Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

93. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 11, 1963, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Vietnam

PRESENT

• Secretary Rusk, Attorney General, Director McCone, Director Murrow, General Taylor, General Krulak, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Assistant Secretary Hilsman, Assistant Secretary Manning, Mr. Janow (AID), Mr. Colby, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Bromley Smith

Secretary Rusk, who had read Ambassador Lodge’s estimate of the current situation contained in Saigon 478, attached,² reviewed the situation as seen in Washington. He said those in Saigon were in the center of developments, and as a result, felt strongly about what they thought ought to be done. He recalled that the U.S., over the past years, had gained considerable experience in dealing with individuals who, in effect, controlled their governments, i.e. Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee, etc. From the Washington viewpoint, what was happening in Saigon was not a new situation. He felt that it was most important for us here to be clear as to what our objectives are in Vietnam. He thought we ought to try to define the perimeters of our problems. The U.S. came back into Vietnam in a major way in 1959 in response to an intensified Viet Cong campaign. If U.S. presence is not needed now, we should leave, but we want to leave behind an independent Vietnam. We cannot leave if to do so consists of abandoning Vietnam to the Viet Cong. At the other extreme, we do not want to apply U.S. force because, if we introduce U.S. troops, we will have resumed the situation in Vietnam to that which existed when the French were fighting a colonial war there. He said Nhu probably has to go, but this did not mean that we had to turn against Diem. It is possible for us to work with Diem. Possibly we can persuade Diem to separate from Nhu. Maybe we can’t, but as of now, we don’t know whether we can force Diem to exile Nhu. Ambassador Lodge so far has not been able to break through to Diem and to conduct meaningful conversations. We do not underestimate the capacity of Diem and Nhu to pull the temple down around their heads and ours if they won’t buy what we demand. It is possible that Nhu may turn to the northern Vietnamese and make a deal with them if he concludes that he cannot accept our requirements. As to the reports we receive of U.S. citizens’ conversations with their Vietnamese friends, he doubted that when the fate of a nation is at stake we should put very much reliance on what the Vietnamese tell their American friends.

Turning to a draft paper outlining U.S. objectives in South Vietnam (copy attached),³ he expressed doubt that we should cut back U.S. aid which is essential to the war effort in Vietnam or reduce aid which benefits the Vietnamese people. He acknowledged the difficulty of finding pressures which we could use which actually bite into the Diem government.

Secretary Rusk recommended that the next step consists of instructing Ambassador Lodge to wrestle with Diem in an effort to prompt Diem to make changes in the government we feel are essential if the war effort is to succeed. He pointed out that the degree of urgency should be thought of in terms of weeks. We are not in a hurry in terms of the coming days. His comment referred to a sentence in the objectives paper which states that our judgment is that there is a time urgency.

Mr. Gilpatric reported that the Defense Department had looked closely at our entire military assistance program to Vietnam and concluded that to suspend any part of it would mean an immediate halt to the war effort in Vietnam. This is true in part because our assistance covers spare parts and ammunition.

Secretary Rusk continued his general remarks by recalling a situation on Mainland China during the time when Chiang Kai-shek was encountering dissidence and opposition. The U.S. had decided to terminate its support to China, stepped out of the Chinese picture, and the Communist Mao took over. He saw similarities in the Vietnamese situation and argued that we must not yield to the temptation of despairing of Diem and act in a way which would result in the Communists taking Vietnam. There are several alternatives yet available to us before we have to choose between getting out or sending in U.S. combat troops. If we do go in with U.S. combat troops, the Vietnamese will turn against us. Perhaps we should offer to assist Diem in finding out whether the Viet Cong was responsible for instigating the student riots.

General Taylor supported Secretary Rusk’s comments by urging that we look at what is happening in Vietnam in historical perspective. He asked who would organize a religious, political movement in opposition to an existing government during a time when that government was fighting a civil war. He said he doubted that Lincoln, during the Civil War, would have acted in a way to meet the protests of a religious, political movement.

Secretary Rusk expressed his belief that both political and religious factors were involved in the Buddhist demonstrations. He speculated that the protest may have started in Hue as a religious protest, which later became a political protest.

Mr. Hilsman said we had never accused the Vietnamese of religious persecution, but only religious oppression.

General Taylor turned to his thought of asking how actions are to be evaluated when they take place in the midst of a civil war. He believed that there had been some penetration by the Viet Cong of the Buddhists who had staged the demonstrations. He suggested that to clarify our thinking we should separate those things we must have from those things we would like to have from Diem.

Mr. Bundy said he liked Secretary Rusk’s sense of timing, i.e., that we do not reach a crisis within days, but rather within weeks.

General Taylor advocated that we avoid pin pricks which serve to annoy Diem. He recommended that in conversations with Diem we be serious and tell him the things that he must do if he is to continue to receive help from us.

Mr. Gilpatric said Defense favored a suggestion that had been made to evacuate all U.S. dependents from Vietnam as a way of indicating to Diem how seriously we felt about the changes we were asking him to make. Both Secretary Rusk and Mr. Bundy shared this view.

Mr. Bundy said we should start pressures against Diem. We are not sure these pressures will be effective, but we can begin now to contain Nhu’s power. If Nhu’s power continues to ascend in the way it has in the past few weeks, and if Nhu continues to carry out his ideas of how to govern Vietnam, we cannot win the war against the Communists.

Secretary Rusk said that the removal of Nhu would be the symbol of a reconciliation by Diem with the Vietnamese people and with the U.S.

