Office of the Historian

143. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Bagley) to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor)1

Washington, April 4, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Hilsman Memorandum2

This memorandum makes two points of interest:

a.
Continued reluctance in Saigon to propose that Americans participate with, as opposed to coordination with, the GVN in any governmental task.
b.
Mr. Hilsmanʼs misgivings on Operation Sunrise are shared by General Harkins.

While Binh Duong is an exposed area, any area which starts the pacification campaign will suffer from some degree of isolation. My understanding of the concept is that regular troops will remain until [Page 304] the strategic hamlets are constructed and occupied and CG/SDC troops take over defense responsibilities. At that point we want the VC to attack on the premise the positron can hold until reserves can be moved in by hero. This is the classic Malagan concept, you may wish to discuss it with Mr. Thompson on Friday, 6 April.3

A suggested draft note of reply to Mr. Hilsman is attached.4

W.H.B.5
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-132-69.↩
  2. See Document 114.↩
  3. No record of a meeting between Thompson and Taylor on April 6 has been found.↩
  4. Not found.↩
  5. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