Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

201. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, May 22, 1962—6 p.m.

3728. Saigonʼs 1471 and 1472 to Department.²

1. Obviously highly desirable find soonest some legal ground from which USG could argue that introduction military personnel and equipment not in violation Geneva Accords. As Embassy Saigon observes, in absence some means of substantively handling this question notification becomes self-conviction; equally, in absence US legal case, Indian attitude toward US cause-and-effect argument tends be that two wrongs do not add up to right. Gundevia has already said once or twice that cause-and-effect argument is admission of US violations.

2. Re fifth paragraph Saigonʼs 1471, from standpoint politico-military considerations GOI would undoubtedly be seriously alarmed by results that could flow from acceptance replacement argument, i.e., explicit sanction for virtually unlimited inflow of US military personnel and equipment. Even a formal US unilateral declaration of GOI that if replacement argument accepted we would use great restraint, as far as further build-up concerned, might well not satisfy Indians as it would not impair our legal right; in addition to which Embassy can appreciate need for maintaining our freedom of action against future contingencies requiring heavier build-up. GOI would undoubtedly consider that its acceptance of replacement argument would radically change balance of political forces in ICC context, with consequent serious results. Embassy Saigon in better position than we to estimate practical dangers involved; GOI officials have in past mentioned risks of expulsion of Commission from DRV or Polish withdrawal. End point of process, as probably viewed by Indians, would be complete breakdown of Geneva Accords and irresistible demand for new international conference.

3. Further immediate factor that would weigh on minds GOI would be that having just found US and GVN in violation of Articles 16 and 17, reversal of this finding as result acceptance replacement argument would lay GOI open to Communist charge of capitulation under US pressure, a subject on which GOI more than usually sensitive at present juncture.

4. Appears therefore that GOI would not accept replacement argument if put to them in its present form. We further assume USG would not wish broach replacement argument to GOI unless some reasonable chance its being accepted.³

5. Foregoing represents Embassyʼs immediate reaction to reference telegram and we will wish give further thought to matter. Meanwhile, would welcome Departmentʼs and Saigonʼs comments on foregoing.

Timmons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5-2262. Secret. Repeated to Saigon, London, Ottawa, and CINCPAC for Polad.
2. Documents 194 and 195.
3. Next to this paragraph the word “Right” was written.