171. Editorial Note
In Geneva on March 19, 1962, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko handed Secretary of State Rusk a paper containing nine principles for negotiations on Berlin that the former had drafted in response to their discussion on March 12 (see Document 169). Rusk reported on the meeting in telegram Secto 65 to the Department of State, March 19, noting that “although some formulations are new and relate to our previous discussions, paper as whole is essentially restatement in guise of principles of basic Soviet position on Germany and Berlin it has developed over past three and one-half years.” For text of telegram Secto 65, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XV, pages 48–50.
The following day Gromyko argued in a discussion with Rusk, as recorded in the memorandum of conversation, that a solution to the Berlin issue “would provide for: (1) a German peace treaty—perhaps without Western participation, which would be regrettable; (2) a change in the abnormal situation in West Berlin, a situation which had ensued from Germanyʼs surrender; and (3) a change in the situation with regard to respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, which was now quite intolerable.” Rusk later in the discussion explained the “vital interests” of the United States: “(1) our presence in West Berlin; (2) freedom of access as it had been understood for many years; and (3) freedom of West Berlin to choose its own way of life.” For text, see ibid., 51–60.
In further conversation on March 22, Rusk proposed that the two sides consider acknowledging that they were unlikely to reach agreement on Berlin soon and “see how disagreement should be handled.” Gromyko did not address the proposal directly, rather emphasizing continuing Soviet patience in the effort to reach an “understanding.” Yet another discussion on March 26 led to no progress. For text of the memoranda of conversation, see ibid., pages 61–69 and 76–89. In telegram Secto [Page 394] 113 to the Department of State, March 26, reporting his “summary reactions” to his talks with Gromyko in Geneva, Rusk stated that the “Soviets have not changed their proposals in any significant way since Vienna summit.” Gromyko had nevertheless “carefully avoided threat and bluster on the one hand and any temptation to declare an impasse on the other.” The Soviets “clearly left the impression that they wished to continue talks on a bilateral basis and are flexible as to exact means.” For text, see ibid., pages 91–92.