Office of the Historian

47. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency1

Saigon, September 2, 1963.

[document number not declassified] Following summarizes 30 August evening conversation CAS officer with [1 line not declassified]. CAS officer purpose was elicit further on [less than 1 line not declassified] statement last week quoting Polish Commissioner Maneli that Ambassador Lalouette had been acting as channel between Ngo Dinh Nhu and Pham Van Dong.

1.
[less than 1 line not declassified] surprised that this news to U.S. Govt. They had reported months ago [less than 1 line not declassified] that Nhu policy was one of ultimate neutralization and unification of Vietnam. It was “open secret” Saigon diplomatic circles Nhu in touch with North. French policy over past year or more obviously that of encouraging rapprochement between two halves of country and use of French channels (not Lalouette personally) was foregone conclusion.
2.
[less than 1 line not declassified] had no hard inter to back this up but repeated earlier statement that Maneli several times in past few months has asked him tell Nhu that Polish Commissioner also available for messages to Dong. Maneli asked [less than 1 line not declassified] also convey this word to Nhu. Both [less than 1 line not declassified] declined serve as intermediary to Nhu.
3.
[less than 1 line not declassified] spelled out at some length his irritation with Americans for relying on “two-bit agents” and ignoring seasoned observers such as self who in position learn great deal. He then cited Nhu press interview circa 8 May in which Nhu said he looking forward to reduction American aid2 as instance handwriting on wall which not appreciated by Americans. Reiterated earlier statements that Nhu basically anti-American.
4.
Both [less than 1 line not declassified] said worst thing now would be for U.S. Govt to take precipitous action as was case in Laos with Phoumi. [less than 1 line not declassified] then offered their services to negotiate with Nhu. Both said Nhu wants negotiate. Both convinced Madame Nhu ready leave Vietnam as first step to save [garble] face. Apparently both recently in contact with Nhu and Nhu apparently volunteered that his wife would like take trip to CONUS [Page 90] right now. [less than 1 line not declassified] especially seemed anxious have DCM Trueheart contact him, perhaps with some specific message he wants convey, but neither [less than 1 line not declassified] willing take initiative for such meeting or volunteer views. They waiting be asked.
5.
[less than 1 line not declassified] then said he reliably informed that Nhu in meeting with Generals “the other night” told them he aware some of them thinking of fast action because they fear country lost without American aid. Nhu then told them not worry, other resources would be available if aid cut, and if worse came to worse he, as Generals aware, had contacts with Northern brothers and could get breathing spell by having North direct Southern guerrillas ease off operations while negotiating more permanent settlement.
6.
[less than 1 line not declassified] said he fears U.S. Govt may be thinking of having Vietnamese troops march into Saigon. This unthinkable as consequent slaughter would have worse repercussions than Bay of Pigs. Both [less than 1 line not declassified] said they cabling home their assessment along these lines and again asked Trueheart take initiative to go see [less than 1 line not declassified].
7.
Above passed Embassy 31 August. Pouching full report.3
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 S VIET. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only. The source text is a copy sent by the CIA to the Department of State exclusive for Rusk, Ball, Harriman, and Hilsman. Copies were sent also to the White House exclusive for Bundy and to the Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence), Department of the Army, exclusive for McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, and Krulak. Received at the Department of State at 1:02 p.m.↩
  2. See vol. III, p. 294, footnote 2.↩
  3. Not found.↩