Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

118. Current Intelligence Weekly Review⁰

Washington, September 14, 1961.

East-West Relations

Khrushchev has used a variety of public statements in an effort to create an impression that the USSR is favorably disposed toward the appeal of the Belgrade conference for direct US-Soviet negotiations over Berlin. He has implied, however, that the initiative for making a definite proposal rests with the US and depends on US willingness to demonstrate a desire for “businesslike negotiations.” Khrushchevʼs development of a more conciliatory line over the past week suggests that he considers the neutralistsʼ initiative an opportunity to increase world pressure on the West for early four-power negotiations.

In a wide-ranging interview with C. L. Sulzberger of The New York Times,¹ the Soviet Premier implied that, while he is willing to meet with President Kennedy, he doubted that such a meeting would be useful. After Nehru and Nkrumah presented the Belgrade conference appeal for direct talks, Khrushchev amplified his remarks to Sulzberger in a special statement which placed more emphasis on the possibility of a meeting with the President. According to Sulzberger, Khrushchev expressed his satisfaction with Sulzbergerʼs dispatch, which gave prominence to Khrushchevʼs willingness to hold a second meeting with the President. Moscow published Sulzbergerʼs report verbatim on 10 September.

Khrushchevʼs attempt to appear responsive to the appeal for negotiations with the US was also reflected in his speech of 8 September at an Indian-Soviet friendship meeting in honor of Nehru.² Khrushchev took the line that there was increasing talk in the West that negotiations were required and that President Kennedy had made his remarks of 30 August³ in this spirit. Khrushchev “welcomed” the Presidentʼs statements, but indicated that the USSR still had doubts over US intentions to engage in “serious” negotiations.

In a private conversation with West German Ambassador Kroll, Khrushchev complained of the “diplomatic fuss” over negotiation on Berlin and asked why “we could not simply sit down and discuss the situation.” In reply to the ambassadorʼs remark on the danger of incidents in the Berlin situation, Khrushchev said he was well aware of this and had given strict instructions to Soviet forces in Germany to take every precaution to avoid incidents. Khrushchev also indicated to the ambassador that in his forthcoming speech at Stalingrad, he would be careful not to offend anyone.

Khrushchevʼs Stalingrad speech on 10 September⁴ portrayed negotiations as increasingly likely. The Soviet leader went to some lengths to attribute to each of the Western leaders a willingness to begin discussions on Germany and Berlin, and drew the conclusion that “glimpses of hope now have appeared” for “peaceful talks.” Soviet propaganda promptly claimed that this speech met with a favorable reception in the West and has been correctly interpreted.

At the conclusion of Nehruʼs visit on 11 September, the joint communiqué contained a statement on Khrushchevʼs agreement to “enter into negotiations with the Western powers … .”⁵

Berlin

Despite Khrushchevʼs asserted readiness for negotiations, he has adhered to the maximum position that negotiations should be directed toward a German treaty and the creation of a free city in West Berlin. He has also continued to assert that the question of access to Berlin could be resolved. He told Sulzberger that any peace treaty would “legalize” free access to West Berlin and that the “substance” would remain unchanged. He included the standard qualification, however, that in the absence of Western agreement to a treaty with both Germanys, communications to and from Berlin would require agreement with East Germany. The Soviet-Indian communiqué also stated that Khrushchev had informed Nehru of Soviet proposals for “international guarantees” of a free city and for “safeguarding the freedom of communications” between West Berlin and the outside world.

This reference may reflect a reported acceptance by Khrushchev of Nehruʼs proposal that theUSSR, as part of a separate treaty with East Germany, guarantee East Germanyʼs execution of the treatyʼs provisions ensuring free access. Thus far, Khrushchev has refrained from offering such a guarantee of East Germanyʼs performance after a separate treaty. This modification of his position is probably intended to encourage Nehru to continue his efforts.

Nehru apparently intended his proposal to serve as a basis for US-Soviet talks. It underscores his repeated references to the need for solving the access question first, which he feels is the key to a larger East-West accommodation on Germany. Khrushchevʼs acceptance presumably accounted for the Indian leaderʼs cautious optimism in discussing prospects for a negotiated settlement with reporters on his return to New Delhi. Nehru will presumably raise this proposal during his visit to Washington in early November, if not through diplomatic channels before then.

Khrushchev probably feels that Western acceptance of Nehruʼs plan as the basis for a negotiation would open up a wide field for maneuvering to gain de facto Western acceptance of a separate peace treaty and a change in the legal basis for Western access. Khrushchev may also feel that an offer to act as a guarantor of East German actions may satisfy Western requirements by maintaining an outward appearance of continued Soviet responsibility.

