Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

156. Current Intelligence Weekly Review⁰

Washington, February 16, 1962.

Soviet Foreign Policy Developments

Moscow last week made a number of diverse moves which Khrushchev probably calculates will draw the West into top-level contacts later in the year. His probable aim is to use a summit conference as the occasion for new Soviet disarmament proposals and to consider the diplomatic impasse on Berlin.

The USSR publicized the release of Francis Powers on 10 February as an effort to improve US-Soviet relations. This was followed on 11 February by Khrushchevʼs relatively moderate letter¹ proposing that the heads of government—rather than the foreign ministers, as the West had suggested—meet at Geneva prior to the 18-nation disarmament conference opening on 14 March. Khrushchev retained a free hand to accept the Western proposals and press for a summit later.

At the same time, the USSR resumed pressure on the Western position in Berlin by attempting to impose temporary conditions on the use of the air corridors. This maneuver, together with Gromykoʼs adamant stand in the Moscow talks with Ambassador Thompson, suggests that Khrushchev is seeking to impress on the Western Powers that Berlin remains a potentially dangerous situation.

Khrushchevʼs Proposals

Khrushchevʼs letter of 11 February was nonpolemical and in sharp contrast to vitriolic Soviet propaganda that US policy is hypocritical. Khrushchev noted that US and Soviet “reasoning, on the whole, runs in the same direction,” and he expressed hope that the West would “rightly understand the motives which have prompted” the Soviet proposal. He went to some lengths to disclaim that his proposal was a mere propaganda gesture by admitting that participation by the heads of government was “unusual” and by claiming that he was actually drafting his proposal when the letters from President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan² were received. Moreover, he acknowledged that the heads of government could not be expected to complete a final treaty, but that their presence would provide the committee with a “powerful and correct start” and open the way for a “breakthrough in international relations.”

Khrushchevʼs immediate and tactical aim in calling for an 18-nation summit was to regain the initiative by countering the US-UK proposals. He emphasized that “direct contacts between national leaders” had become an “established international practice,” and he accepted the Presidentʼs proposals for a “broader exchange of opinions” between the heads of government. Moreover, he did not rule out acceptance of the Western proposal for a foreign ministersʼ conference to precede the Geneva meeting, stating: “It goes without saying that the foreign ministers must also take part … both with the heads of government and in the subsequent period … .”

Khrushchev specifically stated that the heads-of-government meeting he proposed should not be considered a substitute for a summit meeting “as it is generally understood.” This may foreshadow an effort to arrange a four-power summit at a later date with an agenda broader than disarmament, or to use an 18-nation heads-of-government meeting as the forum for establishing contacts with the US on other international issues, particularly Berlin.

While the release of Powers and the Khrushchev letter point toward a Soviet effort at establishing a more favorable climate for resuming top-level contacts, Khrushchev has been careful not to over-commit the USSR to a general relaxation of tensions. His letter was followed by an authoritative Pravda “Observer” article on 13 February which sharply attacked the West for proposing a foreign ministersʼ conference while preparing for a series of nuclear tests. Khrushchevʼs letter, moreover, left open the possibility that he might go to Geneva regardless of the Western position. He may view the Geneva conference as an ideal forum to project an image of greater interest in disarmament than the West, and may believe that the prospect of attendance by some neutral leaders would force a reversal by the West.

The presence of other leaders might appeal to Khrushchev if he plans to unveil some new disarmament package. His letter avoided all the substantive points raised by the President and Prime Minister Macmillan. This failure to reply, particularly on the important question of dividing disarmament into three separate categories for immediate consideration, suggests that he may initiate further correspondence on the substantive issues. Soviet diplomats in London have hinted that Moscow is considering new comprehensive disarmament proposals which would include the standard plan for complete and general disarmament plus some immediate steps in the field of European security and partial disarmament.

