Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

184. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Bagley) to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor)¹

Washington, May 9, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Viet-Nam Task Force Meeting 9 May 1962

1. Task Force meeting today was mainly devoted to a verbal report from Mr. Stoneman, the USOM representative, on his observations in a three week visit in Viet-Nam.

2. He was impressed with the operation of the intermediate level US country team committee chartered to support, on the US side, GVN province pacification operations. This has served to focus US attention to the details of implementing action in South Viet-Nam to an extent not previously attempted. For the first time the country team is evaluating detailed supporting action that in the past has been left to the GVN. As a result, the US is more actively prodding the various ministries in Saigon for information and status of planning.

3. The initial results of this new US procedure has been a clearer realization of GVN disorganization and ineffectiveness. There is no detailed GVN long-range planning for province pacification to include logistic requirements and personnel needs. The requirements deficiency is important because AID has only enough in-country resources to support two more province operations. In order to generate necessary activities in the pipeline to avoid future logistic delays, the US committee in Saigon is now trying to work up their own estimates of material requirements based on what is understood to be the proposed schedule for future operations. From this AID and MAP resources will be tapped.

4. Mr. Stoneman was amazed at the lack of firm planning in Saigon. Though he characterizes the US side as energetic and willing, he stresses the limits of US influence due to the lack of GVN organization and Diemʼs resistance to any suggested streamlining. USOM recently asked Diem for authority to bypass the Saigon ministries and deal directly with the province authorities to support rural operations. Diem said no.

5. Mr. Cottrell got the inference from this presentation. He observed it is now obvious we are reaching a crucial point at which it may be necessary to make a firm approach to Diem to insist on administrative procedures that will get the job done. If action along these lines is not undertaken, it is possible the large US investment will be of no avail.

6. Mr. Stoneman also had a lengthy discussion with the Minister of Civic Action. You will recall this Ministry is also responsible for propaganda. Stoneman says it is obvious the Minister considers the civic action part of his task as of the lowest priority. He has no rational conception of how his personnel are to be used or what type of support they may need in the months ahead. He does not understand the objectives of civic action and is approaching it on a very narrow basis.

7. The importance of continuing GVN ineffectiveness to the war in SVN is now being comprehended on a wider basis in Washington. You may wish to raise this issue at the Special Group (CI) meeting of 17 May.²

W.H.B.³

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-132-69. Secret.
2. No record of the May 17 meeting has been found.
3. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.