Office of the Historian

59. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Rowan)1

Washington, February 13, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Saigonʼs 1013 re Press Treatment2

Problem

1.
Ambassador Nolting reports that he is in trouble with the press because of a) press exclusion from helicopter missions, b) exclusion from boarding USS Core at Cap St. Jacques and c) discrimination arising from special treatment of Soucherek of Life Magazine.
2.
Nolting requests authority “be given Task Force Saigon to decide on local correspondents’ requests to cover field operations in which U.S. participating, including arrival of equipment when deemed advisable.”

Discussion

1.
A large number of experienced, responsible American journalists are now in Viet-Nam covering a newsworthy development—the participation of U.S. military men in South Viet-Namʼs war.
2.
Until recently, our press coverage from Viet-Nam has been on the critical side—a search for a culprit responsible for the downward trend in the war against the Viet Cong. Critics point to President Diem and his tightly controlled government and military services as the impediment to success.
3.
In my opinion, the only way this unfavorable publicity—originating mostly from malcontents in Saigon—can be reversed is through registering successes in the security effort. The criticism will then abate and the reporting will be directed to the factual progress in the war.
4.
I believe we have almost reached the bottom of the downward curve. The results of our imminent adoption of a coordinated strategic plan (McNamara-Thompson-Hilsman-Diem ideas appear to be converging) plus the men, materials, and training should bring about a gradual upward curve favoring the GVN.
5.
Consequently I believe it important that our press representatives in Saigon be treated effectively in order to achieve the best constructive coverage. The attached article from U.S. News and World Report,3 with a “box” entitled “Curtain of Secrecy” saying that this “looks like a U.S. Embassy effort to confuse and disguise the situation” is a sample of the kind of coverage we do not want.
6.
Since Ambassador Nolting is on the scene and in constant touch with the newsmen, I believe he should be charged with the responsibility of press relations and coverage, with appropriate advice from Washington. He should be allowed to permit coverage of certain operations, taking into account the military commanderʼs opinion, and he should provide the newsmen with appropriate guidance.

Recommendation

1.
That we concur in Ambassador Noltingʼs request for authority (1013)
2.
That we provide him guidance, i.e.:
a)
That he should emphasize to newsmen in backgrounders that we are not taking over the direction of the war; that we are “in support of” the Vietnamese; that therefore they should not over-emphasize the U.S. role.
b)
That we do not deal in numbers because we do not want to telegraph our punches in detail to the Viet Cong or provide numbers for DRV complaints to the ICC.
c)
That we are in firm support of the GVN and are not looking for a replacement for Diem, and that we believe we can win with Diem by gradual change in the tight controls he previously exercised.
d)
We do not want coverage of civilian casualties as a result of government military operations.
e)
Any other guidance Washington deems appropriate.
  1. Source: Harriman Papers, Vietnam 1962. Confidential. The memorandum was sent to Rowan through Harriman. Typed at the top was: “Harriman said burn this.” In Harrimanʼs handwriting in the border was the following: “I disagree with this memo, but you should read it. I believe our press will build this assistance to Vietnam as our participation in this war—a new war under President Kennedy—the Democratic War [?] Party, so skillfully avoided by the Republican President Eisenhower. The Press do not belong on these aircraft but can be kept fully informed by briefings in Saigon by our military or Embassy. WAH”↩
  2. Document 48.↩
  3. Not found attached.↩