Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

125. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, September 17, 1963—9:28 p.m.

CAP 63516. Eyes only personal for Ambassador Lodge. Dept pass immediately. Deliver only one copy. No other distribution in Dept whatever. From the President.

1. Highest level meeting today has approved broad outline of an action proposals program designed to obtain from GVN, if possible, reforms and changes in personnel necessary to maintain support of Vietnamese and U.S. opinion in war against Viet Cong. This cable reports this program and our thinking for your comment before a final decision. Your comment requested soonest.

2. We see no good opportunity for action to remove present government in immediate future. Therefore, as your most recent messages suggest, we must for the present apply such pressures as are available to secure whatever modest improvements on the scene may be possible. We think it likely that such improvement can make a difference, at least in the short run. Such a course, moreover, is consistent with more drastic effort as and when means become available, and we will be in touch on other channels² on this problem.

3. We share view in your 523³ that best available reinforcement to your bargaining position in this interim period is clear evidence that all U.S. assistance is granted only on your say-so. Separate telegram2 discusses details of this problem, but in this message we specifically authorize you to apply any controls you think helpful for this purpose. You are authorized to delay any delivery of supplies or transfer of funds by any agency until you are satisfied that delivery is in U.S. interest, bearing in mind that it is not our current policy to cut off aid entirely. In other words, we share your view that it will be helpful for GVN to understand that your personal approval is a necessary part of all U.S. assistance. We think it may be particularly desirable for you to use this authority in limiting or rerouting any and all forms of assistance and support which now go to or through Nhu or individuals like Tung who are associated with him. This authorization specifically includes aid actions currently held in abeyance and you are authorized to set those in train or hold them up further in your discretion. We leave entirely in your hands decisions on the degree of privacy or publicity you wish to give to this process.

4. Subject to your comment and amendment our own list of possible helpful actions by government runs as follows in approximate order of importance:

a. Clear the air—Diem should get everyone back to work and get them to focus on winning the war. He should be broadminded and compassionate in his attitude toward those who have, for understandable reasons, found it difficult under recent circumstances fully to support him.

A real spirit of reconciliation could work wonders on the people he leads; a punitive, harsh or autocratic attitude could only lead to further resistance.

b. Buddhists and students—Let them out and leave them unmolested. This more than anything else would demonstrate the return of a better day and the refocusing on the main job at hand, the war.

c. Press—The press should be allowed full latitude of expression. Diem will be criticized, but leniency and cooperation with the domestic and foreign press at this time would bring praise for his leadership in due course. While tendentious reporting is irritating, suppression of news leads to much more serious trouble.

d. Secret and combat police—Confine its role to operations against the VC and abandon operations against non-Communist opposition groups thereby indicating clearly that a period of reconciliation and political stability has returned.

e. Cabinet changes to inject new untainted blood, remove targets of popular discontent.

f. Elections—These should be held, should be free, and should be widely observed.

g. Assembly—Assembly should be convoked soon after the elections. The government should submit its policies to it and should receive its confidence. An Assembly resolution would be most useful for external image purposes.

h. Party—Can Lao party should not be covert or semi-covert but a broad association of supporters engaged in a common, winning cause. This could perhaps be best accomplished by disbanding the party and starting afresh.

i. Repeal or suitable amendment Decree 10.

j. Rehabilitation by ARVN of pagodas.

k. Establishment of Ministry of Religious Affairs.

1. Liberation of passport issuances and currency restrictions enabling all to leave who wish to.

m. Acceptance of Buddhist inquiry mission from World Federation to report true facts of situation to world.

5. You may wish to add or subtract from the above list, but need to set psychological tone and image is paramount. Diem has taken positive actions in past of greater or less scope than those listed, but they have had little practical political effect since they were carried out in such a way as to make them hollow or, even if real, unbelievable (e.g., martial law already nominally lifted, Assembly elections scheduled, and puppet bonzes established).

6. Specific “reforms” are apt to have little impact without dramatic, symbolic move which convinces Vietnamese that reforms are real. As practical matter we share your view that this can best be achieved by some visible reduction in influence of Nhus, who are symbol to disaffected of all that they dislike in GVN. This we think would require Nhus departure from Saigon and preferably Vietnam at least for extended vacation. We recognize the strong possibility that these and other pressures may not produce this result, but we are convinced that it is necessary to try.

7. In Washington, in this phase, we would plan to maintain a posture of disapproval of recent GVN actions, but we would not expect to make public our specific requests of Diem. Your comment on public aspects of this phase is particularly needed.

8. We note your reluctance to continue dialogue with Diem until you have more to say, but we continue to believe that discussions with him are at a minimum an important source of intelligence and may conceivably be a means of exerting some persuasive effect even in his present state of mind. If you believe that full control of U.S. assistance provides you with means of resuming dialogue, we hope you will do so. We ourselves can see much virtue in effort to reason even with an unreasonable man when he is on a collision course. We repeat, however, that this is a matter for your judgment.

9. Meanwhile, there is increasing concern here with strictly military aspects of the problem, both in terms of actual progress of operations and of need to make effective case with Congress for continued prosecution of the effort. To meet these needs, President has decided to send Secretary of Defense and General Taylor to Vietnam, arriving early next week. It will be emphasized here that it is a military mission and that all political decisions are being handled through you as President’s senior representative.

10. We repeat that political program outlined above awaits your comment before final decision. President particularly emphasizes that it is fully open to your criticism and amendment. It is obviously an interim plan and further decisions may become necessary very soon.

1. Source: Washington Federal Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, SGN (63) 19 GVN. Top Secret; Flash; Eyes Only. Prepared in the White House and sent to the Department of State for transmission to Saigon. Also printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, pp. 545-547.

   In a memorandum to Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Harriman, and Robert Kennedy, September 17, Bundy stated that he drafted this cable. Bundy attached a draft of CAP 63516 which was similar although not identical to the text printed here. Bundy’s memorandum reads in part: “I have taken the liberty of doing a draft of a possible instruction that would initiate action under what we are now calling Phase I of Track 2—namely, a final effort of persuasion and pressure short of a decision to dump the regime no matter what.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Memos and Miscellaneous, Part II)

2. Not further identified.
3. Document 111.