Statements by bloc leaders and officials continued to stress the inevitability of a peace treaty before the end of the year. Discrepancies over the timing of a peace conference, however, suggest that no final decision has been made in Moscow. News accounts quoted Polish party secretary Gomulka as stating the treaty would be signed in December, but the Rumanian minister in Washington told US officials that a treaty would be concluded in November. Khrushchev is reported by the Indian press to have sounded out Nehru on the possibility of attending a German peace conference in November. Moscow also is reported by Western diplomats to have begun pressure on Helsinki to join bloc countries in signing a treaty with East Germany. Statements by East German leaders suggest that following the elections in both East and West Germany the bloc may publish a revised draft of a treaty, together with a declaration on a free city for West Berlin.

Khrushchevʼs remarks to Sulzberger and a statement by a Soviet official at the UN indicate that the USSR still views UN consideration of the Berlin question as a last resort, Khrushchev told Sulzberger that the UN could take up the issue if the four powers failed to agree; the Soviet representative said the question would not come before the UN if the West wished to settle it through negotiations.

Military Measures

Moscow has continued to reinforce its diplomatic position by announcements of military measures designed to impress world opinion with Soviet resoluteness over Berlin. On 10 September Moscow published the communiqué of the third meeting of the Warsaw Pact this year.⁶ The ministers of defense and military chiefs met in Warsaw on 8 and 9 September to discuss specific questions “concerning enhancement of military preparedness of the troops belonging to the joint forces” of pact states. The communiqué stated that the chiefs of the general staffs have been instructed to work out “practical measures to strengthen further the defenses” of the pact members. This provides a broad cover for further bloc moves to counter Western military measures, which the Soviet press is carefully reporting. It is believed that some of the satellites have followed the Soviet lead in retaining conscripts and have called up limited numbers of reservists. Additional steps might include the holding of large-scale exercises and even the movement of additional Soviet troops into Eastern Europe. In a speech on 10 September, Gomulka alluded to continued movement of troop convoys which would be observed by the populace.

The pact meeting coincided with an announcement by Moscow that, between 13 September and 15 October, tests would be held in the Pacific of “more powerful and improved versions of multistage carrier rockets of space vehicles.”

Nuclear Tests

Khrushchev has also used his statements justifying the resumption of testing and rejecting the US-British proposal for a ban on atmospheric tests to improve his political position in the Berlin crisis. He told Sulzberger that the development of several “super powerful bombs” would force the “aggressors to think twice” and that theUSSR was obliged to assure itself of “no lesser capability” than the US, Britain, and France. He claimed that “we shall continue the tests we have started because we cannot ignore the danger that now is being created by the Western countries.” His reference to testing a 100-megaton device, however, was amended to read only the “explosive device” for such a weapon.

In his formal rejection on 9 September⁷ of the proposal by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, Khrushchev adopted the same general line and defended resumption of testing as being forced on the Soviet Union in order to “counter the threats of aggression.” He labeled the US-UK proposal as a propaganda maneuver to permit the US to resume underground tests and allow France to continue its program and thereby obtain a “unilateral advantage” over the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government, Khrushchev stated, “cannot and will not make such a deal.” He added that nuclear tests can be ended “everywhere and forever only on the basis of complete and general disarmament.” But he also claimed that the US-Soviet bilateral talks on disarmament show that the US “does not even want to approach general and complete disarmament.”

The Soviet delegate at the Geneva nuclear talks read this statement into the record at the 340th meeting on 9 September and then pressed for a communiqué stating that the conference had suspended its work, with no reference to a US-UK proposal to state that the talks had recessed until after the UN General Assembly debate. Although the Soviet delegate agreed to a final statement that the conference would be recessed, he clearly implied in the discussion that any further meetings would require agreement on the governmental level and that the USSR would resume talks on a test ban only within the context of general disarmament.

Nehruʼs Visit

The Indo-Soviet communiqué was a restatement of Soviet and Indian views with prime emphasis on the former. The leaders agreed on the “fact” of two Germanys, on the need for “complete and general disarmament under strict and effective international controls,” and on support for anti-French and anti-Portuguese liberation movements in Algeria, Angola, and Goa. On other issues, however, Nehru merely “noted” the Soviet position as “explained” by Khrushchev, expressed no response at all, or was obliquely critical, as on the question of nuclear testing.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Secret; Noforn. Prepared by CIAʼs Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 1-4 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.
1. For Sulzbergerʼs account of his interview with Khrushchev, see The Last of the Giants (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 788-803.
2. For text, see Pravda, September 9. For the condensed text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XIII, No. 36, October 4, 1961, pp. 7-9.
3. For text of Kennedyʼs remarks at his news conference on August 30, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 572-580.
4. For text, see Pravda, September 11, and Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XIII, No. 37, October 11, 1961, pp. 3-6.
5. For text, see ibid., pp. 7-8.
6. For reports of the meeting, see Pravda, September 10, 1961, and Izvestia, September 12, 1961.
7. For text of Khrushchevʼs statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 384-391.