Office of the Historian

170. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Bagley) to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor)1

Washington, April 26, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Forrestal View on Defoliants
1.
I talked with Mr. Forrestal on the several factors involved in the question of employing chemicals for crop destruction.
2.
The essential element in his view is a desire for assurances that the potential gain will be worth the possible adverse propaganda and political results. He sees particular sensitivity in US association with action that decreases food supply in a generally food-short continent such as Asia. He is not convinced the intelligence that is available will provide more than a few clear-cut cases in which crop destruction might serve its purpose. He feels these limited gains would not offset the other disadvantages. On the other hand, if the target survey indicated a significant potential gain against the VC he would tend to give the political disadvantages less weight. He distinguishes between Communist propaganda on recent defoliation and that which would follow crop destruction.
3.
On this basis, I sense he would not object to telling Saigon to go ahead with a joint study of possible targets, but will resist any suggestion that the Embassy be authorized to give a go ahead for crop destruction on the basis of such a survey without Washington once again considering the issue.
4.
Since writing the above, I understand the new State/Defense draft calls for a review in Saigon of crop destruction tests previously conducted in SVN;2 if on review, the Amb and Gen Harkins are [Page 346] convinced these tests indicate effectiveness, a combined target survey with SVN is authorized; on completion of the survey, Washington will then consider any recommendations for crop destruction operations and advise Saigon accordingly. This looks like the best action we can get and, in my mind, is sound if undertaken expeditiously.
W.H.B.3
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-132-69. Secret.↩
  2. See Document 174.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