Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, April 4, 1962—6:07 p.m.

1173. For Ambassador Nolting from Harriman.

1. Department increasingly concerned over constant implications in press generally of U.S. participation and direction, rather than purely support and training of Vietnamese against Viet Cong. Elements of international press and critics of our present policy continue to emphasize “growing U.S. involvement” the “moral responsibilities” and other similar concepts, implying Vietnamese situation is becoming more of a U.S. rather than a Vietnamese war. Even names of operations, such as Sunrise, Farmgate, suggest U.S. rather than GVN planning.

2. Part of this press picture is probably developed by observing support and advisory activities in which American presence is conspicuous, leading to conclusion U.S. is assuming leadership of operations, and noting public statements of partnership or joint relationship implying assumption U.S. responsibility.

3. An article in the New York Times Sunday Review Section April 1 by Homer Bigart reports a large group of American colonels and civilians inspected stockade in Operation Sunrise. Why do large groups of Americans inspect anything? It leads Bigart to report that “Americans were taking on a drastic program that was certain in the initial stages to be bitterly resented by the peasantry whose allegiance must be won.” His references to a U.S. officer helping to plan Sunrise further involves U.S. responsibility. In the eyes of the world these reports lead to this becoming our war rather than their war. This should be prevented.

4. There are two dangers, first, adverse international reaction to assumed U.S. dominance, and secondly, Viet Cong using conspicuous US military role to gain popular support from nationalists and anticolonialists by portraying U.S. as assuming former French role. American teams with battalions must not give local impression that they in command of operations.

5. It cannot be overstressed that the conduct and utterances public and private of all U.S. personnel must reflect the basic policy of this government that we are in full support of Viet-Nam but we do not assume responsibility for Viet-Namʼs war with the Viet-Cong. This responsibility remains with the GVN.

6. You should bring this telegram to the attention of all senior members of Task Force Saigon and request them to take appropriate action to impress this policy clearly upon all members of their respective organizations, and also in other ways get the cooperation of all concerned to devise means of minimizing U.S. presence and reducing public impression U.S. going beyond announced objectives.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/4-462. Secret; Priority. Also sent to CINCPAC for Polad. Drafted by Harriman and Cottrell, and cleared with Johnson.