Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

334. Memorandum for the Files by the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Heavner)¹

Washington, December 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Senator Mansfieldʼs Reactions After Visiting Viet-Nam

According to Frank Meloy, who accompanied Senator Mansfield on his recent visit to Viet-Nam, the Senatorʼs chief impressions of the Viet-Nam situation are as follows:

1. Senator Mansfield still believes that Diem is personally incorruptible. He sees no alternative to Diem, and feels we must continue our present policy. However the Senator was disappointed by Diemʼs two and one-half hour monologue during which the Senator got the impression that Diem is a good deal older and more withdrawn from reality than when he last saw him. The Senator was a little miffed because Diem insisted upon recounting the whole history of his regime as though the Senator were a stranger to the Viet-Nam situation. The Senator also got the impression that the Nhuʼs now had more real power than ever before, and he considers this unfortunate.

2. Senator Mansfield had an overall impression of having faced the same problems and the same kind of situation in 1954 and 1955. He feels we are in a sense back again in the beginning.

3. The Senator feels that in the years from 1955 through perhaps 1959 Diem failed to get rice roots support among the peasants, and that the early drive and enthusiasm which characterized his government was somehow lost. He believes the key to winning the present struggle is not just extending the authority of the government but the extension of popular support and acceptance of the government. The government must be closer to the people.

4. The Senator was extremely critical of the past AID program. He directed his criticism in particular against former USOM Director Arthur Gardiner, whom he regards as a “disaster”. The Senator feels that part of the blame for the lost opportunity during the years 1955 to 1959 rests with our misguided AID program and our misdirected military training effort. (He feels the military training effort was misdirected in that it was aimed exclusively at meeting the threat of overt invasion from the north rather than the threat of guerrilla warfare.)

5. Nevertheless the Senator feels that the thrust of our present AID and military effort is right. He feels the strategic hamlet program may well succeed. He thinks we must continue our present efforts in pretty much their present form.

6. At the same time the Senator was dismayed by the prospect of huge and endless aid expenditures for Viet-Nam. He was not impressed by General Harkins estimate that the war can be won in one year—in fact, he was apparently annoyed by Harkins “undue optimism.”

7. If the present effort in Viet-Nam fails, Senator Mansfield believes our only alternative is to attempt to neutralize the whole area.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 22.1 Mansfield Visit to Saigon. Secret; Limit Distribution.