25. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)1
SUBJECT
- Comments on Senator Mansfield Report2
The following comments are keyed to the pagination of the report:
Page 1: Our aid programs were “ill conceived and badly administered.”
Comment: Our old military aid program was ill-conceived since it was designed to repel overt invasion. This concept was changed in late 1959. Our old economic aid program was well-conceived but badly administered.
Page 2: American and Vietnamese officials speak of success in a year or two.
Comment: Only General Harkins says this and we have repeatedly suggested to the military that he be dissuaded from voicing such an estimate. The guerrilla wars in Greece, Malaya and the Philippines each lasted the better part of a decade. If we can win in five years we will be doing twice as well as was done in the others. The British knew they would win in Malaya in 1951 but did not achieve preponderant control for four years. We will be doing well if by the end of 1963 there are enough indications for us to say we can win.
Page 3: The growth of Viet Cong strength during 1962.
Comment: Our own strength also grew during 1962. The ratio of Vietnamese military and paramilitary to Viet Cong military and paramilitary (i.e., all forces of both sides) was 2-1/2 to 1 in our favor at the end of 1961. It has now grown to 3-1/2 to 1 in our favor, still a narrow margin in terms of the 10 to 1 or 20 to 1 cited as being necessary in the textbooks. However, our side has tremendous strength in men and equipment.
Page 3: Road travel and rice as indicators of improvement.
Comment: The change from a near panic shortage of rice to large exportable stocks during 1962 was more than an indicator. Perhaps the most important indicator was that the VC were unable to escalate [Page 71] the size and number of their attacks during 1962. If guerrilla forces are unable to steadily increase the size and number of their attacks they lose momentum. When a force which is inferior in size such as the VC once loses momentum it is extraordinarily difficult for it to regain momentum.
Page 4: The Viet Cong tactics can change.
Comment: Viet Cong tactics and our own change constantly. As guerrillas the Viet Cong strategy of living off the peasants while attempting to gain their support cannot change. They have no other major source of supply which is easily available and if their revolution is to succeed they must have peasant support. Strategic hamlets are designed to make the sea of Vietnamese peasants an inhospitable element for the VC fish.
Do the peasants support the Viet Cong merely out of fear or indifference?
Comment: No one really knows what the Vietnamese peasants think. However we believe it wise to assume that they will align themselves with whichever side appears stronger and more capable of benefiting them. This provides a reasonable basis for our programs.
Page 6: Can we win with Diem?
Comment: For a year we have increasingly shifted the emphasis of our programs to the province level.
There are really many wars in Viet-Nam, and we are fighting them at the local level as much as possible.
Comment: While Saigon does cause difficulties, Nhu’s emphasis on the strategic hamlet program has on balance been useful.
Page 7: The problem can be licked provided there is plenty of Vietnamese and American vigor and self-dedication (particularly Vietnamese).
Comment: Agreed.
Page 8: If present remedies are inadequate it is not recommended that we go to war ourselves.
Comment: Agree, but we should keep the Communists guessing on this one.
Page 9: Change in the situation caused by increased infiltration.
Comment: We have asked DOD and Saigon repeatedly for a contingency program to meet increased infiltration. General Wheeler should have comments.3
Page 9: A major increase in Chicom support.
Comment: This would be a major escalation which I doubt that the Chinese would risk. It would very seriously damage our prestige if we were to withdraw in the face of such an escalation
[Page 72]Is it in our interest to maintain a “quasi-permanent position of power on the Asian mainland?”
Comment: It is rather in our interest to prevent the Chicoms from achieving a quasi-permanent position of power in southeast Asia.
If a U.S. position of power in Asia is not essential, any improvement in Viet-Nam should be viewed as “strengthening our diplomatic hand.”
Comment: Success in the Malayan, Greek and Philippine wars was not achieved by diplomatic conferences. It was achieved rather when the Communist guerrillas decided that the power was against them, that they should lie low. Our objective in Viet-Nam should be similar, i.e., to help the Vietnamese Government to obtain a position where it is recognized as being predominantly sovereign over its own national territory (south of the 1 7th parallel).
Viet-Nam would be unlikely to survive another Geneva conference.
The same comment applies to the last paragraph on page 16. Our diplomacy cannot be “vigorous” unless based on a real position of strength.
- Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, LEG-Mansfield Report. Secret. Initialed by Wood.↩
- Reference is to the December 18, 1962, report to the President; see footnote 4, Document 24.↩
- See Document 26.↩