Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

270. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, August 23, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Viet-Nam: Project for Crop Destruction (Secretary McNamara has submitted a memorandum recommending approval of this project.)²

Description

About six Vietnamese operated helicopters with Vietnamese air support would spray herbicide on 8 areas of land totaling 2500 acres as a part of the successful Hai Yen II operation now taking place in Phu Yen province. These fields are in the mountains. On the basis of ARVN intelligence Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins believe that these crops will, unless destroyed, nourish local Viet Cong. However, there is no first-hand evidence to prove that this riceland is primarily for Viet Cong use (Tab A³). Because of this operation there are resources in the province to care for any Viet Cong or Montagnards who may flee the area.

It is not feasible for ground troops to enter this area and destroy the crops.

If the operation is to be carried out, it should, to be effective, be done in August.

Disadvantages

(a) Although conducted by Vietnamese, there would be Communist propaganda attacking the use of U.S. aircraft and techniques for the destruction of Asian peopleʼs food.

(b) The way to win a guerrilla war, basically, is to win the people. Crop destruction runs counter to this basic rule. The problem of identifying fields on which the Viet Cong depend is hardly susceptible to solution so long as the Viet Cong and the people are co-mingled. The Government will gain the enmity of people whose crops are destroyed and whose wives and children will either have to stay in place and suffer hunger or become homeless refugees living on the uncertain bounty of a not-too-efficient government.

Other people, who merely sympathize with them, will also hate the government for crop destruction. The use of strange chemical agents, to destroy crops, strikes at something basic implanted in human beings (even if the people do not—as many will—fear that the chemical agents are also directly harmful to people).

(c) Use of United States aerial spraying techniques to destroy crops in Viet-Nam may give rise to Communist propaganda that the United States is embarking on chemical warfare in Asia. This could give rise to increased charges of use of poison gas and perhaps even of biological weapons against Asian population.

Advantages and Other Considerations

(a) We have already carefully limited our supporting role in Viet-Nam. We should not voluntarily deprive ourselves of the use of new techniques unless we are sure the Vietnamese can subdue the Viet Cong without them.

(b) The most effective way to hurt the Viet Cong is to deprive them of food. Food is scarce in their mountain strongholds and food destruction there can be most effective.

(c) Neither the method nor the concept are new. The British destroyed some crops from the air in Malaya. In Viet-Nam, both sides are destroying each otherʼs food. The Vietnamese have been burning Viet Cong crops with air-dropped napalm for some months. Napalm damages the soil for several years; defoliants do not.

(d) The GVN is very anxious to undertake this program and is looking into purchasing the chemicals in Hong Kong, Taiwan or Tokyo. If the GVN does this, it will be more difficult for us to control and delimit the operations.

(e) We have already absorbed some Communist propaganda accusing us of destroying crops in connection with our earlier defoliant tests (Tab B).⁴ This propaganda did not arouse major international repercussions. The Communists may continue these charges even if we stop all defoliant and do not engage in crop destruction operations. Communist charges of germ warfare in Korea were not withdrawn consequent to the fact that, being untrue, they could not be proven.

(f) With available techniques and chemicals the crops can be killed (Tab C).⁵

(g) Earlier limited defoliation experiments in Viet-Nam are reported to have had the following effects:

a. Viet Cong leaders issued orders which showed concern (Tab D).⁶

b. According to Ngo Dinh Nhu, defoliation appeared to the Montagnards as a powerful weapon, suggesting that the GVN is the more powerful side which they should join; he has asserted it also made the Viet Cong put more pressure on the Montagnards to ensure adequate food supplies, and contributed to their leaving Viet Cong areas.

c. In neighboring Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk did not show concern.

Conclusions

Destroying crops will inevitably have political repercussions. Intelligence is not yet reliable enough to assure that the crops destroyed are those controlled solely by the Viet Cong. Some innocent, or at least persuadable, peasants will be hurt and the Viet Cong will make the most of this in their propaganda and recruiting. Internationally, there will undoubtedly be greater reaction to a program of crop destruction than there was to defoliation.

Since food in South Viet-Nam is plentiful, it is not likely that a program for destroying crops would be effective enough to produce starvation among the Viet Cong, but two realistic strategic goals do seem possible. First, an effective program might be able to cut down food supplies enough to prevent the Viet Cong from stockpiling, thus making it difficult for them to concentrate large forces and sustain them in combat. Second, an effective program would force the Viet Cong to spend an increasing proportion of their time on acquiring and transporting food, rather than fighting.

It seems clear, however, that such results could be achieved only at a later stage in the counter-guerrilla campaign, after the Viet Cong have been isolated from the peasants and driven into well-defined areas of concentration. To be effective, the program would have to be extensive, and it is doubtful whether the government could carry out an extensive program while the Viet Cong are as widely dispersed as they are at present. An ineffective or premature program would only force the Viet Cong to intensify their efforts to penetrate or destroy nearby strategic hamlets, and the strategic hamlet program is in its present nascent state still extremely vulnerable.

Recommendations

I recommend that we make the foregoing conclusions known to Ambassador Nolting and ask that he seek to dissuade President Diem from now embarking independently on a crop-destruction program which would be at least premature.

I further recommend that the program under immediate consideration be disapproved.

Dean Rusk⁷

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret. According to another copy, this memorandum was drafted by Rice and Wood on August 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 851K.23/8-2362)
2. Document 262.
3. Telegram 129 from Saigon, August 8; Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-862.
4. Telegram 145 from Saigon, August 15; ibid., 751K.23/8-1562.
5. Tab C was a six-line extract from an operational program on vegetation control.
6. Tab D was a three-paragraph extract from a review of the defoliation program in South Vietnam.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.