Office of the Historian

74. Memorandum From the Naval Aide of the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Bagley) to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor)1

Washington, February 23, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Viet-Nam Task Force Meeting, 21 February 1962
1.
Items of interest developed at the Task Force Meeting of 21 February are indicated below.
a.
The organization of the State-Defense-AID economic group to proceed to Saigon for review of FY-62 and FY-63 economic aid programs, decided upon at the 15 February meeting,2 was discussed. The project is bogged down by AID delay in naming a representative chartered to make on-the-spot decisions; AID has asked Saigon USOM director Gardiner for his views on the trip, which will result in additional delay and possible haggling on whether the trip is needed at all. The reason for the trip is basic—to modify the AID programs so that project characteristics are compatible with the C.I. strategy and will support it in proper order of priority.
b.
Defense indicated dissatisfaction with the progress and results of the provincial surveys. The military and intelligence objectives now being undertaken are not being met because team membership is too small and not enough time is devoted to each province. For example, there is need of data on numbers and location of CG and SDC. Defense feels there should be economic representation so that later civic action in the province pacification strategy can be properly planned. There should be more teams and a priority approach to parallel the 10 provinces selected for military pacification; the whole project should be speeded up. At Honolulu, Ambassador Nolting was moderately receptive to these criticisms; he was reluctant to push Diem. Governor Harriman indicated State support for any needs the Ambassador indicated. In the Task Force, Cottrell said the Honolulu discussion seemed to focus on the shortcomings and he would assume Ambassador Nolting will get with it; further, he asked the economic group to look into the matter when in Saigon. [This response was not very strong to say the least; I talked to Admiral Heinz and suggested he buck this to the Special Group (C.I.) next week through Secretary Gilpatric.]3
c.
The recent RDF intelligence indicating a VC radio station inside the Cambodian border (about 10 miles) was discussed… . [The Honolulu meeting discussed the question of improving DF capability and accuracy in detail; the VC are now using a onetime tape that will be unbreakable so there is a need for pinpoint locating information to destroy rather than monitor military communication facilities.]
d.
State asked Defense for suggestions to soften the impact of 900 MAAG personnel scheduled to arrive in SVN in March. [The heavy input is due in part to the Bragg schooling; the first course completes in late March.]
e.
The proposed arrangement to handle the U.S. news representatives in SVN was agreed in Honolulu (the Ambassador will make final decision on newsmen going on U.S. helos and aircraft with Country Team advice; in any case where General Harkins says they are not to go, they won’t).
W.H.B.4
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-133-69. Secret. Drafted by Bagley.↩
  2. See footnote 2, Document 63.↩
  3. At the March 1 Special Group (CI) meeting, it was agreed that the Group would investigate the question of “whether economic programs are being pushed as vigorously as others” and urged that “economic personnel should be included in survey groups for key provinces “ (Department of State, Special Group Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451, Special Group (C.I.) 1/1/62-7/31/62) Brackets in this and following paragraphs are in the source text.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