Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

6. Talking Paper Prepared by Colonel Robert M. Levy, J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

Washington, January 4, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Current Actions and Requirements in Viet-Nam

Background—National Security Action Memorandum No. 111, dated 22 November 1961 to the Secretary of State,² stated that: (a) the US Government (USG) was prepared to join the Viet-Nam Government (GVN) in sharply increased joint efforts to prevent further deterioration of the situation in South Viet-Nam (SVN), and (b) the joint effort required the undertakings by both governments as outlined therein. The Secretary of Defense on 27 November 1961 in a memorandum, Subject: “First Phase of Viet-Nam Program”,³ assigned the responsibility for developing concepts, plans and specific requirements for carrying out the military actions listed in NSA Memo No. 111 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

—GVN efforts required:

a. Decentralizing and broadening of the government to realize the full potential of all non-communist elements m the country.

b. Vitalizing appropriate wartime agencies with adequate authority to perform their functions effectively.

c. Overhauling the military establishment and command structure so as to create an effective military organization and assure a mobile offensive capability for the Army.

—The USG:

a. Has provided increased airlift to the RVNAF in the form of helicopters, fight and transport aircraft.

b. Has an operational aerial reconnaissance and photography unit fulfilling GVN requirements.

c. Is providing air-ground support by presently deploying a PACAF Tactical Air Control System (TACS) to SVN and shipping 30 T28B (Nomads) to the GVN in February.

d. Is providing personnel for Special Intelligence.

e. Has added USN efforts to those of the VNN in coastal control and surveillance.

f. Has a “Jungle Jim” unit in operation in SVN.

g. Has approved and funded certain facility and communications/electronics projects.

—USG decisions are still pending on the establishment of a US Military Assistance Command, reorganization of the MAAG, and the key route defoliation plan.⁴

—CINCPACʼs revised list of numerous facility and communications-electronics improvements is under urgent consideration by JCS.⁵

—In early December 1961 Ambassador Nolting reached an agreement with President Diem intended to increase the effectiveness of GVN conduct of the war and UN/GVN relationships and military collaboration.⁶

—The Secretary of Defense, at the 16 December 1961 meeting at Hqs CINCPAC,⁷ indicated his intention to provide whatever necessary at this time, short of combat troops, to defeat communist forces in SVN.

Discussion—The USG has pressed on rapidly with the military portion of the overall program of actions deemed necessary in SVN. Receipt of highest level decisions on two pending actions and the establishment of new priorities and funding for the facilities and communications/electronics improvements will set in motion these remaining actions.

—Unfortunately, President Diem has not followed through on the agreed GVN measures as fully as hoped or desired. He continues to resist delegation of authority or to permit concentration of forces under a single commander for fear of a coup. His present stance negates the possibility of attaining an effective command structure. His disapproval of a US backed plan recently presented by Gen “Big” Minh delayed effective action against the enemy.

—There is reason to believe that a close, personal contact, sufficient to win his ultimate confidence in joint US/GVN collaboration, has not yet been effected with President Diem. The groundwork of joint agreement developed by Ambassador Nolting has not produced encouraging prospects of obtaining effective results.

—The personnel, matériel and funds being expended on SVN will in great measure be wasted unless the GVN quickly and conscientiously collaborates with the USG, improves its military system and commences the other required reforms.

—Establishment of a new US command in SVN prior to firm establishment of mutual collaboration with President Diem could prove ineffective and embarrassing.

Recommendations—It is recommended that:

a. Ambassador Nolting be asked for a frank and detailed assessment of President Diemʼs present relationships with US missions now in SVN and the possibilities of obtaining the GVN efforts, changes and degree of collaboration required.

b. The attached list of questions and problem areas be thoroughly discussed with Ambassador Nolting.

c. A list of major changes in GVN policy regarding joint military collaboration and its military establishment be compiled in conference with Ambassador Nolting for his urgent development with President Diem.

Attachment⁸

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEM AREAS

1. Has Diem given a definite date of release of the 5,000 Rangers for the Border Patrol?

2. Has Diem given approval for a joint US/GVN military intelligence system? If not, why not?

3. Is the GVN in fact coordinating closely with us in operations involving US units? Do GVN commanders coordinate with US commanders? If not—is it due to lack of authority or lack of desire on part of RVNAF?

4. At what levels are US uniformed personnel actually participating with RVNAF on operational missions? What is the lowest level officially agreed to by the GVN?

5. Does the VNAF and VNN have suitable representation on the Joint General Staff? If not, what or who is preventing this change?

6. Is General Khanh still at odds with Colonel Vinh, CINC, VNAF? Is he still withholding permission for VNAF to strike at suitable targets in a timely manner?

7. What visible and factual changes have been made to date in the reorganization of the military establishment?

8. What is the status of the Central Intelligence Organization? Has its resources been increased? Has approval been granted for US personnel participation?

9. Are US advisors participating in operational planning-and in what degree?

10. What is the actual status of the National Internal Security Council?

11. What civic action progress is being made under GVN auspices?

12. What is the present status of the Province Chiefs in relation to:

a. Command Chain—RVNAF

b. Provision of SDC troops to ARVN during large operations

c. Provision of intelligence

d. Direct line to Diem

13. Do you feel that Diem would be more tractable and more likely to collaborate closely with the USG if Nhu were not on the scene?

14. Does Diem distrust “Big Minh” to a point which negates his value as Field Force Commander?

15. In the event of a coup or Diemʼs death who in your opinion would be best successor? Most likely successor? Effect on US/GVN relations and conduct of war?

1. Source: JCS Files. Top Secret. Prepared for General Lemnitzer, for his meeting with Ambassador Nolting on January 9 at 10 a.m. Nolting arrived in the United States on January 5 and departed with Secretary McNamara for Honolulu en route to Saigon on January 14. During his stay in Washington he was involved in numerous meetings and briefings, some of which are documented in the following pages. Nolting subsequently indicated that his primary purpose in returning for consultations was to discuss the terms of reference for the new military commander in Vietnam. “Department of State, Office of the Historian, Vietnam Interviews, Frederick Nolting, June 1, 1984) For the original terms of reference agreed to at the Palm Beach meeting with the President, see Document 9.
2. SeeForeign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Document 272.
3. Not printed.
4. See Documents 2 and 1.
5. Not found.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Document 306.
7. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Document 324.
8. Secret.