Mr. Hilsman called attention to his paper entitled “A Plan to Achieve U.S. Objectives in South Vietnam,” copy attached.⁴ He said this plan was merely a concept, but it did have specific courses of action which illustrated how the concept would become reality.

General Taylor returned to the question of urgency. In his view, there is none. Mr. Hilsman commented that this time reference involved weeks and months. Mr. McCone said the Agency estimated we would have a grace period of three months before there was real trouble.

The Attorney General asked whether any estimate had ever been made as to how Diem would react if we said he must do certain specified things or we would withdraw from Vietnam. Mr. McCone said no such estimate had been made. Mr. Gilpatric recalled that some believed Diem would pull the house down around him in reaction to an ultimatum.

Mr. Hilsman said that former Ambassador Nolting believed that if we made clear to Diem that Congress might force us to drastically reduce aid, Diem might yield.

Mr. Hilsman said we might withdraw aid to Colonel Tung’s Special Forces. Mr. McCone replied that this could not be done. Aid to the Special Forces was so interlaced that we could not stop some forms of aid without affecting others. General Taylor also doubted there would be any way in which we could withhold support from Colonel Tung alone. Mr. Hilsman repeated his view that he believed such action was possible.

The group turned to a discussion of a Congressional resolution proposed by Senator Church. Secretary Rusk was concerned that our support of such a resolution might get out of control. He predicted that Senators who are opposed to aid would vote for us along with those who would use the withdrawal of aid as a sanction to force Diem to change his method of governing. He agreed that we should encourage Senators to sound off, but was not enthusiastic about voting a specific resolution. Mr. Bundy commented that the plan proposed by Mr. Hilsman put too much weight on press policy. Mr. Murrow agreed. He recommended that we not leak our decisions to the press, as recommended in the plan, but make formal, precise announcements.

General Taylor commented that the plan would not overcome Nhu if he chose to resist.

Mr. Bundy suggested we could tell Diem that we are cutting all links to Nhu and thus isolate Nhu. We would give assistance for the prosecution of the war, but not through Nhu or Colonel Tung. He did not favor the use of black press stories.

In response to a question, Mr. Colby said that Colonel Tung was a nonentity. Mr. Murrow asked then why we should hit him. Mr. Hilsman responded that we were seeking to attack Nhu through Colonel Tung.

General Taylor asked whether the objective of the plan is to reduce the influence of Nhu or eliminate him. Mr. Hilsman responded that the courses of action recommended in the plan will have very limited material effect, but those who are expert in Vietnamese affairs say that the actions proposed will have a profound psychological effect.

General Taylor asked what we do if the plan fails. Mr. Bundy said we need not look at the plan in such black and white terms. He said we could live with an interim target for months. We could decide later if we had to take more drastic action.

Mr. Hilsman said one objective was to take actions, plus words, to disassociate the U.S. government from Nhu. The report is still circulating in Saigon that we fully support Nhu. If we succeeded in disassociating ourselves from Nhu, this may result in his removal.

Mr. Bundy said a good case could be made for continuing U.S. aid, but he suggested that we should build up our own distribution system so that if we wish to redirect our aid we would have a capability of doing so. We do not now have this capability because our aid is distributed by the Vietnamese. Mr. Janow replied by saying that we cannot take over the distribution of our aid. The system is so built that it will defeat the objective of phase one actions. He pointed out that we must decide soon on what we are going to do about several major pending issues, the biggest one being whether we go forward or not with a new PL 480 agreement. If we do, and if we take other big aid steps, the small actions suggested in phase one will be ineffective.

Mr. McCone said that Nhu’s base is wider than Colonel Tung’s Special Forces. Mr. Hilsman said the steps in his plan were not aimed at achieving a material effect, but rather at creating a psychological effect while continuing to support the war effort.

Mr. Bundy said no one could estimate whether the plan would succeed or not. He said he saw no serious objection in an effort to break the tie between Nhu and the U.S.

Secretary Rusk said that the next step is another attack on Diem by Ambassador Lodge. He said we should review the bidding for the past eight years. Then we should call attention to what has happened in the last few months. We could then explain to Diem that we were behind him in his effort to win the war, but that the actions of the last few months would have to be dealt with in a way which would increase his public support.

Mr. Bundy then read extracts from a paper prepared by Mr. Colby⁵ which outlined an approach by the U.S. to Nhu in an effort to prompt him to take actions which would result in our being able to support him in the government.

At this point the meeting adjourned to the Cabinet Room (separate memorandum of record).⁶

Bromley Smith⁷

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings on Vietnam. Top Secret. Drafted by Smith. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text indicates the President did not attend the meeting. A memorandum for the record of this meeting by Krulak is in the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Trip to Vietnam, September 7-10.
2. Not attached. but see Document 86.
3. Not attached, but see Document 89.

4. Krulak’s record of this meeting makes it clear that Hilsman is referring to early drafts of his “Reconciliation” and “Pressures and Persuasions” track papers. For the drafts as printed, see attachments to Document 114. Krulak’s record reads as follows:

   “The Group then studied the draft program prepared by Mr. Hilsman. Mr. Bundy made the point that the paper was too much in reliance on the press and on press leaks. General Taylor stated that the proposed Phase I actions would not get rid of Nhu if suasion failed. Mr. Bundy agreed with this, saying that we are not going to get rid of Nhu by putting out black newspapers. He does, however, like the idea of threatening the evacuation of dependents on the basis of pure risk to their well being.”

5. Not found, but Colby describes this paper in Honorable Men, pp. 212-213. He notes that it was “clearly out of tune with the Administration’s temper.”
6. Document 94.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.