Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

227. Memorandum From the Special Consultant for Counterinsurgency, United States Operation Mission (Phillips) to the Acting Director of the Mission (Fippin)¹

Saigon, June 25, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Conversation with Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu on 22 June 1962

1. Mr. Nhu said that although he had originated the strategic hamlet program, it was only an idea, a “pipe-dream”, to him until the last four months. Since that time he has been making constant trips to the provinces, particularly to the south. During his more recent trips, all ceremonies were eliminated and he insisted on only single course meals. Most of his time was consumed by visits to hamlets and meetings with strategic hamlet teams, hamlet chiefs, province chiefs, district chiefs and committees. These discussions often lasted as long as five hours. He found the trips very tiring but at the same time exhilarating because he had been able to test out his theories about strategic hamlets through actual experience.

2. He viewed the strategic hamlets as a means to defeat communism while, at the same fume, overcoming the problems of an underdeveloped country. These problems, in addition to communism, were separatism among various groups of the population and inherited systems of privileges. He said the imposition of democracy at the top in an under-developed country brought anarchy which resulted in dictatorship. Democracy must be instituted at a level where the people can understand it and where it can be a revolution to eliminate the existing system of privileges and the defeatism and separatism which exists in the minds of the people.

3. In time of war people think you must suppress democracy to win. To the contrary, he said, we shall use the war against communism as a means to introduce democracy and we shall use democracy to win the war. This is the strategic concept.

4. Free elections of the hamlet chief and hamlet council are the key to success of the strategic hamlets. The first thing Nhu asks when he visits a hamlet and talks to the hamlet council is how were the elections conducted. He tells the district committees (for strategic hamlets) that hamlet governments elected by a show of hands are only provisional. If they are not sure of a hamlet, they may have an initial provisional electron through a show of hands. However, they must have an electron by secret ballot before the strategic hamlet (civic action) team goes on to another hamlet and before the hamlet can receive a charter (which Nhu describes as a social contract between the province and the hamlet). He tells the cadres working in the hamlet that they must not tell the people who to vote for; otherwise the election defeats its own purpose. If the cadres want a particular person to be elected, that person must prove himself to the people by working harder than the others. If he deserves to be elected, he will be elected.

5. In answer to a question whether he did not think the Government should attract the Viet Cong to surrender, he said that this was very necessary. He said he had indications that the strategic hamlets were demoralizing the Viet Cong. He felt that the Government should urge them to surrender and rejoin their families. Special fortified or combat hamlets might be established with these families as volunteers to fight the Viet Cong.

6. Mr. Nhu said he was not satisfied with the concept of the defended hamlet as it had been applied so far in Vietnam. He did not believe that uprooting people was the best answer—it resulted in too many problem and was too expensive. He had discussed a new idea with the strategic hamlet committee during its meeting Friday morning. He wants to induce young families to volunteer to establish defended hamlets; then attract people to these hamlets from the Viet Cong areas. These new hamlets would be similar to the Israeli Kibutzes. Each defended hamlet would have several commando groups similar to those in operation now on the high plateau, which would ensure security outside the fortified hamlet.

7. Mr. Nhu felt that the two major weapons which could be used to win the war were the strategic hamlets and the commandos. He wanted each hamlet or at least every village to have a commando team which would operate as guerrillas, in similar fashion to Viet Cong tactics. He was very impressed with the Montagnard teams he had seen on the high plateau recently. This, he felt, was the answer to carrying the offensive to the Communists. He believed that harassment by the commandos would force the Viet Cong to group for protection, and when this happened the Army could strike with its mobile forces carried by helicopters.

8. He said he had asked some of the men being trained by our Special Forces what they thought of the Americans and got back the reply that they weren’t like the French at all but were their friends, ate their food and worked alongside them. Mr. Nhu felt there should be more Americans like this in the countryside.

9. Finally, he felt that placing the divisional commanders in charge of the strategic hamlet program in their tactical zones would be very helpful. The Army could thus give the additional support to the program to make it succeed.

Comment

From experience gained in other countries, particularly in the Philippines, the most urgent need in defeating a Communist guerrilla movement is a firm political base among the people. With most of the Vietnamese village people neutral in the present struggle, such a base does not yet exist in Vietnam.

The strategic hamlet program, as Mr. Nhu conceives of it, presents an excellent chance to build a political base of popular support at the hamlet level. The danger is that the hamlet elections, which are the key to the success of the program, may not be genuine. The central problem is that many Vietnamese lack experience and confidence in democratic procedures. It is easier for them to tell their people what to do. And they are fearful of making a mistake, particularly of ever electing a Viet Cong.

My superficial observation after inspection trips to Phu Yen and Tay Ninh provinces and considerable talk with local officials is that too many strategic hamlet teams are forcing these elections, even though they told me that all elections were now being held by secret ballot.

Without offending the Vietnamese, we can do much to lend them moral as well as material support in the strategic hamlet effort. My impression is that they are in an experimental frame of mind. Most of them know that they must in the final analysis, win the enthusiastic support of the villagers if the Communists are to be defeated. However, they tend to become preoccupied with the control or repressive aspects of the program. We must help them learn how to generate and keep alive the enthusiasm of their own people, knowing that without strong popular support no amount of men or material will win this war.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, 350.Counterinsurgency Plan. Secret. Copies were sent to the Ambassador; the Deputy Chief of Mission; Chief, MAAG; Chief, MACV; and Chief, OSA.