102. Memorandum of Conversation0
On Monday morning at 10:15 a.m., June 26, 1961, the President met with Aleksey Adzhubey, Editor of Izvestia; Mikhail Kharlamov, Chief of the Press Division of the Soviet Foreign Office; and Georgi Bolshikov, Editor of USSR and former Washington correspondent of the TASS News Agency who acted as interpreter.
The President began the discussion by asking Mr. Adzhubey if he had made any progress in his conversation with me relative to improving communications on the journalist level. Mr. Adzhubey replied that we had made progress and that he was looking forward to receiving a memorandum from me on the subject.
The President then said he had read with interest Premier Khrushchevʼs speech in the Soviet Union yesterday1 in which the Soviet Premier had described the United States as a “worn out runner” and predicted the Soviet Union would surpass us economically in 1970.
The President cited a number of figures to the Soviets showing that their economic growth estimates were impossible—that the USSR could not pass us by 1970-1978. These figures showed that in 1913 when Russia was under the czars, their Gross National Product (GNP) was 43% of the United States. In 1959 it was 47%. He said by the best possible estimates of Soviet growth and the lowest possible estimates of United States growth, the Soviet UnionʼsGNP would be only 62% by 1978. He said this in itself would be a remarkable advance for the Soviet people and would bring them to a standard of living comparable to that of the United States in 1960. The President said that this was the area of competition that we should engage in. He said that the Soviet Union should not force us into a war. The President said that we should all be around in 1978 to see whether or not Mr. Khrushchevʼs estimates were true.
Mr. Adzhubey interrupted to say that the Soviet Union figured on increasing from 11% to 11-1/2% while the President computed it at 6%. The President said that the Russians were entitled to their figures as we were also entitled to ours and that we would guarantee a world at peace to allow us to find out who is right. The President said it was like the story of a high-jumper: progressing from one foot to six feet could be done very easily but from six feet up the progress can be only measured in inches.
The President said he could not understand why the Soviet Premier wanted to force the United States out of Berlin. He said that West Berlin [Page 265] was a symbol for Americans and that if we gave up our rights in Berlin he would be impeached by the American people. Mr. Adzhubey replied by saying that he did not believe that he would be impeached. Adzhubey continued by saying that the Soviet Union merely wanted to make a treaty with East Berlin; they did not want to force the United States out of West Berlin but wanted the right to have Russian troops in West Berlin. The President pointed out that the subject of a treaty with East Germany was not the issue. He said that he had read Mr. Ulbrichtʼs statements recently where Mr. Ulbricht was threatening to shut off access to East Berlin; threatened to close Templehof Airport and that the United States could not and would not stand for this. The President said the United States and the Soviet Union were the two most powerful nations in the world. Why should they fight and leave everything to the rest of the world—including the Chinese.
In relation to the subject of Soviet troops in West Berlin the President said he had not yet heard any proposal for allowing American troops in East Berlin. The President said that when the war came to a close perhaps the lines could have been drawn so that matters would be different now. But the lines were drawn as they were and the United States has long-standing commitments to West Berlin and it cannot go back on these commitments. Mr. Adzhubey said that he could not understand all the concern in the United States over West Berlin; the Soviet Union had proposed that Berlin become a free city; that French, American, British, Soviet, Swedish and Indian troops be allowed in West Berlin. The President said that reading Mr. Ulbrichtʼs remarks he did not think that Mr. Ulbricht grasped the real significance of a “free city”. Under Mr. Ulbrichtʼs proposal, Berlin would not be a free city. The President said that if the Soviet Union was so desirous of West Berlin being a free city, why didnʼt the Soviet Union just keep the “status quo” because West Berlin is, in effect, now a free city. Again the President said he heard no proposal by the Soviet Union to allow American troops into East Berlin. He also pointed out that West Berlin had not become a part of the Federal Republic while East Berlin had been incorporated into the East German Democratic Republic.
The President said that American forces in West Berlin were token in nature—10,000 men—a symbol of our commitments; that we were going to maintain these commitments.
The President reiterated the hope that the United States could live in peace with the Soviet Union and that that had been his hope since taking office.
The President pointed out that American troops had not been sent into Laos and Cuba (in the latter case, there was a desire by the American people to do so). Mr. Adzhubey said he understood this; the Soviet Union had not sent troops into Laos either.
[Page 266]Mr. Adzhubey concluded the conversation by saying that perhaps the Soviet Union could also send a token force into West Berlin—17 nurses. The President laughingly said that perhaps it could be worked out.
The President then took Mr. Adzhubey, Mr. Kharlamov and Mr. Bolshikov into the Fish Room where he showed them the model boat which Mr. Khrushchev sent to him. Mr. Adzhubey said that our exchanges should be in boats of this type.