269. Memorandum From the Vice Presidentʼs Military Aide (Burris) to the Vice President1
Washington, August 17,
1962.
RE
The program for South Vietnam which you delineated in your memorandum to
the President in May of last year2
continues to be the basis for U.S. effort in that area. Your program was
modified only slightly by General Taylorʼs mission3 in three specific military areas, as follows: (1) improve
intelligence, (2) improve communications, (3) provide air logistics. The
net result of General Taylorʼs
recommendations was to provide information as soon as possible on Viet
Cong activities and to offer a means of transport whereby Government
troops could move swiftly to attack the Communists.
In the economic field, your recommendations were augmented and amplified
by the Staley Committee,4
with which recommendations you are familiar. The recommendations of Dr.
Staley were generally
accepted and the measures which have been implemented have been
generally successful.
[Page 602]
The specific measures in your program have therefore been proven to be
sufficiently comprehensive. The goals which were set remain essentially
unchanged, and constant surveillance is maintained in State and Defense
on the degree of achievement or accomplishments in each specific point
or area (see attached memorandum).
On the practical side, there has been concern as to just what these
measures have contributed toward winning the war, or at least toward
reversing the trend sufficiently in favor of Government forces to permit
victory in the foreseeable future. While the conditions described in the
recent Newsweek article5
are rejected by State and Defense, it is virtually impossible to elicit
specific replies from either of those Departments as to the degree of
success or failure, particularly in the military field. While confidence
in eventual victory is generally accepted, only General Harkins has said that “we are on the
winning side”. Mr. Wood in State
assessed the situation by saying that the trend against the U.S. in
South Vietnam was halted last November, but presently we are just about
holding our own and an upward trend in our favor is not yet clearly in
sight.
Politically, Diem is, if anything,
weaker than he was when you met him, but the U.S. is determined to work
with him in the absence of a reasonable alternative. Economically,
progress is being made through the excellent cooperation of the
Vietnamese on the principles set down by the Staley Committee. Socially, much progress has been made
in health measures, agriculture credits and improvements, education, and
information. Great emphasis is being placed on these social activities
because of the recognition that the real strength of Vietnam lies with
the peasants and the Army and not with the central Government. Certain
achievements here, however, are going to be more gradual. Militarily,
such statistics as incidents, casualty rates, desertions, loss and
capture of weapons, frequency and size of attacks, border infiltration,
etc., do not reflect such a favorable picture. We are now in a period
where the impact of U.S. training, supplies, assistance, doctrine and
technique should soon be felt and yield results.
Mr. McNamara has held six
conferences in Hawaii with the Ambassadors and principal military people
from the area. While the voluminous transcripts of those conferences
reflect great attention to detail in providing for optimum success of
American effort, there is also a repetition of Mr. McNamaraʼs philosophy that the United
States must make an effective showing in Vietnam as quickly as possible
or be misunderstood by the American people, Congress and indeed by the
world. There is also motivation to avoid the charge of “too little, too
late”.
[Page 603]
With the settlement in Laos, great attention has been paid to the
transfer of Viet Cong forces, but such an increase has not yet been
detected. However, the border crossing problem, as it has long existed,
remains practically unsolved. There have also been rumors that the
Communists would seek a Laos-type settlement in South Vietnam, but such
a settlement is currently ruled out because the South Vietnamese people
will not willingly accept the kind of settlement imposed in Laos. While
Mr. McNamara has pursued the
military effort with a great sense of urgency, he has, for planning
purposes, established a time factor to carry out the Presidentʼs
decision last year to seek the settlement in Laos and to defend South
Vietnam. In addition to the elements of urgency described above, he has
also set forth the assumption that the present effort will be maintained
for three years. This is not to say that the effort will be terminated
or phased out in this period, but rather it is a realistic expression of
a reasonable period during which success must be achieved or at least be
in sight. Under present circumstances we appear to be just about turning
the corner.
[Attachment]
Memorandum Prepared in the Vietnam Working Group6
Washington, August 16,
1962.
SUBJECT
- Viet-Nam—Current Status of Items Discussed Between Vice
President Johnson and
President Diem
The following points were discussed (some appeared in the Joint
Communique of May 13, 19617). Each
is followed by a description of its present status:
- 1.
-
Agreed to infuse into our actions high sense of urgency
and dedication.
Achieved on both sides, as evidenced by the American
military build-up, improved Vietnamese morale, exchanges
of messages between President Kennedy and President
Diem, and the
momentum behind the strategic hamlet program in
Viet-Nam. President Diem told Ambassador Nolting last month
that US-Vietnamese cooperation was excellent. Both sides
are agreed on the importance of helping the peasants
quickly by means of the strategic hamlet
program.
- 2.
-
Diem pleased US
has approved MAP support
for 20,000 force increase but pointed to problem of
paying local currency costs for this increase.
The present regular armed forces level is now about
200,000, or 50,000 above the level in May 1961. The
local currency problem has not been completely solved.
