216. Editorial Note
At a July 26, 1962, meeting of the Committee of Principals, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Foster stated that recent findings held “some hope for modification of the present U.S. position on a nuclear test ban.” He continued, “the fundamental question is whether, in contrast to continued ‘leapfrogging’ of tests, the national interest is best served by taking advantage of technical improvements in order to propose a treaty that might be more acceptable to the Soviet Union.” Secretary of Defense McNamara “stated that he believed that if we could be certain that the Soviet Union would stop testing, we should do so. Dr. Seaborg had no reservations about this.” Secretary of State Rusk proposed as an alternative that the United States say to the Soviets that “we would like to work on a comprehensive treaty but that we are [Page 469] aware of the Soviet position on on-site inspection,” then tell them that, “for our own part, we want to make a start somewhere, so we propose starting with an atmospheric treaty and making it comprehensive as soon as possible.” For text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, pages 499–507.
On August 1 the President met with a small group of advisers to discuss the nuclear test ban issue. According to a memorandum prepared by Director of Central Intelligence McCone, “McCloy and Lovett strongly urged the President not to engage in detailed negotiations until and unless the Soviets change their position on zero on-site inspections and indicated that there existed a climate which would permit negotiation. I strongly supported this recommendation. It was agreed that we should follow this course.” At a larger advisory meeting that followed the same day, the earlier decision was ratified but, according to McConeʼs memorandum, “a difference arose between Arthur Dean and Secretary Rusk, the latter favoring immediate acceptance of an atmospheric ban but Dean maintaining that this should be a holding position and we should exhaust the possibilities of a comprehensive ban before proceeding with a discussion of an atmospheric ban.” For text, see ibid., pages 531–533.
In telegram Todis 469, August 3, the Department of State transmitted its instructions to the U.S. delegation to the disarmament conference in Geneva: “The United States should declare its willingness to discuss a comprehensive test ban treaty involving internationally-supervised national control posts, including some on Soviet soil and involving a possible reduction in the number of on-site inspections.” However, the delegation was to avoid negotiating the precise arrangements for international supervision until the Soviet Union accepted the principle of on-site inspections. “If the Soviet Union continues to indicate unwillingness to accept obligatory on-site inspections on Soviet soil, the United States should be ready to discuss affirmatively an atmospheric-outer space-underwater test ban treaty, possibly around the latter part of August, taking the position that the Soviet refusal to agree to on-site inspection makes it necessary to go to this type of treaty.” For text, see ibid., pages 534–535.