148. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman), White House, Washington, April 6, 1962, 4:55 p.m.1
South Viet-Nam
The President read the letter from Ambassador Galbraith dated April 5, 1962 with the enclosed memorandum.2 Governor Harriman indicated that while he agreed with some of the conclusions in the memorandum, he had difficulty with others. He thought it was important that the overt association of the U.S. with military operations in Viet-Nam be reduced to absolute minimum. He showed the President a telegram to Ambassador Nolting on this subject.3 The President agreed with the position expressed in the telegram.
Governor Harriman also said he supported the idea of using the forthcoming ICC report, if it adopted a strong enough position, as a means of investigating whether a common reduction of involvement by the Viet Minh and the U.S. could be achieved. The Governor said he was not in favor, however, of an attempt to reconvene the Geneva Conference or to seek a neutral solution in Viet-Nam.
The Governor said that while he thought that Diem was a losing horse in the long run, he did not think we should actively work against him, because there was nobody to replace him. Rather our policy should be to support the government and people of Viet-Nam, rather than Diem personally.
The President asked that Ambassador Galbraithʼs memorandum be forwarded to Secretary McNamara for his comments. (I will do.) The President asked what instructions should be given to Galbraith with respect to an Indian approach to Hanoi with a view to exploring the possibility of getting them to withdraw from Viet-Nam in conjunction with us. Governor Harriman replied that we should await the ICC report before deciding our reaction to an Indian approach to Hanoi. If the report is strong, the approach might be worthwhile. The President agreed but said that instructions should nevertheless be sent to Galbraith, and that he would like to see such instructions.4 (Harriman will do early next week; I will make sure the President clears.) The President [Page 310] observed generally that he wished us to be prepared to seize upon any favorable moment to reduce our involvement, recognizing that the moment might yet be some time away.
The President thought it was very important and specifically requested that we prepare now a U.S. position on the anticipated report from the ICC. (I will pass this along to State.)
The President asked why defoliation had not been tested elsewhere than Viet-Nam before being tried. He asked Forrestal to investigate.
[Here follows a section on Laos.]
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 1/62-5/62. Top Secret. Prepared by Forrestal. The meeting was held at the White House. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs log. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Appointment Books)↩
- See Document 141.↩
- Presumably Document 145.↩
- The instructions referred to here have not been found.↩