155. Editorial Note
Under new election laws adopted by the National Assembly on June 13, 1963, and promulgated by President Diem on June 16, elections for the Republic of Vietnam’s National Assembly were to take place on August 31. The laws called for a 2-week active campaign beginning on August 16 and culminating on election day. The events of August 21 and the imposition of martial law delayed this schedule, and elections were ultimately held on September 27. On October 7, the Embassy submitted to the Department in airgram 249 a report on the campaign and the elections. The following comprises the summary portion of that report:
“Preceding election day on September 27, potential candidates had been effectively limited by a variety of factors ranging from a general sense of the hazards of independent politics to quite specific indications that their particular candidacies were unwelcome. One candidate with a reputation for independent views, Nguyen Tran, was disqualified. Thus on September 27 the alternatives before the voters were limited; there was no known oppositionist in the running. This fact suggested that any candidate still in contention would be more or less acceptable to the government, or at least not seriously opposed thereby, and this consideration was probably a major factor in the government’s decision to proceed with the elections at this time. The advantages in so proceeding depended on the government’s ability (a) to produce a large voter turnout, thus refuting the idea of popular discontent which might manifest itself in abstentions from the polls, (b) to maintain tight public security against the threat of VC disruptive activity or popular manifestations, and (c) to administer the voting in a [Page 304] manner that appeared both fair and efficient, so as to enhance the government’s prestige both among its own people and internationally. In general, the government appeared to have succeeded on these points, although some doubt is cast on point (c) by the existence of charges of various malpractices such as the issuance of more than one voting card to ‘reliable’ individuals and of manipulated vote-counting. If such practices in fact took place, the Embassy doubts that they were designed to swing elections to particular individuals (the GVN did have a list of favorites, and did work for them), although this may have been the incidental result. It seems more likely that such practices were designed to insure the appearance of a large voter turnout which was a factor of more concern to the government. It is of course also possible that corruption or misplaced zeal at the local level may have influenced some results.
“In general, the GVN ability to mount successfully an effort such as that represented by the election in the present state of popular feeling represents impressive evidence of the GVN’s ability to control its own people (not, however, of its popularity), to carry out a complex and widespread organizational project, and to maintain a surprisingly high degree of security against potential VC disruptive efforts. Not to be entirely ignored either, is the long-run benefit resulting from the training of both government and people in the basic mechanics of electoral procedures.
“With regard to the victorious candidates for the 123 seats, these included 60 incumbents (25 incumbents were beaten). 96 candidates who were supported by the GVN (according to a CAS report) won election. These included 55 members of the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) and 19 women, all of whom are probably members of the Women’s Solidarity Movement (WSM). On the other hand, based on the same CAS resort, GVN-supported candidates were defeated in 15 cases (the GVN remaining neutral in the rest of the elections). It is not clear that all these 15 defeats will be allowed to stand, since some challenges to the elections held in Saigon have already been registered, and it remains possible that various devices might be used to overturn the results already recorded. Nevertheless, the GVN is likely to acquiesce in most (if not all) of these defeats.
“The new legislature will have an almost even balance between new deputies and incumbents, and among the new faces will be two deputies of Chinese-origin, representing the first emergence of the Cholon Chinese community into Vietnamese public life. Missing from the new Assembly will be such relatively independent figures, who tended to be identified with organized labor, as Pham Van Tung and Tran Sanh Buu. These men were, interestingly enough, beaten by the two Chinese-origin deputies. As has been indicated, the extent to which candidates were screened as well as the large percentage of government-backed candidates who won, combine to suggest that the most conspicuous characteristic of the new Assembly will be its docility. Given the already established powerlessness of the National Assembly as an institution, the new personnel do not appear likely to cast themselves in the role of innovators. Any significant evolution in the function of the Assembly during the next few years will therefore probably have to depend on initiatives taken outside the legislature itself.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 S VIET)
The elections took place with only minor and isolated incidents of violence notwithstanding earlier reports, mostly based on Government of Vietnam sources, that the Viet Cong sought to sabotage the voting procedures on a countrywide basis. As the Embassy observed elsewhere in airgram A-249, the lack of violence “provided a remarkable example either of VC indifference to the idea of disrupting the elections or of GVN ability to provide a high degree of security at least for a short time over its national territory.” The Embassy also noted that the elections represented a “calculated risk” to the Diem government in that they gave voters the option of leaving their ballots blank as a sign of disapproval, and polling stations provided a potential focus for popular demonstrations against the government. On the other hand, the Embassy noted, the Diem government stood to gain in domestic and international prestige if it could carry off the elections successfully. While the Embassy was unprepared to accept the stated 92.82 percent voter participation at face value, it did believe there was a massive voter turnout, in part because of subtle official pressure and in part because of the holiday atmosphere which the Diem government attempted to associate with the elections.