Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

9. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)¹

Washington, January 6, 1962, 1:40 p.m.

061840Z. Top Secret Eyes Only for Admiral Felt and General McGarr From Lemnitzer.

1. Purpose of this message is to inform you of decision pertaining to U.S. command organization in Vietnam made during Presidentʼs conference with Sec Def and JCS at Palm Beach on Wednesday, 3 January.² Strict instructions at that time forbade any dissemination whatsoever of the discussion or decision. Sec Def has now modified these instructions to permit informing you on a strictly personal, not-to-be divulged-to-others basis.

2. In attendance at Palm Beach conference were President, Vice President, Sec Def McNamara, Dep Sec Def Gilpatric, Gen. Decker, Adm. Anderson, Gen. Smith (representing Gen. LeMay who was ill), Gen. Shoup, Gen. Taylor, Gen. Harkins and myself. Harkins invited by President to attend.

3. There was a thorough discussion of the situation in Vietnam and of the proposition that a reorganization of the U.S. military set-up was desirable in order to create in the minds of Diem and other Vietnam officials an awareness of the gravity of the situation, the increased support to be furnished by the U.S. and the necessity for greater acceptance on the part of the GVN of U.S. guidance, advice and counsel. Inherent in the proposed reorganization was the appointment of a senior U.S. military commander with terms of reference which would give him a position of greater authority and influence than that heretofore given the Chief, MAAG.

4. After full consideration of the pros and cons of the proposition, and particularly of the specific terms of reference (quoted below) which had been drafted jointly by the Sec Def and Sec State, the President approved the recommendation of the Secretaries of State and Defense that a U.S. Military Assistance Command should be established in Vietnam at an early date. He approved the terms of reference as drafted. He also approved the nomination of Lieutenant General Harkins to be commander of the new command with rank of general.

5. The question of timing of the release of this appointment was discussed. It was decided that no announcement would be made until after discussions with Ambassador Nolting who was due to arrive Washington 5 January.³ It now appears that any announcement will be delayed until after return of Amb Nolting to Saigon in order to permit him to accomplish the necessary preliminary contacts with Diem. (Note: For your information, Sec Def is planning next general meeting, such as was held 16 December, for 15 January at Honolulu.⁴ Nolting would presumably attend enroute back to Saigon.

6. Approved terms of reference follow:

• “1. The Senior U.S. Military Commander in South Vietnam will have the direct responsibility for all U.S. military policy, operations and assistance in that country, and the authority to discuss—both the U.S. and Vietnamese military operations directly with the President of Vietnam and the leaders of the GVN. The Senior U.S. Military Commander will also furnish advice to the GVN on all matters relative to security and maintaining internal security in South Vietnam and to the organization and employment of the RVNAF and of counterinsurgency or other paramilitary forces.
• “2. The Senior U.S. Military Commander will have the title ‘Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command—Vietnam.’
• “3. The Senior U.S. Military Commander will have direct access to CINCPAC and through him to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.
• “4. Since the U.S. Ambassador is responsible for political and basic policy matters, the Senior U.S. Military Commander will consult with him on such matters. In case of differences of view, both representatives would be free to communicate such differences to Washington for decision in accordance with already existing procedures.
• “5. The Ambassador and the Senior Military Commander will keep each other fully informed, especially on all high-level contacts with the GVN, and including major military plans and pending operations.”

7. It is of utmost importance that you hold contents of this message strictly to yourselves until further instructions are issued here.

1. Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Folder 24. Top Secret Priority; Eyes Only. A handwritten draft by Lemnitzer, dated January 6, is ibid., L-211-71.
2. See Document 2.
3. Regarding Noltingʼs visit, January 5-14, see Documents 14–16.
4. Regarding the first Secretary of Defenseʼs Conference at Honolulu, December 16, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Document 324; regarding the second, see footnote 1, Document 6.