333. Memorandum From Michael
V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to
the President1
Washington, December 21,
1962.
INCREASE IN U.S. AIR FORCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I attach a memorandum from Secretary Gilpatric to you recommending an increase in the U.S.
air capability in South Vietnam.
The memorandum also recommends an investigation of the possibility of
obtaining Chinese Nationalist pilots to fly C-47 aircraft for the GVN. I understand that they are to be used
only on transport missions thus releasing the SVN pilots now so engaged for combat. Although there are a
number of Chinese Nationalists working for the GVN, none are pilots.
Despite his worries about increasing U.S. military presence in South
Vietnam at this time and the use of air power for strategic attacks on
targets which are not clearly identified as solely Viet Cong, Governor
Harriman approves Secretary
Gilpatricʼs proposal.
Governor Harriman believes that
the proposal is justified, because close-in air support to the increased
activities of the ARVN in defending
strategic hamlets is essential to the success of the program.
We are still very sensitive to the necessity of assuring that air strike
targets are selected so as to minimize the adverse political
consequences of killing uncommitted peasants. This is one of the
problems which Roger Hilsman and
myself will try to look into during our visit to South Vietnam.2
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[Attachment]
Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President
Washington, December 20,
1962.
SUBJECT
- Augmentation of U.S. Air Unit in Vietnam
- 1.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have reviewed two requests
from the Commander in Chief, Pacific, both of which are related
to providing additional combat air capability in support of
military operations in South Vietnam (SVN). The first is a request for early augmentation
of Farmgate by 18 aircraft (5 T-28s, 11 B-26s, 2 C-47s) and 117
USAF personnel (95 combat,
22 air base support). Farmgate is the current code name of the
Air Force Jungle Jim Squadron that you authorized on 11 October
1961 to be introduced into Vietnam.4 The second request is for approval to
initiate talks with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) on the subject of the use of
Chinese Nationalists as Vietnamese Air Force C-47 pilots.
- 2.
- A review of operations by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
(RVNAF) and paramilitary
forces for the past six months shows that practically all ground
actions now are coordinated with some air support effort. This
has resulted in continually increasing requirements for air
support. Appreciation of the role of air support by the
Vietnamese is evidenced by the increasing numbers of combat
missions flown the past several months in support of convoys,
strategic hamlet defense, heliborne assault, interdiction,
conventional ground operations, and paramilitary operations. In
September 1962, the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) fighter aircraft
flew 620 combat sorties as compared with 150 combat sorties the
previous January. This increase dramatically illustrates the
growth in the number of air support sorties. The impact of these
increasing requests for air support has been so great that
requirements exceed the combined capabilities of the VNAF and
Farmgate. In fact, CINCPAC
states:
“We are daily losing opportunities to destroy Viet Cong
due to inability of VNAF to answer valid requests for
air strikes. This situation results primarily from VNAF
pilot shortage. Farmgate pilots are being overflown
averaging 100 hours per month and cannot fill the gap.”
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Farmgate,
and for all practical purposes the VNAF, has reached
optimum operating capabilities. Their combined efforts
are not able to fill all valid requests for air
support.
- 3.
- During the next several months, which CINCPAC states will be
critical, the need for air support is expected to continue to
increase because of the following factors:
- a.
- Increase in offensive operations as the Vietnamese
forces continue to become more active and
aggressive.
- b.
- The addition of the ninth division to the Army by the
end of 1962, and the steadily expanding capabilities of
the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps.
- c.
- Increased number of air mobile operations made
possible by the recent addition of two helicopter
companies.
- d.
- Support of President Diemʼs nation-wide offensive planned for
early 1963.
- e.
- Expansion of the Citizens Irregular Defense Groups and
paramilitary programs.
- f.
- Improvement in weather which favors military
operations supportable by air.
- 4.
- In addition to the above, General
Harkins visualizes dispersal of certain strike
teams for air support into three areas of SVN. This decentralization is
designed to provide an air strike capability in each of these
areas and thereby decrease the reaction time for air support. In
the past, the majority of Farmgate aircraft have been
concentrated in the Saigon area due to limitations in
maintenance, availability of pilots, and equipment. As a result,
penalties have been paid in terms of targets lost and slow
reaction times. The dispersal of strike teams will alleviate
this problem, but at the same time will increase the requirement
for facilities, pilots, and equipment to accomplish the air
support role. Therefore, to meet increasing requirements for air
support which will be necessitated by the foregoing
developments, additional air support capability is needed now in
SVN.
- 5.
- The continual growth of coordinated ground and air operations
induced by the increasing numbers of heliborne operations and
the steady increase of air support capabilities in SVN over the past year has been
instrumental in producing a unifying effect within the RVNAF. Prior to the influx of air
support/heliborne operations, military planning on the part of
the Vietnamese forces basically was isolated, noncoordinated,
“do what you can” action with very little rapport between the
armed forces and other elements of the GVN. With the continuing growth of air capability,
there has been a marked improvement in coordinated military
planning and in the use of all national resources.
Significantly, the growth of air support and
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heliborne operations has given
U.S. advisors a firm entree into RVNAF planning and has resulted in a marked
increase in military initiative and successes. This entree must
continue to be exploited.
- 6.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have reviewed the requirement
for air support in SVN. It is
our opinion that the requirement will increase in the next few
months as set forth by CINCPAC and that every reasonable effort should be
expended to insure that adequate and timely air support is
available for current military and paramilitary operations as
well as for the planned nation-wide offensive. Recognizing the
concern over direct U.S. commitment in SVN, we have examined a number of possible
solutions. It is considered that actions now underway to
increase VNAF pilot training and aircraft equipage ultimately
will make possible the desired reductions in direct U.S.
commitment. Programs are now underway to increase Vietnamese
student pilot training and to provide additional combat aircraft
phased with the expanded pilot output which will result.
Currently student pilots total 131 for fixed wing aircraft and
66 for helicopters. In about 12 months it may be possible to
reduce U.S. participation in combat close support operations
(Farmgate) as this new group of Vietnamese pilots becomes
operationally ready. The extent of this reduction will depend on
the extent of the need for Farmgate aircraft to train the VNAF
in special tactics and on the number of valid air support
requests as ground operations expand in the coming months.
CINCPAC does not at this
time foresee a need for further Farmgate augmentation beyond
that recommended herein.
- 7.
- In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, the
overriding conclusion is that an immediate increase in the air
support capability is needed and should be provided without
losing sight of the necessity for continuing to increase the
capability of the VNAF to fill Vietnamese air support
requirements. From our review of possible methods of increasing
air support capabilities immediately, we conclude that the most
favorable options are those recommended by CINCPAC: immediate augmentation
of Farmgate as outlined in paragraph 1 and introduction of 30
Chinese Nationalist pilots. We anticipate that the latter could
not be realized as an increase in RVNAF capabilities earlier than four months after
initiating discussions with the GVN.
- 8.
- Therefore, I recommend that you approve the augmentation of
Farmgate as requested by CINCPAC and initiation of discussions with the
GVN on the possible use of
30 Chinese Nationalist pilots to fly
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transport aircraft in the RVNAF. The Department of State
concurs in this recommendation.5