In an 8 February conversation with Ambassador Thompson in Moscow, the new Soviet ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, said that he was “not clear” concerning what the West had in mind with respect to the third disarmament category and inquired if this referred to such steps as measures “against surprise attack.” He emphasized the importance of making a start “somewhere” on the question of disarmament and expressed the belief that atomic testing would be a “good field in which to begin.” Dobrynin said that as a “layman” he could not understand why the US could not now agree to a ban on atmospheric testing without inspection and control, as it had “surely been demonstrated” that the US had the capacity of detecting atmospheric tests without control stations in the Soviet Union.

Dobryninʼs remarks suggest that theUSSR expects the test question will be raised at the 18-nation talks, despite the formal Soviet rejection of the US-UK proposal to merge the test ban question with the talks on general and complete disarmament. The USSR may be considering putting forth a formal proposal which would be restricted to a ban on atmospheric tests in line with the Kennedy-Macmillan proposal of 3 September. Soviet leaders would probably calculate that such a proposal could embarrass the West and draw considerable support from the nonaligned powers represented at Geneva.

Since the US-UK announcement of tentative plans for US atmospheric tests at Christmas Island and British underground testing in Nevada, Moscow has initiated a propaganda campaign charging that the tests are a “certainty” and accusing the West of having broken off the test ban talks to continue with its test program. A Pravda article said that the new series of Western tests “is clearly linked” with plans for making NATO a fourth nuclear power. Izvestia warned that if the West conducts nuclear tests, “the Soviet Union will have to resume testing.”

Berlin and Germany

Soviet moves to demonstrate a willingness to negotiate with the West have not been accompanied by any effort at compromise in the Thompson-Gromyko talks. While Gromyko has simply reiterated previous positions, he has not yet indicated that he is ready to break off the dialogue. The Soviet attempts this week to place temporary restrictions on Western use of the Berlin air corridors, together with the deliberate stalling in the Thompson-Gromyko talks, may be aimed at inducing the Western powers either to move directly into formal negotiations or to make concessions.

By resorting to unilateral moves in the sensitive area of access, the Soviet leaders may be attempting to demonstrate that Khrushchevʼs withdrawal of a deadline for a separate treaty should not be interpreted as an indication that Moscow will be content with the status quo in Berlin. This attitude was emphasized in a long article in a special edition of Izvestia on 11 February which accused the West of avoiding solutions of major international issues and of playing for time, particularly on the Berlin question.

Soviet interference with air access to Berlin began on 7 February when the Soviet controller at the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) announced that Soviet military transports would “engage” the southern air corridor from Frankfurt to Berlin at altitudes up to 7,000 feet for three and a half hours on 8 February. While it is unusual but not unprecedented for Soviet planes to conduct maneuvers in the corridors, the prior announcement and attempt to “reserve” the bulk of the corridor airspace were clearly designed to infringe on unrestricted Western access. The Soviet controller refused to file flight plans for Soviet aircraft, as is customary, and refused to guarantee flight safety for Western aircraft flying within the altitudes “engaged” by the Soviets.

The procedure was repeated for the northern and central corridors on 9 and 12 February, although on the latter date the Soviets canceled their restrictions. However, restrictions were reinstituted for 14 February, and for 15 February for the southern corridor. For the first time, the Soviets warned that if Western aircraft flew at altitudes planned for Soviet planes, this would be considered as “trespassing with resultant consequences.”

This warning was followed by a “strong protest” against alleged Western violations of established procedures and a demand that Allied flights cease unless given specific Soviet approval. These moves, together with the first deliberate harassment of incoming flights on 14 February and again on 15 February, indicated that the Soviets were carefully but deliberately raising the level of tensions. The further attempts to impose conditions on Western flights on the grounds that the Allies must have Soviet approval may have been intended as an implicit warning that the Soviets would withdraw from the four-power air safety center.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Secret; No Further Dissemination. Prepared by CIAʼs Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 5-7 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.
1. For text, dated February 10, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VI, pp. 87–90.
2. Dated February 7; for text, see ibid., pp. 85–87.