Office of the Historian

49. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency1

Saigon, September 2, 1963.

[document number not declassified] Damage assessment report.

1.
First, we would like to state our belief that events of last week and their denouement as of this time do not represent decisive victory for Nhu and GVN and that they are not as result of these events out of woods. So far we would call contest draw. Gen. Kim’s contact with Rufus Phillips2 indicates operation has been contained not destroyed and that GVN still has good reason to fear and take into account activities on part of U.S. and of Generals.
2.
We assume that Diem and Nhus are fully aware that USG encouraged Generals to attempt coup and that CAS was instrumentality of this encouragement. We estimate that they know good portion, possibly most of substantial details of our approaches. Our impression is that GVN realizes, however, that it is still in profound difficulty with military leaders, good portion of population, and with U.S. GVN must be assessing fact of U.S. willingness to back alternative leadership and to go to some lengths to encourage and support alternatives. Next moves on part of GVN and U.S. Govt will be to reach readjustment [Page 93] and re-accommodation and GVN must realize that it will have to give reasonable satisfaction to USG to continue major programs even if modified in form and practice.
3.
There is even possibility that all major programs can go forward as in past although we expect some curtailment on those matters relating to political power centers.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL S VIET. Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only. The source text is a copy sent by the CIA to the Department of State exclusive for Rusk, Ball, Harriman, and Hilsman. Copies were also sent to the White House exclusive for Bundy and to the Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence), Department of the Army, exclusive for McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, and Krulak. Received at the Department of State at 7:24 p.m.↩
  2. See Document 46.↩