228. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Counselor for Political Affairs in Vietnam (Mendenhall) and the Chinese Ambassador in Vietnam (Yuen Tse Kien), Saigon, June 26, 19621
SUBJECT
- Current Situation in Viet-Nam
(Note: During a farewell call on the Chinese Ambassador he decided to engage in a very frank exchange on the situation in Viet-Nam. At the conclusion, he expressed the desire that his views not be repeated to others. Therefore, this memorandum should be regarded as containing very sensitive information and recipients are requested not to give it any further distribution.)
In an exchange assessing the strategic hamlets program the Chinese Ambassador expressed serious concern that GVN Minister of Interior, Bui Van Luong, in his recent speech on the program before the Lions Club, placed economic and social development of the hamlets in the fourth phase of the program. The Ambassador repeatedly emphasized that economic and social works to improve the lot of the peasants should be in the very first phase because they are essential for winning the people to the support of the Government. He said the Vietnamese are a good people, but they have been buffeted and forced to work for both sides in conflicts for 17 years since 1945. Now that they are being asked once again by the GVN to provide work and make other sacrifices in connection with the strategic hamlets program, they must be given some compensation for what they are being asked to do. If it is not demonstrated to them that they are going to get something in the way of concrete benefits out of this program, the risk is great that the strategic hamlets program will drive them over to the enemy.
The Ambassador then said that it did not actually take much to gain the loyalty of the Vietnamese peasants because they now have so little. He mentioned the usual type of benefit which we have been [Page 474] urging on the GVN, such as agricultural credits, schools, dispensaries and agricultural tools, and also mentioned that he thought a little cement to enable the peasants to pave the floors of their huts and thus keep them dry underneath would be an extremely useful means of attracting support.
He indicated that it is up to us Americans to find the means of inducing the GVN to undertake an adequate economic and social program. He suggested the advisability of avoiding any approach based on politics or principles, since either would ruffle GVN feathers, and thought perhaps the best means might be simply to go to the GVN and state that we have the money for such a program and letʼs get started with one in specific places.
The Ambassador stated that President Diem is a fine man but he thinks only in black and white without any shades or nuances. The Ambassador said he had talked with Vice President Tho about the reported number of around 25,000 Viet-Cong, and indicated that many of these are Hoa Hao and Cao Dai rather than Viet-Cong. He said the Vice President had agreed with this analysis as well as with the Ambassadorʼs view that it would be desirable to win over by compromise the non-VC fighting against the Government and thus reduce the proportions of the guerrilla problem to those who are actually Communists. Since President Diem, however, sees things only in black and white he refuses to make the compromise necessary for this purpose.
The Ambassador also indicated the, the President puts too much emphasis on the “moral side.” The President is stressing constantly what he expects the people to do on behalf of the nation, but he should be outlining to the peasants what the Government is going to do to better their condition. The Ambassador concluded sorrowfully, however, that President Diemʼs nature cannot be changed and therefore effort must be made to find other means to meet these problems. He reverted to his suggestion about the need for U.S. efforts to sponsor economic and social development in the hamlets. He indicated that he himself cannot influence the GVN directly because he is obliged to talk very circuitously with most GVN officials. (This may have been an oblique reference by the Ambassador to the pressures which can be placed by the GVN on the Chinese community in Viet-Nam unless the Chinese Ambassador treads carefully.)
The Chinese Ambassador emphasized that the war in Viet-Nam should not be permitted to drag on too long. Already, he said, some Vietnamese are beginning to think in terms of neutralization of Viet-Nam. They ask that if it can be done in Laos, why not in Viet-Nam? When I questioned him more closely on this, the Ambassador said he has heard this view particularly from representatives of the old scholar [Page 475] class and not thus far from those who are politically active. He indicated that in his view, however, these thoughts of neutralization would spread as people became weary of the continual killing.
I asked the Ambassador whether those who are talking about neutralization are thinking just in terms of the South or all of Viet-Nam. He said that most of them are thinking of neutralization initially of the South with the thought that Viet-Nam might eventually be reunified over the longer term. A few are thinking in terms of early neutralization of both parts of Viet-Nam.
Comment: I was struck that for the first time during my three years’ service in Viet-Nam I had received serious indication that neutralization is beginning to be considered by some Vietnamese as a solution to the Vietnamese problem. It was even more striking that this indication came in two conversations, one immediately after the other on the same day, with Vice President Tho and the Chinese Ambassador.
- Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-016-69. Secret; Limited Distribution. This memorandum and Document 229 were transmitted to General Taylor in the White House by Rostow on July 31. Covering the two memoranda of conversation was an intra-office transmittal slip from Taylorʼs office with the following message: “These memoranda deserve special note. I have marked key parts, but suggest all are worth reading. Major point made is need to accelerate CI effort and more liberal social-economic actions are mandatory. Time is of essence because of growing sentiment for neutral solution. Perhaps latter point is means to press Diem?” Also sent to Nolting, Truehart, Richardson, Harkins, Weede, the Vietnam Working Group in Washington, INR, and the Embassy in Taipei.↩