However, GVN deficit
financing, higher yields on US-financed imports,
increased tax collections, combined with US assurances
that we will provide resources needed to stem possible
inflation, have been sufficient to move ahead with the
buildup.
- 3.
-
Agreed parallel political and economic action has equal
importance with military measures but stated political
and economic actions must be those appropriate to
Viet-Nam as country which is underdeveloped and subject
Communist subversion.
There has been political and economic progress since May
1961, although Diemʼs popular support has probably
declined. This is counterbalanced by momentum achieved m
the strategic hamlet program already underway, which
shows great promise to reverse the trend as villagers
get security, more local self government, economic
benefits and a greater stake in the outcome of the
war.
- 4.
-
Agreed to increase in MAAG personnel.
A steady increase of U.S. training, advisory and logistic
support personnel commenced in May 1961. The number has
risen from 700 to 10,000, including those in operational
units attached to the new Military Assistance
Command/Viet-Nam (MAC/V), of which MAAG is now a component.
MAAG advisers in
each province are doing a terrific job.
- 5.
-
Agreed to MAAG support
and advice to Self-Defense Corps.
The training and rearming of SDC units is proceeding rapidly and they
are giving a good account of themselves.
- 6.
-
Diem pleased
with MAP support for
entire Civil Guard force of 68,000.
Training has been speeded up with a target of training
and rearming all CG units
by the end of calendar 1962. The strength target for FY
1964 is now 90,000.
- 7.
-
Diem accepted
offer of material support for the Junk Force.
Construction is underway to develop a force of 28
Divisions (20 junks per Division). Four divisions are
now operational and performing their mission to harass
VC seaborne
communications and stop infiltration from
outside.
- 8.
-
Noted that we are prepared to consider the case for
further increase in the strength of GVN armed forces.
[Page 605]
We have established a force goal of 225,000 (an increase
of 50% from May 1961) to be achieved by June
1964.
- 9.
-
Agreed to further urgent joint study of border control
techniques.
Plans and concepts for border control are still under
study by RVNAF and
U.S. advisors. Intelligence on infiltration is
improving, especially as patrols of mountaineers are
being rapidly formed. US planes and helicopters and
improved radio communication now make it possible to
bring Vietnamese troops quickly to any threatened
point.
- 10.
-
Agreed to consider establishment in southeast Asia of
research and development facilities.
Combat test development centers have been established and
are in operation in Viet-Nam and Thailand. Research has
led to many improvements, e.g. better arms and armament
for helicopters.
- 11.
-
Agreed to use of US military specialists to assist
Vietnamese armed forces in health, welfare and public
works activities at village level. Stressed importance
of tact of foreign officials in working in this
field.
US forces are working in all forty provinces to train the
Vietnamese Armed Forces in civic action and civil
affairs, as well as mounting their own civic action
programs.
- 12.
-
Agreed to renew border control negotiations with the
Cambodian Government.
In spite of repeated efforts by the US, joint
Vietnamese-Cambodian control has not been effected and
incidents are frequent, causing friction and helping the
Viet Cong. Cambodia did, however, invite the GVN to send a military
commission to visit border areas and determine the
extent of Viet Cong activity on the Cambodian side. The
GVN has accepted and
will dispatch a team shortly. It might develop into a
joint operation.
- 13.
-
Agreed on desirability of using foreign non-American
experts in counter-guerrilla field, but stressed it
would be up to initiative GVN to request these experts and they would
have to work under its control.
The British have sent a highly qualified advisory
mission. Many of its recommendations have been accepted.
Australia has sent thirty trainers to augment US MAAG activities. Other
countries have sent survey missions or are being
approached to provide help.
- 14.
-
Agreed to proposal for sending US economic and fiscal
experts to work out financial plan as basis for joint
efforts.
A mission under Dr. Eugene
Staley worked out a plan with the
Vietnamese and completed its work in Viet-Nam in July
1961. The plan was adopted and embodied in National
Security Action Memorandum 65,
[Page 606]
August 11, 1961.8 As a result the
Vietnamese have added import taxes so that aid dollars
now generate more piasters.
- 15.
-
Agreed we should work together on a longer range
economic development program.
The GVN has announced a
formal 5-year plan, but it is more in the nature of a
catalogue of projects than an integrated plan. The
ongoing AID program is
continuing to contribute to long range development, but
conditions in Viet-Nam have required a shift in emphasis
to programs with an early pay-off which can help win the
war sooner.
- 16.
-
Diem presented
memo to Vice President on need for additional commodity
aid and for relaxation of “Buy American” policy on aid
to Viet-Nam.9
The amount of assistance which could be absorbed by
Viet-Nam was a matter of dispute in May 1961. The
Staley
Mission subsequently established criteria which have
proven workable for that portion of commodity aid
channeled through the private sector. In addition,
commodities and equipment procured directly for the
public sector (e.g. materials for strategic hamlet
construction), which are not affected by the absorptive
capacity of the private sector, have been increased
significantly.