Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

142. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Bowles) to the President¹

Washington, April 4, 1962.

U.S. POLICIES IN THE FAR EAST

Review and Recommendations

[Here follow a three-page introduction, a six-page section entitled “The Shape of East and Southeast Asia in 1962,” a four-page section entitled “The U.S. Position in the Region,” and the first three pages of a section entitled “U.S. Objectives Regarding Non-Communist Asia.”]

3. A third U.S. objective in non-Communist Asia should be the maintenance of an effective but unprovocative military presence capable of deterring an overt attack by Communist forces.²

At present the Seventh Fleet and other U.S. forces provide such a deterrent. Even among the unaligned nations the importance of this military shield is increasingly recognized in private discussions, even though not always in public statements.

However, the failure of the Lao and South Vietnamese governments, with almost unlimited U.S. support, to create viable societies which their people are prepared vigorously to defend has led to a direct U.S. confrontation with Communist forces in Southeast Asia. This in turn has raised far-reaching questions about the political framework in which our military forces can be most effectively employed.

As I have noted in an earlier section, many vigorously anti-Communist Asians believe that Western-sponsored regional defense organizations, such as SEATO, do more damage than good to the cause of regional unity and security. Similar doubts as to SEATOʼs usefulness were expressed by several of our Mission Chiefs at the recent Regional Operations Conference at Baguio.

Although our abrupt abandonment of this organization now might be interpreted as an act of weakness, I believe that on balance it has hindered rather than helped our efforts during the last few years.

Moreover, it could be persuasively argued that a conspicuous American military presence in an area bordering directly on Communist China may, in certain circumstances, serve more as a magnet for Communist pressures than as an effective defense.

When we contrast the ability of such unaligned nations as Cambodia and Burma to destroy indigenous Communist guerrillas and to contain Communist infiltration across their borders with the vulnerability of Vietnam and Laos, which are closely associated with us, it is difficult to escape such a conclusion.

This is not to deny the importance of the U.S. military role in those unaligned nations that are not under direct Communist pressure.

For instance, the Pentagonʼs training of Indonesian officers has created powerful pro-U.S. attitudes within the Indonesian armed forces which may be the key to Indonesiaʼs political future.

Similarly, American military missions can help train and arm indigenous forces, on the model of the new Cambodian army, that combine an effective counter-guerrilla capacity with skill in building bridges, roads, schools, and clinics. This provides a counter-subversion force that can also act as a powerful bridge between the people and their government.

4. A final objective for U.S. policy is the stabilization of the three outstanding politico-military situations which now endanger the region and in which our own military forces have become indirectly or directly involved.

These are the impasse in Laos, the war in South Vietnam, and the precarious balance in the Taiwan Straits.

[Here follows a brief section on the impasse in Laos.]

B. South Vietnam.

Here again the new Administration has taken courageous steps to save a situation that had been rapidly deteriorating.

Yet the outcome remains unclear; the situation in Vietnam may develop in any one of three ways.

1) One possibility would be a clear-cut military victory by the South Vietnamese government, the destruction of the Vietminh guerrillas and a restabilization of the divided country along the lines of the 1954 Geneva Agreement.

Much as we desire this outcome, it appears to me unlikely, given the present Vietnamese leadership. It is difficult to see how our weapons and training can compensate for the politically weak base on which Diem operates; his liabilities will tend to limit the effectiveness of the most carefully planned military tactics.

2) A second eventuality would be the drastic worsening of the existing situation and the threat of total collapse of South Vietnamese armed resistance. What should we do then?

It may be argued persuasively that the Rubicon has already been crossed, that U.S. prestige is now irretrievably committed, that our failure to throw in whatever force may be required-regardless of the Chinese military reaction-will result in the collapse of all the independent nations of Southeast Asia and the total humiliation of the United States.

In rebuttal, it may be said that a French army of 350,000 failed to defeat or contain Vietminh forces that were less well organized than those now operating within gunshot of Saigon; that this failure cost the French 90,000 casualties without active Chinese Communist participation; that under present circumstances the Chinese would quite probably react to a major American military effort near their borders by entering the war as they did in Korea; that if the Vietnam government should collapse under pressure, our embarrassment, although acute, would not be fatal; and that the independent nations of Southeast Asia, finally free of any illusions about the immediacy of the Communist danger, could then be rallied for effective defense.

If the President should determine that deeper U.S. military involvement is not worth the likely consequences, some skillful balancing will be required.

On the one hand, we will need to avoid public statements which may later compound our embarrassment if the situation in fact should turn against us. On the other, we should continue to leave the Vietminh, Communist Chinese, and Soviets with reason to fear a massive U.S. military movement against the heart of the Vietminh operations in Hanoi if such action should prove necessary to save the situation in South Vietnam.

