of Western troopsʼ remaining in West Berlin, Khrushchev apparently tried to leave an impression that his position was hardening. He said that the USSR would agree to a temporary presence of troops under UN auspices but would not accept forces of NATO members under the UN flag. He made no reference to his earlier public proposal to replace Western forces with contingents from four smallerNATO and Warsaw Pact states underUN authority.

Despite Khrushchevʼs public rejection of any NATO troops in West Berlin, the Soviets continued to hint privately at flexibility on this issue. A member of the Soviet UN delegation sounded out a US official on 17 August regarding a “UN solution” which would permit US, British, and French forces to remain in West Berlin, supplemented by contingents of Warsaw Pact and other NATO troops, all under the UN flag. Ambassador Dobrynin also mentioned this formula in his 13 August talk with Secretary Rusk.

The Soviet ambassador to Bonn took a cautious line after returning from Moscow, stating on 18 August that there is “no definite date” for signing a separate treaty and that Moscow expects further talks between Rusk and Dobrynin. [13 lines of 2-column source text not declassified]

Possible Initiative on Berlin in UN

There have been further indications that Khrushchev may come to New York next month to place the Berlin and German questions before the UN General Assembly and possibly to create an occasion for a meeting with President Kennedy. Khrushchev reportedly told the West German ambassador on 18 August that he probably would arrive in the second half of September, although his plans were not yet definite. President Kekkonen of Finland told [1 line of 2-column source text not declassified] that his visit to theUSSR has been scheduled from 10 to 17 October, after Khrushchevʼs visit to the UN.

Khrushchevʼs principal purpose in appearing before the UN probably would be to generate additional pressure on the West to be more forthcoming in negotiations for a Berlin settlement. He might envisage this as his final effort to probe for Western concessions before deciding to proceed with a separate peace treaty. Recent Soviet pronouncements suggest that Khrushchev will propose a “compromise” under which the Western “occupation regime” would be replaced by some form of UN role in guaranteeing the independence and security of West Berlin. He may also call for the admission of both German states to the UN and seek UN endorsement of the need for a German peace treaty, portraying this as the prerequisite for progress on disarmament and a general improvement in East-West relations.

The possibility cannot be excluded, however, that Khrushchev has decided to proceed toward a separate peace treaty or invoke other measures to heighten Berlin tensions and believes that taking the issue to the UN would inhibit Western reactions.

Geneva Talks

The USSR rejected on 20 August proposals for a nuclear test ban treaty which would include tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, but not underground explosions. A Soviet spokesman at Geneva said a partial test ban “will not settle the problem” of ending the nuclear armaments race “because the Americans would continue testing weapons underground.” He added that theUSSR remains “dedicated” to the eight neutralist membersʼ “compromise” memorandum as the “sole” basis for a treaty banning all tests.

In a talk with Ambassador Dean on 15 August, Soviet delegate Kuznetsov made it clear that the USSR will not relax its insistence on a test ban based exclusively on national detection systems, with no international supervision or obligatory on-site inspections. He contended that on-site inspection is an entirely political question and that the divergent views of Soviet and US scientists are irrelevant. Kuznetsov hinted, however, that prospects for agreement may improve in the next few years with changed circumstances, including perfection of detection systems which might make the US more willing to forego on-site inspection.

[Here follow sections on Soviet-Iranian relations and the Sino-Indian border.]

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; Noforn. Prepared by CIAʼs Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 1-3 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.
1. For text of the statement issued by the Soviet news agency TASS announcing abolition of the post of Soviet commandant in Berlin, August 22, see Documents on Germany,1944-1985, pp. 823-824.
2. For text of the speech, see the FBIS Daily Report, USSR amp; East Europe, pp. BB8-BB19, August 20, 1962.