Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

51. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President¹

Washington, September 2, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Draft telegram to Lodge

1. The attached draft telegram to Lodge is a joint product of Hilsman, Forrestal, and myself. We have deliberately drafted it quite concretely and firmly in order to give a clear target for comment and suggestion by those to whom it is being circulated. By early evening I should have from Forrestal reactions of Harriman, McNamara, Rusk, and Taylor, and I will call you then.

2. The urgency of this message is only in the desire which McNamara and I feel particularly to get dialogue with Diem started. If you prefer to review this instruction in presence of your principal advisers, we only lose one day by waiting until tomorrow. Carter of CIA has strongly recommended this delay, and Dean Rusk inclines to agree.²

3. You may also wish to know before meeting with the Vice President that he has been very skeptical of last week’s line of action and would probably incline to a line substantially softer than this message.

4. Pierre’s first report of your press conference comments³ sounds perfect to us, and we believe that a message much weaker than the attached draft would be quite inconsistent with what you have said.

McG. B.

[Attachment]

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam⁴

Washington, September 2, 1963.

For Ambassador Lodge. Re your 403.

1. Results your talk with Nhu promising on surface but we fear stalling tactics especially in light of [document number not declassified].⁵ Thus Nhu [in?] Dalat could still be power behind throne; Mme. Nhu’s tour could be plus for her local prestige unless she stays away a long time; dealings with Buddhists depend on concrete action not expression of intent; broadening of Cabinet may or may not be real. In short, everything depends on evident cut in personal authority of Nhus.

2. In this situation feeling here is that it is essential that central negotiations should be conducted directly with Diem and that you should proceed to a first meeting as soon as possible. Bargain with Nhu would only confirm his ascendancy.

3. You should react strongly against any bargain on removal of U.S. agents or stopping of American radio attack on GVN. We are not offending party in this case and must not be put on defensive. This does not preclude later adjustments if we get a solid bargain.

4. You will have President’s broadcast comment separately.⁶ You should emphasize to Diem that President has carefully understated degree of his concern in order to make needed improvements easier.

5. Subject to these specific comments, the following is guidance for your first conversation with Diem.

(a) General Posture:

We will maintain publicly and privately tension of U.S. discontent with repression which has eroded effort toward common goal of winning war until there are concrete results in GVN policies and posture. U.S. not trying to overthrow government, but engaged in candid and critical talks to improve it. Purpose of general posture is to give you leverage with GVN; avoid false impression U.S. tried something and now backing off; and to avoid seeming to acquiesce in repression, which would put U.S. on wrong side fence with majority of people inside Vietnam and the world.

(b) First Meeting with Diem:

You should make points Deptel 294⁷ re common interests in defeating Viet Cong; difficulty in continuing support in face daily juxtaposition U.S. casualties in [and] aid with repressive measures; and common problem, under time urgency of working out set of GVN policies and actions that will make continued support possible.

Specifics in addition to 1, 2, 4 and 5 of your 403; release of remaining students and bonzes including satisfactory guarantees safety of three bonzes now in U.S. embassy; removal of press censorship; restoration of damaged pagodas by the GVN; repeal of decree 10; and honest negotiation between GVN and through Buddhist leadership on outstanding issues.

6. If any progress made on foregoing your continuing dialogue with Diem should include pressing further measures to widen support at home and abroad such as

(a) revitalization of GVN, possible Thuan as PM, generals in posts of Defense and Interior.

(b) improvement of relations with Cambodia covering border incidents, Mekong rights.

(c) redefinition of role of U.S. advisers to give them broader scope.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Memos and Miscellaneous. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the President read this memorandum and another note in Clifton’s hand states: “Bundy ready to talk on the phone.” No record of the President’s conversation with Bundy has been found.

2. Rusk expressed his agreement with Carter in a telephone conversation with Hilsman, September 2—1:12 p.m., as follows:

   “The Sec. said that Pat Carter had urged no hasty action on reply to 403 from Saigon. Hilsman said he had gotten the word also and had passed it along to Bundy. Bundy did not favor hasty action. They were in the process of working on a draft to pouch to the Pres. The idea was to get the draft to the Pres., the Sec, the other Principals and then see where we go from there. The Sec. said to remove some of our people would be very dangerous.” (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) Telegram 403 is Document 44.

3. Not found.
4. For text of this telegram as sent, see Document 56.
5. Document 46.
6. Reference is to telegram 319 to Saigon, in which the text of the President’s interview of September 2 was transmitted with the instruction that it should not be released to the press there. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 S VIET)
7. Document 39.