54. Memorandum of Conference With the President1
SUBJECT
- Vietnam
OTHERS PRESENT
- Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Dillon, Attorney General, General Carter, Director McCone, General Taylor, General Krulak, Under Secretary Harriman, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Ambassador Nolting, Mr. Hilsman, Mr. Colby, General Clifton, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Bromley Smith
The President asked what the French are doing toward assisting the Vietnamese. He was handed a paper on French economic and military programs in Vietnam.2 He commented that the French were doing practically nothing and their program had been minimal in the last ten years.
Mr. Hilsman added that the French were doing very little in Laos. Mr. Forrestal said their program there involved approximately $9 million.
The President commented that the French were trying to get for Vietnam what had been done in Laos, i.e. neutralization. He pointed out that neutralization was not working in Laos and he wondered why Walter Lippmann had suggested that the Laotian case provided an illustration of what should be done in Vietnam. As to whether the French would protest the recent statement3 he had made about De Gaulle’s comment4 on Vietnam, the President said he doubted Ambassador Alphand had the guts to protest.
Secretary Rusk suggested that the President look at the draft instructions to Ambassador Lodge (copy attached).5
The President requested any information on a report6 concerning the defection of three Viet Cong battalions. Ambassador Nolting said that this report involved units in Laos. not Vietnam. Mr. McCone cast [Page 101] doubt on the entire report which had been repeated by Nhu in his statement to our officials.7
The President asked whether sending Nhu to Dalat would mean an improvement in the situation in Saigon. Several members agreed that it would be an improvement.
Secretary McNamara said that the resignation of Nhu would be helpful for U.S. public opinion and world opinion. If Nhu were physically absent from Saigon, this would also be an asset.
In the light of these comments, the President asked that the first paragraph of the Lodge instructions be rewritten. He did not think we should be so negative as the draft.8 Mr. Hilsman responded that the instructions represented our opening bid to Diem. He expected that they would end up somewhere in the middle.
The President felt that there might be some substance to the proposals Nhu made to Ambassador Lodge. He did not think we ought to discourage the travel abroad of Madame Nhu, but he did not want her to come to the U.S., and above all, did not want her to make a speech in Washington. Mr. McCone added that he thought a trip by Madame Nhu was a good idea. He believed we could handle the press in such a way that the trip would not increase Madame Nhu’s prestige.
The President asked whether we should negotiate with Nhu or Diem, but expressed his view that we should negotiate with Diem, as the instructions indicated. Mr. Harriman agreed that negotiations should be conducted directly with Diem.
The President suggested that paragraph 2 be revised to indicate that General Harkins should resume frequent meetings with Minister of Defense Thuan and Diem on military matters as soon as Ambassador Lodge had met with Diem.
Paragraph 3 dealing with how to react to any suggestions to remove individual Americans or to stop what are alleged to be American radio attacks on the Diem regime was deleted after Secretary McNamara and Director McCone expressed their doubt as to whether Ambassador Lodge should discuss these matters at all. It was decided that the paragraph was not necessary in the light of the President’s public statement.
Secretary Rusk pointed out that Diem may insist that certain U.S. officials be removed from Vietnam. He said that if the Vietnamese know what we know they would undoubtedly want certain officials to [Page 102] leave. He suggested that we leave the personnel question open but keep in the question of U.S. radio attacks. Ambassador Nolting thought that Nhu’s complaints about U.S. radio attacks referred not to the Voice of America but to certain armed forces radio programs heard in the area.
At the President’s suggestion, paragraph 4 is to be rewritten to make clear that the President’s broadcast was an effort to express his views on the situation in Vietnam and was not a personal attack on Diem. Ambassador Nolting commented that the President’s words would not be provocative to Diem because he would understand why the President was required to comment on the Vietnamese situation. It was agreed that the entire CBS transcript, part of which was not broadcast, would be sent to Ambassador Lodge.
Paragraph 5 was revised in ways which are apparent in comparing the draft with the final text (attached).9
The President commented that Halberstam, the New York Times reporter in Saigon, was not an accurate reporter. He noted that the Bonzes went to our Ambassador in search of protection. Hence, the Buddhists were not anti-U.S.10
A draft of an additional paragraph was circulated. It involved military contacts with the Vietnamese generals. It provoked a prolonged discussion which resulted in its being deleted.
[Page 103]Mr. Hilsman pointed out that we had already had two contacts with Vietnamese generals. One would lead to a further discussion, and the other was a rejection, in effect, of further contact. Secretary Rusk said these contacts indicated there was less support than we had thought there would be.
Secretary McNamara asked why we should try to unscramble the confused situation among the generals in Vietnam. He thought we ought to keep Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins out of touch with the generals.
The President decided that we should wait for the generals to contact us. Meanwhile, we assume that they are not acting and that we are going down a diplomatic route. When they come to us we will talk to them. We should avoid letting the generals think that the U.S. had backed off.
As the meeting ended, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor agreed that no action need be taken in connection with current instructions to our military forces. Fleet movements would continue in view of the fact that such action created no problems for us. Ships on station would remain in place. Proposed redeployment of aircraft would be stood down, however.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings on Vietnam. Top Secret. Drafted by Smith. The meeting was held at the White House. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1982, 649A. A memorandum for the record of this meeting by Krulak is in the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Vietnam, chap. XXIII.↩
- Not found.↩
- Document 50.↩
- See footnote 7, Document 26.↩
- Not attached to the source text. A draft telegram was attached to Krulak’s memorandum for the record. With the exception of the last two paragraphs (see footnote 10 below) the draft cable attached to Document 51 was almost identical to the draft under discussion at this meeting. For the cable as sent, see Document 56.↩
- Not found.↩
- See Document 44.↩
-
In Krulak’s record, the President’s remarks are recorded in more detail. It reads as follows:
“The President stated, with respect to paragraph 1, that it is too negative; that it should be rewritten to exhibit that visible removal of the Nhus from the Saigon scene is some improvement, and to make sure that there is a requirement for some actual substance in the reduction of Nhu’s power.”
↩ -
In Krulak’s record, he describes these revisions as follows:
“5. Respecting paragraph 5a of the attached draft, the President did not desire to use the expression ‘keep up tension’ end directed that it be replaced by the phrase ‘we will continue to assert, publicly and privately, U.S. discontent’. In connection with paragraph 5b, the President was desirous of ensuring that the second phrase read ‘difficulty in continuing support of American people’.”
↩ -
Krulak’s record of the rest of the discussion at the meeting reads as follows:
“6. Following further discussion and minor editorial alteration of the draft, Mr. Hilsman proposed the addition of two paragraphs, shown on the attached as paragraphs 6 and 7. The President decided to omit paragraph 7 and have paragraph 6 sent as a separate message in light of its greater sensitivity. He stated that its thrust should be in terms of saying that the generals should be in contact with us, rather than we with them, in the event that they desire action; that, on the basis that the generals are not acting, we are now making a diplomatic effort. He was anxious to make it plain that it was the generals and not we who backed off.”
Paragraphs 6 and 7 referred to by Krulak were not part of the draft attached to Document 51. They read as follows:
“6. It is possible that Nhu’s response to present confrontation between U.S. and GVN might be violent and it seems to us essential that we open other possibilities. In view of this and [document number not declassified—Document 46], you authorized to explain to ’Big’ Minh either directly or via Kim that we are pressing Diem to change policies, but realize there is little real hope of achieving this.
“7. Your authority to suspend U.S. aid at any time remains in force.” (Draft telegram attached to memorandum for the record by Krulak)
↩ - Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