Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

183. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, May 5, 1962—4 p.m.

3509. For Harriman.

Parthasarathi came in at my invitation for long and I think important talk about South Vietnam. He confirmed confidentially what we had heard from Canadians about the report, hopes to have it by first of June.² It will condemn Hanoi for subversion, cite us for exceeding ceilings. …

I pressed Parthasarathi at length on his discussions in Hanoi. He stressed what we have heard before, to-wit, that there is a difference between moderates who would like to forestall Chinese intervention and a radical pro-Chinese fraction. He doubts that there is any fear of American attack on North Vietnam but there is a widespread conviction that we aim to entrench ourselves militarily in the South. He states also that the Russians have told Hanoi that we are not very comfortable in our situation in the South, that we do not see how we can win with Diem but equally do not see any alternatives.

Turning to the South, Parthasarathi believes Diemʼs political base is continuing to shrink, that the strategic villages plan, however plausible from a military point of view, is politically disastrous and based on false analogy by Thompson and others to Malayan situation. He does not, however, see any immediate alternative to Diem.

Turning to the prospects for settlement he shares your doubts about a general conference. He does note that it would focus world attention on area which would be a restraining factor. However he strongly hopes that since both moderates in the North and Americans in the South find the situation unsatisfactory, the way will be kept open for negotiation. The right time he thinks is following the initial explosion which will accompany the submission of the report to the co-chairman. When the latter dies down he hopes the Co-chairman will ask for bilateral talks on stabilization, compliance and peace. His suggestions are rather along the line of our recent discussions in Washington, to-wit, if North calls off the dogs for a stated period of months, we proclaim a standstill on military personnel and equipment with further understanding that if after say six months situation is stabilized we begin withdrawal.³ He urges that while reunification is not possible there is a strong and genuine desire both North and South for increased contact. Politically reunification is attractive on both sides.

I will repeat summary of conversation the first of the week to Saigon, London. etc.⁴

Galbraith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/5-562. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. See Document 208.
3. Next to this sentence the word “wrong” is written.
4. A sanitized copy of this telegram was sent as 3571 from New Delhi, May 10, and repeated to Saigon, London, Geneva, Paris, Ottawa, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for Polad. The sanitization involved deleting the last sentence of the second paragraph, all of the third paragraph, the first two sentences of the fourth paragraph, and the sixth sentence of the fourth paragraph. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/5-1062)