Office of the Historian

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

Saigon, August 31, 1963, 6 p.m.

391. Eyes only for Secretary. CINCPAC POLAD exclusive for Admiral Felt. Deptel 284.2

1.

You will have seen Harkins’ report3 which makes it clear that there is neither the will nor the organization among the Generals to accomplish anything. (It is conceivable but only conceivable that further talk between Big Minh and Harkins will alter this estimate.)

[Page 67]

This marks the end of one week which began with your instructions of last Sunday. We used every asset that we had including General Harkins. Our record has been thoroughly respectable throughout and we have shown our willingness to put ourselves on the line.

2.
At some indeterminate date in the future [if?] some other group with the necessary strength and lust for office comes forward, we can contemplate another effort.
3.
I believe the government suspects us of trying to engineer a coup. This belief plus the fact that I have been strictly correct and have not in any way sought to flatter or cajole them have put them in an apprehensive state of mind. They also believe I could say something which would help them with U.S. public opinion if they did something to justify it. Finally they expect me to make a report to Washington.
4.
Perhaps an arrangement could be worked out whereby the following could be made to happen: Madame Nhu to leave the country, Mr. Nhu’s functions to be limited entirely to Strategic Hamlets, the office of Prime Minister to be created and Mr. Thuan to become Prime Minister; Archbishop Thuc to leave the country. In addition the students and Buddhists would be liberated; Decree Law 10 would be repealed; the pagodas would be repaired and conciliatory gestures would be made. All of this, if agreed to might be announced by President in Washington. I think there is a dependable person of highest quality and prestige who would be the go-between. I would not talk of this to Nhu or Diem without further clearance with you.
5.
I think the U.S. Government was right to instruct me as it did last Sunday not only because of the state of opinion in America and Free World but because the Government of Viet-Nam has acted both as liars and criminals. But now the only attempt to change the government which would succeed would be one which the U.S. could mount itself and, of course, that is out of the question.
6.
To take up a different but related matter, I am very reliably informed that French Ambassador Lalouette was with Nhu for four hours on August 20 when the attack on the pagodas took place. I am also advised by a dependable source that he wants the U.S. Government out of Viet-Nam so that the French can become the intermediary between South and North Viet-Nam. On Friday (the day on which I had my talk with Lalouette)4 he gave a lunch at which were present the Papal Delegate and the Italian and Australian Ambassadors. After the Australian had gone Lalouette said: “We must save the family”, as though the family were the first consideration.
7.
I have good reason to believe that the Holy See would be willing to intervene with General De Gaulle. I understand that the Papal Delegate told Diem that he had betrayed his church and his country. I am reliably advised that Nhu is in a highly volatile state of mind and that some sort of gesture through Nhu to North Viet-Nam is not impossible.
8.
As one more persuasive factor in our dealings with GVN would it be possible for House or House Committee to cut our appropriation for foreign aid for Viet-Nam? Giving me chance to get GVN to agree to our points on the ground that this would facilitate restoration of the item. I am too far away to know whether or not this would be practical politics. But here it could have certain advantages.
Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIET. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 7:16 a.m. Repeated Operational Immediate to CINCPAC. Relayed by the Department of State to the White House, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA. Another copy of this telegram has a marginal note indicating that the President saw it. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, State Cables)↩
  2. Document 31.↩
  3. Supra.↩
  4. See Document 27.↩