103. Editorial Note
In a report transmitted to President Kennedy on June 28, 1961, Special Consultant Dean Acheson contended that the issue over Berlin was far more than an issue over that city. “It has become an issue of resolution between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the outcome of which will go far to determine the confidence of Europe—indeed, of the whole world—in the United States.” Until the Russians were shown that what they want to do was not possible, Acheson stated, “no negotiation can accomplish more than to cover with face-saving devices submission to Soviet demands.” It was necessary to devise “a course of conduct which will change the present apparent Russian disbelief that the United States would go to nuclear war over Berlin, rather than submit.” For text of Achesonʼs report, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XIV, pages 138–159.
In National Security Action Memorandum No. 58, June 30, President Kennedy instructed the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury to submit recommendations for possible military, economic, and other actions against the Soviet Bloc should the latter increase tension over Berlin. For text of the NSAM, see ibid., pages 162–165. Alternative strategies for dealing with Berlin were discussed at a National Security Council meeting on July 13 and at a meeting of the Steering Group that [Page 267] followed. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara favored proceeding with all measures not requiring the declaration of a national emergency. For text of the memorandum of discussion, see ibid., pages 192–194.
The Steering Group again discussed Berlin at a meeting just prior to the National Security Council meeting on July 19. According to the minutes, Secretary Rusk “indicated his support for a military program with three characteristics: 1. A present build-up; 2. A capability to stop DDR troops by the end of 1961; 3. An ability to fight conventional war for several weeks against Soviet forces, at the same point in time.” In National Security Action Memorandum No. 62, July 24, Kennedy authorized a “prompt strengthening of the United States military position, including giving the U.S. “the capability of deploying as many as six additional divisions and supporting air units to Europe at any time after January 1, 1962, that the international situation many warrant it.” For text of the Steering Group minutes and NSAM No. 62, see ibid., volume XIV, pages 219–222 and 225–226.
In a speech to the nation the evening of July 25, President Kennedy stated that the United States “cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin.” He outlined six steps the United States would take in the military field “to meet this threat to peace.” For text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 533-540. In telegram 323 to the Department of State, July 28, the Moscow Embassy reported that in a meeting with John McCloy the previous day Chairman Khrushchev stated that the “President in effect had declared preliminary war on Sovs because he had presented Sovs with ultimatum and had said if ultimatum not accepted that would mean war. Sovs regretted President took this course, but accepted challenge and would not change policy directed at signing peace treaty.” For text of telegram 323, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XIV, pages 231–234.