225. Editorial Note
In April 1962 the United States had informed the North Atlantic Treaty Organizationʼs North Atlantic Council that it would be willing, if the allianceʼs European members wished, to “join its allies in developing a modest sized (on the order of 200 missiles) fully multilateral NATO sea-based MRBM force.” The United States did not “urge a NATOMRBM force on the Alliance, in view of already programmed US strategic forces, but we are prepared to proceed with it in view of the recognized need for greater sharing of nuclear responsibilities within the Alliance and the fact that such force would have military utility.” For text of the Department of Stateʼs instructions to the U.S. Mission to NATO, transmitted in telegram Topol 1579, April 16, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XIII, pages 380–383.
While in Geneva for the disarmament conference and the signing of the Laos Accords, Secretary of State Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had a private dinner, probably on July 22, for which no memorandum of conversation has been found. During the dinner, Rusk and Gromyko discussed nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and Gromyko apparently raised objection to aNATO multilateral nuclear force as an obstacle to any agreement on nonproliferation. See ibid., volume VII, page 494, footnote 3 thereto, and footnote 6 on page 503 for fragmentary information on the dinner.
On August 8 Rusk called in Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and, according to the memorandum of conversation, asked that he convey a “personal message” to Gromyko on “non-diffusion” of nuclear weapons: “Your Government apparently wishes to consider multilateral arrangements with respect to nuclear weapons as a part of the central problem of the multiplication of national nuclear forces. I sincerely believe that this point of view rests upon a misunderstanding and that it stands in the way of our acting together on a common interest. From our point of view, we consider the discussion of multilateral arrangements in the West as, among other things, a means for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons on a national basis.” Rusk stated further that he “had the impression from our conversation in Geneva that it might be possible for us to concentrate on the single issue of national nuclear capability.” Were it “clear on both sides that this is the object and that we are not now trying to deal with the issue of possible multilateral arrangements, it seems to me that we might be able to reach an agreement with respect to the non-transfer of weapons, either directly or indirectly, to additional national forces.” Dobrynin, commenting on “the point in the Secretaryʼs message concerning multilateral arrangements,” said “he thought this was all right—it is not part of the central problem. He asked about Germany, however. The Soviets had three points, not to give Germany [Page 479] atomic weapons directly, indirectly, or through multilateral arrangements.” For text, see ibid., pages 541–547.
On August 23 Dobrynin brought in Gromykoʼs reply to Rusk. According to the memorandum of conversation, “the message from the Foreign Minister noted that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. positions now appear to be quite close as regards the non-transfer problem. It is proposed that an international undertaking be sought involving three points: (1) an obligation on the part of the nuclear powers not to hand over to non-nuclear states nuclear weapons or the technical information necessary for their production; (2) an obligation on the part of non-nuclear states not to produce and not to acquire from other states nuclear weapons, and also not to receive technical information necessary for their production; (3) there should also be excluded the transfer through military alliances to those states which do not possess them i.e., the transfer of such weapons in an indirect manner, irrespective of whether or not the national armed forces of these states are component parts of the armed forces of any military alliance.” Rusk commented that, “as he understood the presentation, the position outlined by Foreign Minister Gromyko would appear to be a constructive and positive step forward.” Rusk continued, “we cannot define now the hypothetical formula [for the multilateral nuclear force] upon which the alliance on our side may agree; however, it should be clear that we would not use an alliance arrangement for the purpose of passing nuclear weapons indirectly to a non-nuclear power.” For text, see ibid., pages 556–557.