Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, April 30, 1962—6:27 p.m.

1266. Embtel 1311.²

1. Primary consideration of any crop destruction program is to be sure it will not result in US and GVN absorbing adverse propaganda criticism and adverse local reaction without achieving any commensurate military advantage.

2. This suggests first step should be careful evaluation of whether available chemicals and techniques will in fact produce satisfactory destruction of crop targets. Do not desire approve release of chemicals to GVN until this is determined. Results of the few crop destruction experiments reported to ARPA not conclusive. Therefore as first step COMUSMACV should review all Combat Test and Development Center results their experiments. Also suggest you obtain opinion of expert group headed by General Delmore which is now in Saigon to evaluate defoliation and crop desiccation. Request you report essence their findings. Task Force Saigon should then discuss and review results, reach decision as to employment, and advise Department.

3. If more experimentation is necessary then time should be allowed for this before further steps are taken towards crop destruction program. Appropriate measures should be taken so that unfavorable publicity does not result.

Rusk

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cottrell on April 26, cleared with Rice and Little of the Department of State, Williams of DOD, Riley of JCS, and Johnson of the White House; approved by Harriman. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad.
2. Document 160.