Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, February 21, 1962—10:01 a.m.

1006. Joint State-Defense-USIA Message.Embtel 1013.² State, Defense and USIA concur in view that more flexibility needed at local level in handling of American newsmen covering Viet-Nam operations. We conclude that in absence of rigid censorship, US interests best be protected through policy of maximum feasible cooperation, guidance and appeal to good faith of correspondents.

Recent press and magazine reports are convincing evidence that speculation stories by hostile reporters often more damaging than facts they might report.

Ambassador has over-all authority for handling of newsmen, in so far as US is concerned. He will make decisions as to when newsmen permitted to go on any missions with US personnel, when approved by US military commander.³ They also must approve in advance transport of newsmen on US ships and other US craft, including air, involved in Viet-Nam operations.⁴ Ambassador should coordinate the information policy with GVN if possible.

Attention called to the following guidelines which we believe in our national interest. US military and civilian personnel must see that they are adhered to scrupulously and that Ambassador given complete cooperation if we to avoid harmful press repercussions on both domestic and international scene.

1. This is not a US war. US personnel, civilian or military, should not grant interviews or take other actions implying all-out US involvement. Important that we constantly reinforce idea that this is struggle in which tens of thousands Vietnamese fighting for their freedom, and that our participation is only in training, advisory and support phases.

2. We recognize it natural that American newsmen will concentrate on activities of Americans. It not in our interest, however, to have stories indicating that Americans are leading and directing combat missions against the Viet Cong.

3. Should impress upon newsmen that purpose of certain classified operations is to flush out and destroy bands of vicious Viet Cong terrorists. Every effort made to avoid harming innocent civilians. Sensational press stories about children or civilians who become unfortunate victims of military operations are clearly inimical to national interest.

4. Operations may be referred to in general terms, but specific numbers—particularly numbers of Americans involved—and details of material introduced are not to be provided. On tactical security matters, analysis strength and weaknesses and other operational details which might aid enemy should be avoided.

5. We cannot avoid all criticism of Diem. No effort should be made to “forbid” such articles. Believe, however, that if newsmen feel we are cooperating they will be more receptive to explanation that we in a vicious struggle where support of South Vietnamese is crucial and that articles that tear down Diem only make our task more difficult.

6. Emphasize to newsmen fact that success of operation requires high level GVN-American cooperation and that frivolous, thoughtless criticism of GVN makes cooperation difficult achieve.

7. Correspondents should not be taken on missions whose nature such that undesirable dispatches would be highly probable.

Think it advisable that Ambassador and General Harkins see newsmen at frequent intervals so as to establish point that they keeping press informed to extent compatible with security. Should consider pre-operations briefing of newsmen by designated spokesman.

The point below for consideration and private use at Ambassadorʼs discretion:

It should be possible for Ambassador and/or military to exact from responsible correspondents voluntary undertakings to avoid emphasis in dispatches of sensitive matters, to check doubtful facts with US Government authorities on scene. Seriousness of need for this may be duly impressed on responsible correspondents to extent that, in interests of national security and their own professional needs, they can be persuaded to adopt self-policing machinery. Can be reminded that in World War II American press voluntarily accepted broad and effective censorship. In type struggle now going on in Viet-Nam such self-restraint by press no less important. Important to impress on newsmen that at best this is long term struggle in which most important developments may be least sensational and in which “decisive battles” are most unlikely, therefore stories implying sensational “combat” each day are misleading.

Additional press guidance will be provided from time to time. Your reactions and suggestions welcomed.

Rusk

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam, Country Series. Confidential. Drafted by Rowan, cleared with Wilson, Rusk, Manning, Cottrell, and Johnson of State, McNamara and Sylvester of Defense, and Salinger of the White House, and approved by Harriman; Rowan signed the telegram for Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad and COMUSMACV. The contents were discussed at the Secretary of Defenseʼs Conference at Honolulu on February 19, as indicated in Document 65. Where significant, differences between this telegram and the draft considered at Honolulu are indicated in footnotes below.
2. Document 48.
3. The draft message did not include this last clause.
4. At this point in the draft message was the sentence: “Ambassador to be guided by advice of Task Force Saigon members, particularly General Harkins.”