58. Letter From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Vietnam (Trueheart) to the Director
of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell)1
Saigon, February 12,
1962.
Dear Cot: Fritz has asked me to make an interim
response to your letter of January 26 regarding Farmgate bombing
operations.2
The best evidence I can give you that the points which are troubling you
have not escaped our notice here is the enclosed draft telegram. The
latter is addressed in terms to the question of crop defoliation, but
the arguments are of course applicable to area bombing and this is well
understood. (This, incidentally, is the draft Task Force message
referred to in MAAGʼs MAGPO 779,3
which you may have seen.)
As of now, Fritz is reserving judgement on the conclusions arrived at in
this message. He takes a more pragmatic approach and, before reaching a
position, would want to see the results of a review such as that
suggested in the second paragraph of your letter. Given the fairly
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desperate position we find
ourselves in in Viet-Nam, he wants to be very sure of his ground before
rejecting any weapon which might help to win the war, and he is
understandably reluctant to draw conclusions on vital questions on the
basis of a priori reasoning—which is about all we have to go on at this
point. Moreover, he is particularly anxious not to be recorded in
Washington as for or against the operation in question until there has
been an opportunity for further, objective study. In other words, he is
very keen that this not become at this stage—or, hopefully, ever—an
inter-departmental issue between State and Defense.
Best personal regards.
Sincerely,
[Enclosure]
Draft Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of
State4
JCS 041835Z Dec.5
TF/VN. Official GVN request has been received by MAAG from Defense SecState Thuan for commencement crop warfare
program. In request Thuan
stated instructions being given RVNAF to avoid damage to crops belonging government
supporters and to take such preventive measures as may be required
avoid adverse political or psychological reaction. Efforts now being
made determine if plans have been developed which meet requirements
ref msg for resettlement displaced persons and alternate food supply
system. Vietnamese chairman Joint Planning Committee for defoliation
and crop warfare aware US position stated in ref msg and is
currently trying to ensure that instructions from VN DOD include
appropriate provisions to meet this requirement. Vietnamese have
been generally cool to idea of specific plans for resettlement and
alternate food supply. They insist chemicals will only be employed
in areas not under GVN control and
where population either VC or
sympathetic thereto. They also feel that chemicals just another
weapon in arsenal to be employed against the VC. Since chemicals to be dispensed by Vietnamese in
VNAF helicopters, they apparently feel it their show and are ready
to go.
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Despite this understandable GVN
impatience, Task Force has reluctantly concluded GVN concept of use defoliants against
crops is ill conceived and, if implemented, would have effect
increasing VC strength rather than
decreasing it.
As indicated above, GVN proceeds from
premise inhabitants areas controlled by VC consist entirely VC
troops and “sympathizers”, thus any means may be used against them.
Task Force does not accept this premise. On contrary, we believe
that even in VC controlled areas
populace still susceptible being won by GVN if proper tactics used. Problem in
military/political warfare taking place here is to separate
guerrillas physically and psychologically from people and to win
latterʼs allegiance to government. Admittedly this is lengthy and
tortuous process, but it is only means achieving meaningful victory
in type of warfare such as that confronting Viet-Nam.
Widespread food denial program, like area bombing recommended by
Diem from time to time,
is completely at odds with this approach. It might well
inconvenience VC units and supporters
in areas affected but it would also insure ill will of whole of
population these areas, thereby increasing overall VC strength there.
Various ways of mitigating this effect have been suggested, notably
resettlement and food distribution programs in areas where crop
warfare conducted, but for several reasons we inclined to doubt
value such measures. GVN reps have
argued VC will simply resettle with
afflicted population and will be in forefront those demanding
replacement food. These points well taken, we believe, and
illustrate difficulties administering such a program. Furthermore,
because GVN doubts wisdom
resettlement and food replacement, such programs would probably not
be effectively implemented, even if accepted on paper.
We therefore now see no alternative but to conclude that type of crop
warfare program envisaged by GVN
would not contribute to GVN victory
and might in fact make such victory even more difficult obtain. This
conclusion based purely local factors and is without regard
international aspects.
We recognize that Diem may be
highly displeased this opinion. However, only alternatives are:
- a)
- to permit GVN to proceed
with defoliant operations in its own way—which we believe
would be counter-productive for reasons stated above;
or
- b)
- to insist on detailed case-by-case review by U.S. of
proposed operations. Because of lack of independent
intelligence, we have no sound basis for making such review
and particularly for deciding with assurance that given
operation would affect only hard-core VC. This procedure if conscientiously
implemented would therefore be source continuing invitation
in GVN-US relations.
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Task Force therefore recommends Diem be informed we prepared continue road clearance
program, if trials demonstrate its effectiveness but that we will
not support defoliant food denial operations at this fume.