3) A third possibility-and one which our skillful operations of the last few months make most likely-is that there will be neither total victory nor total defeat but rather the development of an uneasy fluid stalemate with the Viet Cong unable to crack the U.S.-supported government forces, yet still able to maintain an effective opposition.

Although we Americans have never found it easy to accept such a situation, the prospect is not wholly discouraging. With the Viet Cong threat held in check, the South Vietnamese government would have another chance to build a solid foundation of popular support while at the same time we could explore the possibilities for a more permanent negotiated political settlement.

[Here follow two more pages in the section “U.S. Objectives Regarding Non-Communist Asia,” an eight-page section entitled “U.S. Objectives Regarding Communist Asia,” and the first five pages of “Recommendations.”]

C. Policy in Regard to Southeast Asia.

Objectives:

The development of viable, neutral, and independent nations on the Southeast Asian mainland, able to defend themselves against internal subversion or border pressures and increasingly willing to work together, thereby forcing the Chinese either to forgo aggression or to attack overtly in a manner which can be met by the U.S. with world-wide support.

Lines of Action:

1. Clearly and publicly define our political objective of a neutral and independent Southeast Asian area as stated above.

2. With an absolute minimum of direct U.S. involvement and fanfare, strive to stabilize the military situation in Vietnam; our minimal aim should be a deadlock which will provide a basis for meaningful negotiation (i.e., a situation in which operations have become so costly to the Vietminh that continued fighting becomes unprofitable).

3. Without further committing U.S. military forces, keep the Vietminh, Communist Chinese and Soviets apprehensive that we may move vigorously against North Vietnam and even China in response to any increased effort on their part south of the 17th parallel.

4. Decide what specific political terms will be acceptable to us and to South Vietnam, as we have already done in Laos, and make known through a third party our willingness to negotiate with the Russians or others on that basis.

5. Continue our efforts in Laos to create a neutral and independent government under Souvanna. At the same time, prepare a contingency plan for the De facto partition of Laos, in the event of a breakdown in the present negotiations.

6. Keep unaligned nations such as India, Indonesia and Burma informed of our genuine desire for a Vietnam and Laos settlement that will assure a neutral and independent Southeast Asia and the ultimate withdrawal of an overt U.S. military presence.

7. On a step-by-step basis, move toward the dissolution of SEATO and the replacement of its guarantor functions by U.S. bilateral guarantees, on an interim basis, and ultimately, by great-power guarantees of Southeast Asiaʼs security from external aggression.

The following steps would be relevant:

a) The termination of SEATOʼs non-military aspects and the transfer of its viable non-military program (e.g., the Graduate School of Engineering in Bangkok) to other sponsorship;

b) The granting of an interim bilateral guarantee to Thailand similar to our present guarantees to the Philippines and Pakistan, and a public reaffirmation of our commitment to defend the protocol states (Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam); at the same time, we should de-emphasize our military presence in Thailand, while vigorously supporting the Thai government in economic and political development and reform in the north and northeast, backed by civic action and counter-subversion units.

c) An intensive, confidential information program within the region in the course of these steps, to explain this process of gradual dissolution and to reassure the relevant states.

d) As the situations in Laos and Vietnam move toward stabilization, probe the Soviets and Chinese on their willingness to join in a guarantee for the region as a whole; in respect to the Chinese, this step relates to the possibility of grain shipments for local currencies under the carefully prescribed conditions to which I have already referred.

e) Throughout this process, continue to make clear U.S. determination to oppose with whatever force may be required any and all overt aggression in Southeast Asia by either the Chinese Communists or the Vietminh.]

[Here follow two additional pages of “Recommendations,” and a nine-page section entitled “Political Implications of these Recommendations.”]

1. Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Bowles. Secret. The memorandum totals 54 pages and includes a table of contents at the beginning. Bowles transmitted the paper to the President under cover of a memorandum of April 4 in which he indicated that it was the second of two papers growing out of his recent trip, that he was limiting the number of copies due to the controversy sure to be generated by the conclusions, and that he would like to discuss the proposals with the President after he had read it. (Ibid., National Security File, Meetings & Memos, Staff Memos, Chester Bowles) He also sent copies to Bundy and Forrestal in the White House and Walt Rostow in the Department of State. The President had sent Bowles on a mission to the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and the Far East, February 8-March 19; while in the Far East, Bowles chaired the Baguio Chiefs of Mission Conference, March 10-11.
2. The first two objectives were: (1) “to help create independent states, free to make their own choices, capable of maintaining their own internal security, and ready to cooperate with us in case of overt aggression;” and (2) “the fostering of increased cooperation among the nations of the region.”