Office of the Historian

146. Memorandum for the Record by Lieutenant Colonel Sidney Berry, Jr.1

En Route to Saigon, September 23, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • Secretary McNamara’s Instructions to Party Delivered Aboard Plane, 1230-1330 (EDST) 23 September 1963
1.
Mission. Mr. McNamara read the President’s memorandum of instruction2 and commented that the essence of the mission is to appraise the effectiveness of the SVN military effort to defeat the Viet Cong and to evaluate present and future prospects for success. If the prognosis is not hopeful, what action must be taken by SVN and what must USG do to lead SVN to that action?
2.
Letter to Diem. The President will forward to Saigon a letter to Diem3 which Lodge will deliver when Lodge and McNamara call on Diem. Letter will be presented to Diem on judgment of Lodge and McNamara. Not necessary to refer decision to President.
3.
Press Statements. While mission of party is inevitably broader than military, all press and public statements must emphasize military nature of the mission. Members of party should not mention publicly political aspects of trip.
4.
Congressional Testimony. Immediately upon return, Mr. McNamara and General Taylor expect to be called to testify before Congress. Their testimony must be based on thorough investigation and extensive field trip.
5.
Field Trips. Extensive field trips are necessary to build acceptable public posture. Each team member should spend maximum time possible in field. Mr. McNamara and General Taylor will spend most of their time traveling. Mr. Colby will spend most of his time in Saigon. Mr. Forrestal and Mr. Sullivan should alternate working in Saigon and traveling with McNamara-Taylor. So should Mr. Bundy and General Krulak.
6.
Overall Assignment to Members of Party. Mr. McNamara make following assignments:
a.
Mr. Bundy: Edit report.
b.
Mr. Forrestal: Assist Mr. Bundy edit report.
c.
Mr. Colby: Evaluate intelligence.
(1)
Why do so many conflicting intelligence reports exist? Evaluate views of individuals and agencies.
(2)
Appraise trends of SVN society.
d.
Mr. Sullivan: Evaluate conflicting views of US personnel in SVN.
e.
General Krulak: Determine attitude of GVN and US military.
7.
Individuals to be contacted.
a.
Mr. Forrestal:
  • American businessmen-
    • Lincoln Brownell
    • George Calfo
b.
Mr. Sullivan:
  • Ambassadors—
    • Chinese
    • Australian
    • Philippine
    • French British
    • Jacques Poulton (French businessman)
    • Thuc (Dean of Law School)
    • Labor Leaders
c.
Mr. Bundy:
  • ICC Members—
    • Cox (Canadian)
    • Goburdhan (Indian)
d.
Mr. Colby:
  • SVN businessmen
  • SVN labor leaders
e.
Gen. Krulak:
  • British and Australian Military Mission—
    • Serong
    • Cable questions to Thompson through Serong
8.

Questions to be answered. All members of the group should seek answers to the following questions. However, primary responsibility for ascertaining answers is assigned to individual cited.

a.
(Colby) Have key elements of SVN power base moved away from Diem? What are these elements? How far away from Diem have they moved? What is their likely future trend?
b.
(Colby) How serious is the student movement? Is it voluntary? If not, how organized? Who organized it? What of its future?
c.
(Krulak) Is there increasing unrest among the military? Has the situation changed since May? How? What of the future? (Sullivan will also assess views on this question held within the US Embassy.)
d.
(Forrestal) How has the SVN economy been affected by the recent unrest? What of the future?
e.
(Sullivan and Colby) What of the civil servants? How is their morale? What of the future?
f.
(Bundy and Sullivan) What is the true picture concerning political control of the village and hamlets? Do we have an accurate way of measuring this? If not, how can we measure accurately the picture of the situation in each hamlet? Does the USOM report of-the situation in the hamlets jibe with the Jacob Coat chart?4
g.
(Forrestal) Can our military and economic aid be used as a lever to move Diem government to follow our recommendations? If so, how?
h.
(Sylvester) What can be done to improve relationships with the press and reporting by the press? Have other national presses followed the same line as US press?
i.
(All) Is GVN government operated effectively as compared with the past?
j.
(All) What changes have occurred in the physical and mental health of Diem and Nhu?
k.
(All) Has there been a shift in relationship of Diem and Nhu? If so, what? How does their relationship today compare with that of the past?
1.
(All) Is it likely that Diem can retain effective political power?
m.
(All) If he can, can we expect the military effort to succeed? Or will it deteriorate? (This is the crucial question.)

Mr. McNamara enjoined all members of party to list additional questions and give them to Mr. Bundy for consolidation and use in guiding inquiry and writing final report.

9.
General guidance.
a.
Effort will be made to hold daily staff meeting, probably in early morning. Will be conducted by Mr. McNamara or Mr. Colby, whichever plans to be in Saigon for day.
b.
Single reporting system to Washington to be in effect for entire party, perhaps daily reporting cables. Any differences of opinion will be cited in group cable.
c.
Inform Mr. Sylvester of all press contacts—formal or informal—in advance when possible. Always have third party present.
d.
All members of party make daily memoranda for record. Give to Mr. Bundy for use in preparing final report.
10.
Final Report.
a.
Must be completed before return to Washington.
b.
Guides for report are proposed outline prepared by General Krulak and master list of questions consolidated by Mr. Bundy.
c.
To maximum extent, report will be worked out in Saigon. Layover in Honolulu is scheduled for completion of report.
d.
Should there be any dissenting views, they will be cited in the final report.
11.

Summary.

The job is to appraise the course of the war, the present and future of the Diem government, and to determine how the US can best influence the SVN government.

Sidney B. Berry, Jr.
Lt. Col, USA
Military Assistant
  1. Source: Washington Federal Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71-A-3470, Back Up Documents and Notes, 9/25/63-Trip to SVN. Secret.↩
  2. Document 142.↩
  3. See Document 147.↩
  4. Not further identified.↩