185. Memorandum of Conversation0
PRIME MINISTER MACMILLANʼS VISIT TO WASHINGTON, APRIL 27-29
SUBJECT
- Possibility of a Summit Meeting
PARTICIPANTS
- US
- The President
- The Secretary
- Under Secretary Ball
- Ambassador Bruce
- Mr. McGeorge Bundy, White House
- Mr. Pierre Salinger, White House
- Mr. William R. Tyler, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
- Mr. William C. Burdett, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
- Mr. Joseph Sweeney, BNA
- British
- Prime Minister Macmillan
- Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet
- Ambassador Ormsby Gore
- Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office
- Mr. Harold Evans, Public Relations Adviser
- Mr. M.A.M. Robb, Information Minister, British Embassy
- Mr. John Thompson, First Secretary, British Embassy
- Mr. Philip de Zulueta, Private Secretary to Prime Minister
The President said the Prime Minister and he had discussed the possibility of a summit. The Prime Minister commented that a summit hangs on what had just been said about nuclear testing and disarmament. He was doubtful of the value of having a summit if nothing happens. It would be a propaganda exercise. All the pressures would be on us because of our public. We had been thinking about a summit on Berlin, but this raised the problem too high. However, we should not lose contact with this “strange character”.
The President explained that both the Prime Minister and he were in agreement that there is really no sense in a summit unless there could be agreement in some important area, perhaps Berlin or nuclear testing. We would be at a disadvantage. There were three of us and only one of them. [Page 412] There was some advantage in a bilateral meeting in the summer or fall. We should keep this possibility open. A summit would be warranted either in case of a crisis or if an agreement was in prospect. A bilateral meeting was an alternative. The Prime Minister and he were in agreement that it was not right to have a bilateral meeting now.
The Prime Minister suggested that nuclear testing might be the subject of a summit meeting since agreement would never be worked out at the Geneva conferences, complicated by the presence of neutrals. He had the feeling that the only way to do a deal is directly with Khrushchev. The Secretary recalled that in his recent speech on Berlin,1 Gromyko had indicated the Russians might be leading to a meeting of heads of government. We ourselves had played this theme a bit. The Prime Minister said that we must think of the communiqué that would come out at the end of a summit meeting.
At one point during the meeting the Prime Minister said Khrushchev seemed to be in a curious mood. He was talking now at length to anyone who went to see him. If he took a position as he did on Laos at Vienna, it would influence the whole Russian bureaucracy. The whole thing changes at a word from Khrushchev. The thing is to get to him. If we made up our minds to make another effort on nuclear testing we should consider seeing him. It is no good trying to persuade junior people. If the word comes from Khrushchev they will have to work the problem out. When he gives an order he carries the entire structure with him. The Prime Minister agreed on the dangers of a meeting of three or four of us. An opportunity could be created to see Khrushchev at Geneva or the U.N.
Reverting at another point to the question of a summit, the President said that he did not know of any labor agreement that had come about except as the result of an offer at the last minute to the top level. An agreement could result from a summit or maybe it could be reached at a bilateral meeting. The Prime Minister suggested that such a meeting would provide an opportunity for talks also about other matters in addition to the ostensible subject of the meeting. The President again mentioned the awkwardness of a meeting with three on our side and one on theirs. Perhaps it would be better for the Prime Minister, De Gaulle or himself to see Khrushchev bilaterally.