Office of the Historian

140. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rostow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)1

Washington, April 3, 1962.

Congressman Saund of California, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, made an informal suggestion recently that in Viet-Nam more use should be made of nationals of countries nearby and thus reduce the number of U.S. servicemen required. Having been born in the area, the Congressman was especially convincing in presenting this point of view.

Since then we have given considerable attention to the question and I brought it up for discussion in a meeting with the officers of the Joint Staff of the JCS. I believe that it meats current consideration.

The U.S. servicemen or their replacements may be in Viet-Nam for many years; the 5,200 there now evidently will be increased to 8,000 or 10,000 with arrivals reported frequently in the press.

The nationals most likely to be available and acceptable in Viet-Nam are those of the Philippines but others of the area might be usable. Filipino civilian technicians of the Eastern Construction Company are said to be working effectively in Laos.

Psychologically, it would be of obvious benefit to us in the Far East and in our international relations generally, if other nations of the area were cooperating with us militarily in Viet-Nam as a visible demonstration of solidarity against Communist attack. There would also be psychological advantages in the United States.

You are aware of the Presidentʼs desire for us to induce other nations to work with us to the extent feasible in Viet-Nam, as evidenced in point 6 of the May 1961 Program:2

“Cooperate with the GVN in planning the most effective use of assistance offered by other governments to assist Viet-Nam in its actions against the Viet Cong, including the provision of certain expert personnel with long experience, e.g., in Malaya.”

In view of the above considerations, I suggest that the Cottrell Task Force be asked to take a new hard look, and endeavor to come up with positive recommendations for action now or later in line with the idea advanced by Congressman Saund.

  1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 2-B.4 GVN. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Cot—Please consider. I agree with the principle. WAH”↩
  2. Printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Document 42.↩