Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, September 24, 1963—9:25 p.m.

476. Eyes only for Ambassador Lodge and Secretary McNamara. Herewith text of letter from President to President Diem. President’s own judgment is that this letter is not appropriate and not likely to be productive unless in your judgment after further consultation situation is so serious that Presidential pressure of this sort is essential. President does not believe that this kind of letter can be used more than once in a situation of this sort and unless you disagree, his belief is that McNamara can make these points for him orally with less likelihood of personal offense.

Alternatively, somewhat softer language may remove this difficulty. Please tell us what you both think.²

Letter begins:

“Dear Mr. President:

1. I am sending you this letter because of the extreme gravity of the situation which now confronts our two countries in their relations with each other. For us in the United States, difficult and painful decisions cannot long be deferred, and I know that you on your side have problems of similar gravity. Moreover, it is clear to me as I work on this matter that many of its difficulties arise from problems in assessing the real facts of the situation. Both of our Governments, for different reasons, face great difficulties on this score. And so I think it may be important and helpful for you to know accurately just how the situation now appears to me. In return, I shall greatly value the most candid expression of your own assessment, and it may well be that you and I between us can work out a new understanding in place of the present troubled, confused and dangerous relationship between our Governments.

2. At the outset, let me state plainly that the central purpose of my Government in all of its relations with your country is that the Communists should be defeated in their brazen effort to capture your country by force and fraud of all varieties. What we do and do not do, whether it seems right or wrong to our friends, is always animated by this central purpose. In all that it does in its relations with your country, the United States Government gives absolute priority to the defeat of the Communists.

3. This purpose, in a general way, has been a part of American policy toward your country for many years, but as you know it took a new shape and clarity at the end of 1961. At that time, in light of the very unsatisfactory situation in Laos, and in view of the increasing efforts then being made by the Viet Cong, I sent two of my most trusted associates on a careful mission of inquiry to your country. This mission of General Taylor and Mr. Rostow was to give me the best possible judgment of the course of the struggle in South Vietnam and the prospect of success. Their comprehensive report convinced me, first, that the situation was indeed very serious, and second, that by appropriate and determined action your Government and ours together could find a way to victory. Our two Governments then worked out together, and you and I as their leaders formally approved, a new level of effort and cooperation. And I think it is fair to say that my Government has put forth its fullest efforts to achieve these goals ever since.

4. By the hardest kind of joint endeavor, in which of course your people have borne the heavier and the more immediate responsibility, the contest against the Communists in the last year and a half has gradually but steadily turned in our favor. New levels of alertness and skill were developed in the forces of your country; and the essential program of strategic hamlets was pressed forward with steadily increasing energy and speed. Each of us, I know, pays close attention to our reports from all over the country on the course of the struggle against the Viet Cong, and I am sure that these reports agree on the basic proposition that the war has been going well in a considerable portion of your country, at least until very recently.

5. In the last four months, by a series of events which neither you nor I can have wished and whose impact is surely a matter of equal regret to us both, a new and grave set of difficulties has developed. It is not my purpose here to recount in detail events with which you yourself are familiar, nor even to repeat expressions of concern, which you have heard many times from Ambassador Nolting and Ambassador Lodge, on the existing situation and dangers within your country.

6. It may well be your view that American opinion has been misled on these recent events, and I recognize that this is always a possibility in a world in which the accurate judgment of distant happenings is difficult. But that leads me to urge upon you as strongly as I can that the only way to correct this difficulty is to allow more and not less reporting by Americans and by other newsmen in your country. If there is one principle upon which my people are united, by Constitutional commitment, conviction, and tradition, it is that the way to get at the truth is to let people see for themselves—regardless of the irritations and criticism that a free press inevitably produces.

7. I must stress that, as I found it necessary to say publicly three weeks ago, we in our Government are gravely troubled by the danger that some of the methods used by some members of your Government may be creating a situation in which it will not be possible to sustain public support in Vietnam for the struggle against the Communists. What I must make clear is the effect recent events are having upon the situation here in the United States.

8. At the present time it is a fact that unless there can be important changes and improvements in the relations between the Government and people in your country, opinion in the United States, both in the public and in the Congress, will make it impossible for me to continue without change the great cooperative programs which we have been pressing together since 1961. I have said publicly that we do not wish to cut off our aid programs at this time, but it would be wrong for me not to let you know that a change is inevitable unless the situation in Vietnam takes a major visible and credible turn for the better.

9. At a minimum, and within a short period of time, it will become necessary for this Government to take actions which make it clear that American cooperation and American assistance will not be given to or through individuals whose acts and words seem to run against the purpose of genuine reconciliation and unified national effort against the Communists. Otherwise, it will become impossible for us to keep on with our major effort in support of your country. Unless I can show the American people that the United States is wholly dissociated from the public figures and public acts which have raised grave questions here, I clearly cannot ask the support of the American people and the Congress for the central effort.

10. There is much more that needs to be talked out between our two countries on these grave matters. I am asking Ambassador Lodge, as my personal representative, to express my views to you in complete frankness and to be at your disposal for further discussion. I have also instructed Secretary McNamara and General Taylor to review and to report to me on the present military situation. What Ambassador Lodge says to you has my explicit authorization and approval; I have given him complete authority in all aspects of United States operations in South Vietnam, and I rely upon his judgment. Of course I shall also welcome a direct expression of your personal views in a message to me at any time.

11. I repeat that it remains the central purpose of the United States in its friendly relations with South Vietnam to defeat the aggressive designs of the Communists. But I must also repeat that this purpose can only be achieved if major steps are speedily taken to remove the obstacles that have so seriously and regrettably impaired our cooperative effort.” Ends.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 S VIET-US. Top Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Hilsman and cleared in draft with Harriman and McGeorge Bundy. Repeated to USUN eyes only for Secretary Rusk.

2. In telegram 593 from Saigon, September 25, Lodge and McNamara transmitted their views. The telegram reads as follows:

   “We both agree with the President’s conclusion. Situation is very serious but is not likely to be influenced by the delivery of a letter from the President to Diem and, therefore, we recommend against transmitting one to him.” (Ibid., POL 1 S VIET-US)