184. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- United States Travel Restrictions
We have been reviewing our restrictions on the travel of Soviet citizens in this country in the hope of finding a new approach which would strengthen our political and propaganda posture without damage to our essential security needs.
Our restrictions were imposed in 1952 as a means of retaliating against long-standing restrictions on the travel of American citizens in the USSR. Originally they involved prior notification of intent to travel and were applied only to Soviet officials. They were extended in 1955 to all Soviet citizens other than those who are members of the United Nations Secretariat and closed zones, modeled on those in existence in the USSR, were also established. This followed adoption by the National Security Council of NSC 5427 which provided that “restrictions should be placed upon diplomatic and official representatives of Soviet bloc countries in the United States on the basis of strict reciprocity for restrictions placed upon United States representatives in each Soviet bloc country.”1
In 1957 the United States proposed to the Soviet Government that closed zones be abolished on a basis of reciprocity. Subsequently, we have repeated that proposal several times and have also suggested partial elimination, again on a reciprocal basis. The Soviet Government has never replied officially to these proposals.
Our review has indicated that our previous efforts to use our travel restrictions as a bargaining lever with which to exert pressure for a lessening of Soviet restrictions have become increasingly ineffectual in terms [Page 409] of the exchange program. The travel restrictions were adopted several years before the first exchange agreement was signed in 1958. Despite our best efforts, our rationale for the restrictions has been either largely misunderstood or not appreciated by that segment of the American public concerned with exchanges. Furthermore, we have not been able to extract a significant number of exceptions from the Soviets to their own closed area regulations. Actually, during the course of the past year or so, the Soviets have become increasingly adamant regarding exceptions. We have tried ourselves to adopt a stricter attitude, but we find ourselves on a number of occasions making exceptions in order to achieve our over-all goals of maximum usefulness for each exchange. In so doing, however, we vitiate the basis of our closed area policy which is retaliation for Soviet restrictions in the hope that the Soviet authorities might be induced at least to grant reciprocal exceptions or possibly to liberalize or even eventually abolish their restrictions.
We have come to the conclusion that the travel restrictions no longer serve our interests so far as Soviet visitors are concerned. We are, therefore, recommending the abolition of the travel restrictions for exchange visitors and tourists. We would retain adequate controls on Soviet travel in this country by continuing present arrangements among the Departments concerned. In this way itineraries of Soviet exchange visitors and tourists would be coordinated and approved in advance as before. In the case of long-term Soviet visitors, we would keep the advance notification requirement to enable the Departments of State and Justice to remain aware of the movements of such individuals. We have consulted with the Departments of Defense and Justice and with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.2 They have concurred in our recommendation on the basis of the Departmentʼs assessment that the over-all effect would be to our net advantage and that the control arrangements mentioned above be continued. We propose to retain the closed area system for resident Soviet officials for internal security reasons and in order to maintain our bargaining position for our own officials in theUSSR. We also feel that the closed area system should continue to apply to Soviet correspondents accredited in the United States. In view of the stringent restrictions and often provocative treatment to which our correspondents in the Soviet Union are subject, we do not feel we can justify waiving [Page 410] restrictions on Soviet correspondents at this time. Our feeling is re-enforced by the highly distorted reporting engaged in by Soviet correspondents in this country. If we are able to obtain greater opportunities for dissemination of American views in the USSR and if the lot of our correspondents improves, we might wish to reconsider this point.
We consider that removal of the travel restrictions on Soviet visitors would have significant and positive advantages for us, primarily with that segment of the American public concerned with exchanges. Such a move would in all probability result in still greater support of the exchanges program by American scientists and by American universities. At the same time, we could without difficulty assure the public that adequate security controls are being retained. With regard to the Soviet Government, we would present this change as a modest step in improving relations and as in keeping with the hopes expressed at the time of the signing of the recently concluded exchanges agreement regarding broadening of channels of communication between peoples in both countries. We would invite the Soviet Government to respond to our initiative, although the likelihood of a positive response is not great. Our approach would be sufficiently restrained so that it would not be regarded by the Soviets as another evidence of what they consider to be espionage mania or another propaganda gimmick against them.
If you concur in our recommendation to abolish the travel restrictions for Soviet exchange visitors and tourists, the Department will plan to send a note to the Soviet Embassy within the next month or two. The exact timing would depend on the then current international situation. Given the present status of our discussions with the Soviets on a number of international issues, we do not believe in the immediate abolition of these restrictions. Since our primary motivation in doing away with the restrictions is a domestic one, we would not favor, however, indefinitely postponing these changes. In any event, I would plan to advise you before a note is sent.3
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.↩
- Regarding NSC 5427, July 15, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 1238–1246.↩
- Regarding the letters to the Department of Defense and Justice and the CIA, June 9, 1961, see footnote 6, Document 75. In replies dated June 16 and 28, 1961, the CIA and Department of Defense raised some concerns about lifting the restrictions, but stated that it was basically a matter for the Department of State to determine. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.6111/6-1661 and 6-2861) Apparently no reply was received from the Department of Justice, because on February 15, 1962. Rusk again wrote to the Attorney General about lifting the travel restrictions and specifically referred to his June 9 letter. (Ibid., 601.6111/2-2062) In reply to this letter, on March 27 Attorney General Kennedy agreed to lift the restrictions if Rusk determined that it would be to the net advantage of the United States. (Ibid., 511.613/3-2762)↩
- On May 2 Bundy informed Rusk that the President had approved the lifting of travel restrictions on Soviet visitors and tourists. (Rusk memorandum, May 15; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR) On May 15 Rusk sent the President a draft text of a note informing the Soviet Ambassador of the changes. (Ibid.) On June 29 the White House approved the note, which was subsequently delivered on July 6. (Kohler memorandum to Rusk, June 29; Department of State, Central Files, 601.6111/6-2961) For text of the note, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 740-741. A memorandum of Ruskʼs conversation with Dobrynin when he presented the note is in Department of State, Central Files, 511.613/7-662.↩