31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
284. Eyes only for Ambassador. Following is report to you on today’s meeting which reviewed your 3832 and other messages.
Discussion focused on “inertia” mentioned your para 5. Generals so far appear have no plan and little momentum. Further, bits and pieces of information here suggest that Diem and Nhu are moving to normalize situation and head off possibilities of being upset. Prospect of changing government by strong and concerted Vietnamese elements seem very thin on basis of any hard information we have. This raises possibility that Nhu will try to ease internal and international pressures and perhaps bring about quiet liquidation of potential opposition. Possibility therefore increasingly is that if there is to be a change, it can only be brought about by American rather than Vietnamese effort. Obviously, an abortive effort inspired by or attributed to the United States will be disastrous. Central question therefore comes to be how much reality there is in attitude expressed by generals with whom contacts have been made and their capabilities and determination with respect to what has been said thus far. The distinction between what is desirable and what is possible is one which we may have to face in the next few days. This telegram changes none of your instructions but expresses our uneasiness at the absence of bone and muscle as seen from here. Can assure you that highest levels in Washington are s2ivina this problem almost full-time attention.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIET. Top Secret; Emergency. Drafted by Rusk and cleared with Hilsman, Krulak, and Forrestal. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD exclusive for Felt.↩
- Document 20.↩