172. Editorial Note
National Intelligence Estimate 85-62, “The Situation and Prospects in Cuba,” issued on March 21, 1962, included the intelligence communityʼs view that Cuban military capabilities were “essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with strategic weapon systems or with air and naval capabilities suitable for major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate [“over the next year or so”]. This attitude will not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors, and service personnel, the provision of such defensive weapons and equipment as surface-to-air missiles and radars, and such improvement of Cuban naval and air facilities as would enable them to service Soviet units.” For text of the estimateʼs summary and conclusions, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume X, pages 772–776.
Three weeks later, on April 10, the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, Sherman Kent, forwarded to Director of Central Intelligence McCone an estimate on “Probable Reactions to a US Military Intervention in Cuba.” Among other things, the estimate expressed the view that the “USSR would have no means to intervene effectively in Cuba with its own forces, and almost certainly would not resort to general war for the sake of the Castro regime. However, the USSR would exert every means of political and psychological pressure at its disposal to procure a universal condemnation of US aggression against Cuba, and, if possible, a restoration of the status quo ante. To this end, it might make threatening references to Soviet missile power. Communist China and other Bloc states would support these Soviet efforts. In the circumstances, there would probably be a first-class war scare, with panic among the neutralists and a high state of alarm in NATO.” For text, see ibid., pages 783–785.